State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
No. 95
Memorandum of the Substance of
Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff
Meeting, Held at the Pentagon, April 10, 1953, 11 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of 15 persons present, including Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler. The Department of State Delegation was headed by Matthews; Gleason represented the NSC Staff.
[Page 185][The meeting opened with discussion pertaining to the United Kingdom.]
F–84’s for Formosa
General Vandenberg: We would like to discuss the question of sending the F–84’s to Formosa. We have a new message from Radford.
Mr. Matthews: I don’t think we have seen that message yet.
Admiral Fechteler: Radford’s message is in answer to a despatch I sent him.2 After the question was discussed at an NSC Meeting, I sent out a message saying that concern had been expressed that the Chinese Nationalists might use the F–84’s against the mainland and that we might be involved in any retaliation which the Communists might make against such use. That, therefore, it would be advisable to slow down delivery of F–84’s to the Chinese Nationalists until such time as the commitment was secured from them not to undertake offensive action without prior U.S. concurrence. Radford has replied that it is difficult for him to understand the concern of State and Defense over Chinese Nationalist possible offensive moves. He says that the Chinese Nationalists have no planes now and that at the presently planned rate of delivery there will be no operational squadron for three months. He says that he has an informal understanding with the Chinese Nationalist military commanders that there will be no change in the pace or scope of present Chinese Nationalist offensive operations without prior discussion with him through MAAG. Radford urges that there be no slowdown now in delivery of planes for Formosa.
General Vandenberg: In general we think that Radford should be allowed to go ahead with delivery of the planes. It would be good for Chinese Nationalist morale and the possibilities of offensive operations are so slight that we don’t think it will be dangerous to go ahead with the present plans. The present program calls for a total of 77 F–84’s to be delivered to Formosa. Of those, 10 are now in Japan and ready to go. 34 are here in the United States and are ready for transportation. We had originally planned to send them out on a carrier but the carrier that was going to undertake their transportation is presently in drydock and we have no immediate means of delivery of those planes. We do have plans for all 77 of the F–84’s to be delivered to Formosa by September. At present the Chinese Nationalists have 10 pilots who are competent to fly the F–84’s. It is planned that these pilots would be used as instructors [Page 186] to train other pilots and that by September there would be approximately 30 pilots trained in flying these jets.
General Collins: If three months from now—which is about the earliest that the Chinese Nationalists would be ready to make any offensive out of the F–84’s—the armistice negotiations were still dragging on or had broken off, we might well be in a position of wanting the Chinese Nationalists to have an offensive air capability.
Mr. Nitze: The problem really isn’t so much one of slowing down the delivery of aircraft as it is one of how soon we can get formal agreement from the Nationalist Government not to undertake offensive actions without our prior concurrence.
Admiral Fechteler: Radford is now planning two trips there [?] and it is my impression that he was planning to go to Formosa on the second trip. I can tell him that he should go there first in order to get the formal agreement.
General Vandenberg: So far I have done nothing about stopping the planes that are in Japan from being flown to Formosa.
Mr. Matthews: When are they due to go under present plans?
General Vandenberg: The present schedule calls for them to be flown down about the twenty-first of April.
Mr. Johnson:3 The President and our Secretary were categorical that the F–84’s shouldn’t be delivered until a commitment had been secured.
Mr. Nitze: I think you should send out instructions that the planes are to be held in Japan until notification is received that a firm commitment has been secured.
General Vandenberg: In that case I would tell the Far Eastern Air Force to get the planes ready for shipment but not to move them until they have word from me that we have heard from you that a firm commitment has been secured.
[Here follows discussion pertaining to the Korean war.]