Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–1752: Telegram

No. 517
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret priority

Tokyo, February 17, 1952.

1707. CX 63794. This is Sebald’s 1707, rptd SecDef Feb 17. No. 27 from Rusk. Accompanied by Johnson and Bond, had most serious talk with Okazaki and Nishimura sub Art XXII.¹ I said US Govt had given most careful sympathetic consideration views Jap Govt, and was able meet such views in important respects and desired to make new suggestions re Art XXII. Such proposals made in great seriousness but in full spirit cooperation and US Govt hopes Jap Govt will give them most careful consideration to determine whether there is not basis for agreement new text.

As Jap Govt knows, right of US Forces to act in own security is elementary right which no govt can cloud with respect its own forces and right which is implicit in existence Security Treaty and presence US Forces Japan. At same time US Govt recognizes necessity full consultation in event hostilities or imminent threat thereof, with Jap Govt regarding measures for defense Jap area and for carrying out purpose Art 1 of Security Treaty.

US Govt attaches greatest importance to efforts now being made by free nations to organize for peace: US now has security arrangements with almost 40 nations, of which Jap one of first importance. We can best avoid war by determined expression solidarity, and solidarity is best registered by definite indications that nations are in fact joining to assure their security. Altho primary purpose Security Treaty is to prevent war rather than provide machinery waging war, indication of practical machinery is step toward peace. US Govt also considers advantage note provisional character arrangements Pacific.² Jap Govt itself had suggested that joint committee “study and prepare concrete program” re Art 1 of Security Treaty; US Govt believes new text provides means accomplishing this which are better than joint committee, fully occupied with other matters.

Our new draft should help allay any doubts that US considers security Jap is matter gravest importance both countries. Our draft Art XXII does not itself commit Jap to any specific action field of rearmament, but does provide agreement may be reached on combined command drawing together US Forces Japan area and such Jap security forces as are capable contributing defense Japan; we believe Japan could not wish to do less in event emergency.

Altho there are number security questions which could not be answered admin agreement, we believe existence such questions should be recognized and provision made for consultations regarding them. Silence would excite speculation and give rise charges secret understandings.

US Govt and people now carrying heavy burden responsibility security peace-loving nations and hopes Japan will find acceptable draft which proclaims our solidarity in matters upon which future peace of Pacific depends and makes clear that US and Japan are equal partners in this vital relationship.

Okazaki said he could not comment without study our text and consultation PriMin, but would try to let us have Jap Govt reactions Monday. As off-hand comment, he stated our language still appears leave US and Japan in unequal position regarding establishment combined command and designation commander. He also stated question combined command raised serious constitutional questions for Jap Govt since it is only in emergency that Jap security forces come under command PriMin, otherwise Jap Govt has no direct control over all elements apparently covered by our text. Okazaki states question of combined command of peculiar difficulty for Japan because the arrangement is bilateral with the US, which has been occupying power.

After consultation Johnson, text furnished Okazaki omitted last sentence text contained Deptel 2193.³ Reasons:

(1) Provisions for revision covered in general art that subject.

(2) Revision would appear to be limited to issue of rearmament, whereas many other factors would also affect such revision.

(3) To imply revision arrangements not yet made strongly suggests secret understanding about imminence such arrangements.

(4) Language about “capability” derogatory to Japs at period of extreme sensitivity.

(5) Believe important not to inject admin agreement into present difficult domestic debate on rearmament.

Sebald

1. Bond’s memorandum of this conversation, held on Feb. 16, has attached to it notes from which Rusk made his presentation. (611.94/2–2352) Rusk subsequently handed a copy of the notes to Okazaki, together with the revised text of Article XXII.
2. According to the notes mentioned in footnote 1 above, Rusk’s full presentation of this point was as follows: “My Government considers the Security Treaty between our two Governments as a provisional measure, pending the development of further collective security arrangements as envisaged in Article IV of the Security Treaty. My Government believes that it would be useful to acknowledge in Article XXII the temporary character of such arrangements pending a broader and more satisfactory disposition by the nations concerned, regarding the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.”
3. See footnote 3, Document 509.