Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/1–251

No. 463
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to Dean Rusk of the Office of the Secretary of State

secret
official business-informal

Tokyo, January 2, 1952.

Dear Dean: We have been giving some thought to the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement and I am writing this letter to acquaint you with our views about certain political and procedural aspects which we consider important.

We have been told informally by Mr. Nishimura, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Katsuo Okazaki, who until recently served as Chief Cabinet Secretary and is now in the Cabinet without portfolio but informally designated as Foreign Minister, will act as principal negotiator of the Agreement for Japan, assisted by Vice Minister Iguchi, Nishimura,¹ and Yujiro Izeki, head of the International Cooperation Bureau. Izeki is a career Foreign Office man who spent over a year with the National Police Reserve, and his Bureau is expected to be responsible for maintaining liaison with the United States security forces in the future. Officials from other Ministries, particularly Finance, will of course figure prominently, at least in an advisory capacity. In this regard, there is much talk in the press about formation of a new Defense Ministry but this development is not expected to come until after the effective date of the Peace Treaty.

Foreign Office sources state that on matters of substance the Japanese feel they have done just about all they can in advance of the talks by submitting to you their comments on jurisdiction² and the lists of facilities in use by our forces, and on most issues, including relevant items of the budget, they appear to be biding their time. The Japanese do not appear to contemplate a full-dress conference but they will be ready if the negotiators decide on some form of conference procedure.

We feel the important point in this connection is that the Yoshida Government will be under very powerful political pressure in negotiating the Administrative Agreement. Yoshida has lost considerable political strength in the last few months largely because of failures in domestic policies. Dodge’s criticisms of the Government, especially over rice decontrol, together with emasculation of the administrative reorganization program and a general public impression that the present Cabinet has no fixed policies and no reliable leadership, have combined to reduce Yoshida’s popularity from its high point at the time of the San Francisco Conference to the stage where dissolution of the Diet in the next few months, though perhaps not probable, is at least a possibility, even though the normal four-year term for members of the House of Representatives will not expire until January 1953. Yoshida’s main source of strength has been his success in getting a peace treaty, as well as the popular belief that his diplomatic experience would enable him to deal effectively with the United States and the Allied Powers in matters relating to the peace settlement. Should the Japanese Diet and public feel that the Administrative Agreement does not represent a good bargain for Japan, Yoshida and the Liberal Party as now constituted might well lose much of their remaining support, as a consequence of which the present rather delicate political balance might be expected to collapse. Regardless of what we may think of the Yoshida Cabinet and its policies, it is necessary to recognize that in the present political circumstances there appears to be no desirable alternative. The opposition parties are disorganized and politically ineffective if not incompetent, and if the Yoshida Government is compelled to give way we may have to deal with a weak coalition cabinet which may contain elements hostile to the proposed security arrangements. In order to satisfy the public that Japan is getting the best possible deal, the Japanese negotiators will probably go over every proposal with the utmost care, and delay in reaching agreement will almost inevitably result.

Our experience at the recently concluded Fisheries Conference³ was that agreement took twice as long to reach as had been anticipated by our side, and although I think the original estimate of three weeks was unduly optimistic, we were painfully reminded that it is easy to over-estimate Japanese willingness to oblige. The Fisheries Conference fairly readily achieved agreement on basic principles but to obtain full agreement on all matters of principle and on wording required far more time. We gained considerable respect for the bargaining skill of the Japanese, who never missed a point and had infinite patience in exploring issues and in rephrasing ideas until something acceptable came out. They were also well prepared on the facts involved and at times succeeded in making some of our arguments look rather weak.

We feel some concern that if the negotiations on the Administrative Agreement are difficult and protracted, the timetable for Treaty ratification may be affected. I believe Mr. Dulles and Senators Sparkman and Smith left Japan assured that we were on the right course and that the Peace and Security Treaties⁴ could be presented to the Senate for expeditious action, but on the basis of the admittedly inadequate evidence available out here, it would seem quite possible that the Pentagon might desire a postponement of ratification until the Administrative Agreement is successfully concluded, in which event delay in negotiating the Administrative Agreement could conceivably have an adverse effect on the attitude of the Senate. Likewise an unfavorable impression might be created if the Senate should consent to approval of the Treaties but formal ratification by the United States were delayed unduly pending conclusion of the Administrative Agreement. You are of course in a much better position to judge this matter, but we do want to emphasize that negotiation of the Administrative Agreement may well take considerable time and require great patience on the part of all concerned.

A final aspect of the negotiations that could be a real headache is the white heat of publicity which will undoubtedly focus on everything connected with the talks. We found at the Fisheries Conference, which was held at the Foreign Office, that the Japanese press was able to obtain within a day all Conference documents, even those classified “confidential” for working purposes, and also to get accurate summaries of discussions at the Conference. To read about delicate negotiations in the press produced some irritation on our side and showed clearly that at the present time enforcement of security measures on the Japanese side is apt to be very ineffectual. We anticipate that the press will devote major efforts to developing information about the Administrative Agreement, and political and public pressure to get information on the progress of the discussions will be very powerful. Floods of petitions about property and rearmament and demonstrations of opposition to the Agreement, which many of the Japanese seem to consider synonymous with remilitarization, are also not at all unlikely.

In this connection we have noted what amounts virtually to a campaign on the part of certain American correspondents and businessmen in Tokyo to encourage the Japanese to take a firm position in negotiating the Agreement, particularly in opposition to retention by the United States of facilities and troops in Tokyo. There is nothing underhanded or unpatriotic about these efforts but I think it is a factor you may wish to consider in your relations with the press here.

Although I have not discussed the matter with General Ridgway, I feel it may be desirable that the major part of the discussions be held in PolAd’s new office building, the Mitsubishi Shoji, where we will have a large conference room and office space for you and your staff. In this way I think we can obtain greater security of information and also at least partially avoid giving the Japanese the impression that the talks are being held under the aegis of the Army.

I do not propose to go into matters of substance in this letter, but I would like to observe that emphasis on joint committees, the approach we discussed with General Ridgway on November 27,⁵ as a means of working out the details of the Agreement as well as implementing the Agreement after its conclusion, seems politically very desirable and will give the Japanese the feeling of equality which critics of the Security Treaty claim has been lacking in negotiations to date. The Japanese may want to draft the Administrative Agreement in such a way that the provisions relating to the Joint Committee will be placed in a prominent position, just as they proposed revision of the United States Draft Fisheries Convention to place clauses on the proposed International Commission before those relating to abstention. I would also like to observe that the Japanese seem to place great stock in the precedents established by the NATO Agreements, and my feeling is that if they can obtain a statement of principles along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty⁶ and an agreement on jurisdiction closely following the NATO formula⁷ (these being the two aspects on which comparison can perhaps be most directly made), they will be more amenable to our proposals on other points and public acceptance of the rest of the Agreement will be facilitated.

I hope the above views and comments may be of some help to you. We are looking forward to your arrival later this month.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

P.S. You might be interested in the enclosed clipping.⁸

1. Kumao Nishimura, Chief of the Treaty Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. For summaries of some of the Japanese submissions, see the attachments to a memorandum dated Dec. 10, 1951, from Jules Bassin, Legal Attaché to the Mission in Japan, to Sebald, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1422.
3. The Tripartite Fisheries Conference of Canada, Japan, and the United States took place in Tokyo Nov. 5–Dec. 14, 1951. For additional information, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1390.
4. For the Peace Treaty, signed at San Francisco Sept. 8, 1951, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 3 (pt. 3), p. 3169. The text of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, also signed at San Francisco on Sept. 8, is printed ibid., p. 3329. Japan had ratified both treaties on Nov. 19, 1951.
5. Rusk was in Japan Nov. 21–27, 1951, for preliminary conversations regarding the Administrative Agreement. No memorandum of his conversation(s?) held on the latter date with General Ridgway has been found in Department of State files. For some indication of the content of the Rusk–Ridgway talks, see the memorandum by Charles A. Fraleigh of a conversation held Dec. 11, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1428.
6. For text of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on Apr. 4, 1949, see ibid., 1949, vol. iv, p. 281.
7. For text of the Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951, see 4 UST (pt. 2) 1792. For documentation concerning the status of this proposal prior to its entry into force for the United States on Aug. 23, 1953, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
8. The postscript is handwritten. This clipping, not printed, part of page 1 of the English-language Nippon Times for Dec. 29, 1951, included a UP story reporting that it had been learned that following ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan would outrank the commander of U.S. forces in Japan.