Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–452: Telegram

No. 494
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret
niact

Tokyo, February 4, 1952—6 p.m.

Topad 1623. For Allison and Dulles from Rusk. Re Deptel 2132.¹ From point of view simply of negot admin agreement it wld be preferable that peace treaty not reach Senate floor for another week, although no objection action by Fon Relations Comite. Realize that other considerations such as Formosa may result in overall decision to expedite but possibility of questions by senators about admin agreement has had useful influence in moving us along here.²

Principal points requiring further negot are:

(1) Japanese reluctance to include contractors and natls of third states in definition of civilian component Article I;

(2) Japanese desire to handle third sentence para one of Article II in such way as to leave no impression that occupation merely continues upon effective date peace treaty, although they say they do not object to policy of third sentence;

(3) Japanese desire to register in some way other than face of agreement that para two of Article III is included within rights given in para one same article;

(4) Some Japanese resistance interim jurisdiction arrangements Article XV continues but believe this can be overcome;

(5) Serious concern by Japanese over domestic implications para two Article XXII.

Other points are requiring further discussion, but they are likely to remain technical in character. We are continuing talks on basis present US draft and are not asking for fresh instructions yet.

I feel that we shld try to get clearer basis of agreement, particularly on Articles II and XXII, before peace treaty comes to Senate floor if possible. Under no circumstances, however, shld it be intimated in any way that timing peace treaty consideration is related to progress our negots here since effect on Japanese public attitude admin agreement cld be disastrous. I have not asked Johnson to concur these personal views but have shown this to him.

Sebald

1. In telegram 2132, Feb. 2, the Department requested Rusk’s views regarding the coordination of conclusion of the Administrative Agreement with ratification of the Treaty of Peace. (611.94/2–252)

2. In Bond’s memorandum of a preliminary discussion held between the Japanese and U.S. Delegations on Jan. 28, a section reads:

   “Ambassador Rusk then stated that there was one other point which he wished to make clear to Minister Okazaki, and that was that the U.S. Government does not intend to use ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty as a club over the heads of the Japanese in connection with negotiation of the Administrative Agreement. He stated, however, that the legislative processes of the U.S. Government are such that Senate consideration of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the bilateral Security Treaty with Japan would be facilitated and expedited by early signature of an Administrative Agreement, the substance of which would undoubtedly be of particular interest and relevance to the Senate in its consideration of Article III of the Security Treaty.” (611.94/2–2352)