Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128

No. 63
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to John Foster Dulles¹

secret

[Washington,] December 24, 1952.

Korea

I have read with considerable interest Tom Hamilton’s story in this morning’s New York Times concerning the planning by the new Administration leaders for Korea. I do not wish to try to get into this act prematurely but I suggest that it would be helpful to us to know as soon as possible as much as you feel you can tell us about the general thinking of the new Administration on this problem. This is not mere idle curiosity but is based upon the belief that if those of us who are now working on Korean problems have some intimation of the general direction of your thinking and that of General Eisenhower it will help prevent us from doing anything that might prejudice the future. In this connection I note in Marquis Childs’ column² this morning that the question of two Chinese Nationalist divisions for Korea is still alive. I know that this is one of the pet ideas of Bill Foster and has been for some time, but I must say I am still against it. My opposition is based on the following factors:

1. It will cost the United States considerable to equip and transport these forces to Korea as well as maintain them after their arrival.

2. The same amount of money spent on developing two divisions of South Koreans would probably pay more dividends.

3. We don’t know for sure they can fight and we do know the South Koreans can.

4. As indicated in the message from Taipei³ giving an account of Rankin’s and General Chase’s talk with the Generalissimo after Chase’s return from Korea (which I suggested be sent to you on the Helena⁴), it is obvious that Chiang Kai-shek is reluctant to have two divisions go to Korea and would probably only consent on the basis of a quid pro quo which would entail building up the air strength on Formosa far beyond anything our Air Force has been able to do in the past and probably beyond what it can do in the near future.

5. The introduction of Chinese Nationalist troops into Korea would immediately throw Korea into the Chinese civil war and would make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for us to maintain the position that we have so far maintained that in any political talks on Korea after an armistice there would be no discussion of any matters outside of Korea.

6. The political difficulties we would have with our allies as a result of bringing Chinese Nationalists to Korea and the strong possibility that certain of them would attempt to withdraw their own troops already there as a result of the introduction of the Chinese. At the very least there should be considerable diplomatic spadework done before any abrupt announcement of such a decision.

7. The reluctance, according to reports reaching the Department from Korea, of President Rhee to see Chinese Nationalist troops introduced into Korea.

When we consider that two Chinese Nationalist divisions are, according to our own JCS, the equivalent of only one U.S. division, I am strongly of the opinion that the possible advantages to be gained by the introduction of Chinese Nationalist divisions to Korea is far outweighed by the adverse factors listed above.

Other possible use of Chinese forces

In connection with any consideration of possible greater use of Chinese Nationalist forces, I am attaching a telegram which came in from London⁵ giving the text of a London Times story which was headed “General Eisenhower’s Policy for Far East; Forcing Chinese to Negotiate”. The first part of the story is obviously based on the column published by Stewart Alsop last week⁶ on a new plan for Indo-China. However I particularly call your attention to the two paragraphs on page 4 which I have marked. While I have doubts that the policy as outlined there is a completely accurate reflection of Republican Administration policy, nevertheless it is interesting to note that the London Times does envision the possible use of Nationalist troops in a series of raids on the China coast. The reasons they give for approving such use may be wrong, but the mere fact that a paper such as the Times will publish such a story is, I believe, interesting. As you know, there is a considerable program already being carried on with American help which does use Nationalist forces in a manner which keeps the Communists on the mainland guessing and according to some estimates immobilizes perhaps as many as 200,000 Chinese Communist forces. Details of this operation were recently given us and when you desire will be passed on to you.

[Here follows discussion of Indochina and other matters.]

1. Allison sent the memorandum to Secretary-designate Dulles with a brief covering note of the same date.
2. In the Washington Post.
3. Telegram 596, supra.
4. Dulles and other future Cabinet members had joined Eisenhower on the cruiser Helena for several days of discussion during Eisenhower’s return from Korea.
5. Not attached to the source text.
6. The column, by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, appeared in the Washington Post on Dec. 19.