Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/1–1752

No. 477
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret
No. 1021

Tokyo, January 17, 1952.

Subject:

• Japanese Government Memorandum Regarding Relations Between Japan and the Nansei and Nanpo Islands

There is enclosed for the Department’s information a copy of a memorandum dated December 10, 1951,¹ submitted to the Political Adviser by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Iguchi, giving a summary of the views of the Japanese Government for “sympathetic consideration by the United States Government” in connection with any arrangement made for administration of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands.

The enclosed memorandum makes reference to the keen public interest which attended Diet discussions concerning Article III of the Treaty of Peace and proposes the following measures as conducive to good relations between the United States and Japan and to a mutually satisfactory arrangement for the islands:

[Here follows a summary of the enclosure.]

The enclosed memorandum is further evidence of the strong pressure in Japan for action which will clarify the relation of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands to Japan and clear the way for eventual restoration of the islands to Japan.

There is little doubt that opposition to the separation of the Southern Islands from Japan and to renunciation of rights to the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin has constituted one of the strongest Japanese reactions to the Peace Treaty. This attitude appears to vary from disappointment, which is universally felt, to strong resentment, and already serves as a rallying point for critics of the Treaty and of United States policies towards Japan. Although the Soviet Union is also a target of attack because of its occupation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, Japanese antipathy is perhaps less intense on this score because ties with the Southern Islands were much closer and because repatriation from the northern areas has left the loss of commercial opportunity as the main bone of contention. The United States sponsorship of the Peace Treaty has also made it possible for the finger of recrimination to be pointed at the United States.

Japanese concern over the separation of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands has given rise to powerful political pressure in support of efforts to restore the islands to Japanese control or, as a minimum, to obtain close relations between them and Japan. This position was expressed by Diet members of all persuasions at the recent special session which approved the Peace Treaty. The inhabitants of the islands have also exerted pressure through local political agencies for close cooperation with Japan. Popular advocacy of restoration in the form of mass meetings, newspaper articles, petitions, and letters has been insistent. The inhabitants of Amami Oshima in particular appear to have devoted their entire political energy towards reversion, and probably few high-ranking officials in Japan—Japanese or American—have failed to receive at least one long and plaintive petition from some organization or individual connected with the Council for Reversion of Amami Oshima. Available evidence indicates that sentiment for restoration is no less strong even if not so vocal in the remainder of Nansei Islands. Returnees from the Bonin Islands and Japanese businessmen desiring to resume their activities have inspired a powerful movement for restoration of the Bonin and other Nanpo Islands to Japan. There appears to be little doubt that reunion of the Southern Islands with Japan is strongly desired by the inhabitants of these islands and by the Japanese people generally and that any steps taken in this direction by the United States would be most gratefully received.

Statements by responsible United States leaders have apparently not served to clarify the position of the United States or substantially to allay Japanese concern. The term “residual sovereignty” as used at the San Francisco Conference in describing the relation of Japan to the Nansei and Nanpo Islands has no exact equivalent in Japanese and has become the subject of much querulous quibbling. This term would appear to be ambiguous in English to the extent that it could refer either to legal title which would remain in Japan for the duration of United States administration and would be entirely divorced from effective control, or to an interest which would come into being at the conclusion of United States administration, as a residual right in property. Relying in part on Mr. Kenneth Younger’s statement on September 5 at the San Francisco Conference that the Treaty does not remove the Ryukyus and Bonins from Japanese sovereignty,² the Japanese Government appears to lean to the first theory, but does not accept the view that this right of sovereignty can be a mere paper interest devoid of any effective power. On December 14 Ambassador John Foster Dulles stated in Tokyo his opinion and belief that a future administration of these islands could be worked out in a friendly way which would combine the natural desires of the inhabitants with the requirements of international peace and security. This statement stirred up new hope in Japan, particularly by its omission of any specific reference to a possible United Nations Trusteeship, which the Japanese appear to consider as one more possible but unnecessary barrier to resumption of Japanese control of the islands.

Because of the political importance of this issue in Japan and because an informal assurance has been given that practicable arrangements would be worked out, it would appear desirable that action in the direction of clarifying the position of the United States in this regard be taken in the near future. In particular, it is believed important before the Peace Treaty comes into force to clarify both the effect of residual sovereignty and the nationality status of the inhabitants of the islands, in order that the Japanese Government may take whatever legal steps are required for putting Article III of the Treaty into effect.

The Mission is of the opinion that close relations between Japan and the Nansei and Nanpo Islands along the lines of the enclosed memorandum should be encouraged and facilitated by the United States. Politically, this objective is lent cogency by the intense feeling of the Japanese and the islanders arising out of separation of the islands from Japan and the consequent possibility of friction in United States relations with Japan. Economically, the experience of six years of United States administration would seem to indicate that so long as they are cut off from Japan the Nansei Islands in particular are an expensive and unrewarding proposition and that the economic capabilities of all these islands will offer greater hope if they are developed in conjunction with Japan. From the point of view of the strategic requirements of the situation—the need to obtain secure bases for protection of United States interests in the western Pacific—it is understood to be the opinion of CINCFE, as transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a recent staff study, that this protection can be adequately obtained by arrangements similar to those embodied in the Security Treaty with Japan without involvement in any form of exclusive control by the United States.

The degree to which close relations between Japan and the Nansei and Nanpo Islands should be fostered and the timing of any moves in this direction would appear to be matters for determination at an appropriate time in the future. The Mission believes, however, that as a matter of policy the United States should impose only minimum restraints on political, economic, and cultural relations between Japan and these islands, and that the ultimate goal should be restoration of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands to Japan. (The ultimate disposition of Marcus Island and Parece Vela should perhaps be subject to additional consideration.) As a beginning, it is believed that the legal status of the islands should be clarified, if feasible by formal recognition of the sovereignty of Japan and the Japanese nationality of the inhabitants; the desirability of establishing Japanese Government representation in the Nansei and Nanpo Islands should also be considered with a view to assisting in the disposition of problems connected with Article III of the Treaty of Peace and other matters having to do with relations between Japan and these islands.

For the Political Adviser:

Niles W. Bond

Counselor of Mission

1. Not printed.
2. In the course of his remarks before the Conference Younger, Minister of State in the British Foreign Office, stated: “As regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the treaty does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 north latitude; that is to say that those islands nearest to Japan itself are to remain not only under Japanese sovereignty, but under Japanese administration as well.” For full text of Younger’s statement, see Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 88–97.