Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

795.00/8–1952

No. 47
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Department of Defense Meeting, Held at the Pentagon, August 19, 1952, 11 a.m.

top secret

Washington, August 19, 1952, 11 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 15 persons present. The Defense Department delegation included Secretary Lovett, Deputy Secretary Foster, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces) Fred Korth, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Navy Kimball, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lieutenant General Laurence S. Kuter, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Donald B. Duncan. The State Department delegation included Under Secretary Bruce, Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, Allison, and Bohlen.]

Mr. Lovett: We have been working to see what means we could find to relieve the demands on U.S. troops in Korea. We would also like to profit from the $400 million poured into Formosa. There is a proposal by the Armed Forces Policy Committee¹ that we have under consideration which calls for the equipment of two Chinese Nationalist divisions to be used in one of several areas. This proposal was put up to the President for the purpose of working out the procedures of talking about it with the State Department and then with the South Koreans to see if they would welcome such divisions. We have not finished costing the equipment of these two divisions but we do know that we could equip two Formosan divisions more quickly than any others. We don’t know how they would fight but we do know how the South Koreans fight. We also know that there would have to be additional equipment over and above the Formosan program to get these divisions combat-ready.

If we had two combat-ready Chinese Nationalist divisions they could be used in Korea, against the offshore islands, for temporary lodgment on the mainland or in Indochina.

One of the things we still need to have is expert judgment on the attitude of our U.N. partners, if we had these troops ready to be used. What would their attitude be if we (1) moved these forces to Korea, or (2) wanted to put them ashore on the mainland? On the second point the U.S. would have to assume some responsibility for logistic support.

If you could answer these questions this morning we could go into the costing of this problem and tighten this thing up and then talk to you again. Our main object is to substitute more indigenous troops for U.S. troops.

Mr. Bruce: I should like to take up the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea first. At a previous meeting² I believe this subject was fairly well covered in discussion. The discussion addressed itself to the difference between two Chinese and two South Korean divisions, or perhaps more South Koreans.

We feel our allies would oppose the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea, and the Asians generally would be strongly opposed to their use.

There are some other points, but I don’t want to engage in speculation.

Mr. Lovett: You might as well, we do it all the time.

Mr. Bruce: Well, there is the question of whether the Chinese troops would be effective in Korea. I think it is doubtful that they would attract many defectors. You might find the situation reversed and you would be worse off.

Leaving aside any question of priorities, the Department would be opposed to having Chiang or anyone else know that you intend to use the two Chinese divisions in Korea. The effect would be adverse on our allies and in Asia.

If you decided to proceed to fully equip these forces, is it necessary to decide now how they will be used?

Mr. Lovett: The procedures are lengthy in readying and transporting a division of this sort. If we put other countries on notice you would have to do it forthrightly. With Chiang you would have to have specific authority to use these troops in a particular place. Specifically, we could equip the two divisions and get them ready without saying they are for use in Korea, but the JCS paper and the Armed Forces Policy Committee paper³ both say we should get the consent of our allies and Chiang before we go forward. That’s about the story, Dave.

Mr. Bruce: We would anticipate no difficulty in getting Chiang’s consent to use them in Korea or elsewhere. We would have difficulty with our allies. We have a very strong view that it would be injudicious to approach Chiang.

Mr. Lovett: I think it is also our view that Chiang would cause no problem and that those of us familiar with the situation also believe it would be hard to get the allies to agree to use Nationalist forces in Korea, but perhaps not so hard to get their consent for their use elsewhere. As to the danger in Asia, if we use them, I have not heard that point raised. That is a new element as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Matthews: With the Indians, it would be particularly bad. I also think any chance of an armistice would be blown sky high. The chances are not great now and if you tell Chiang he would certainly leak it very quickly.

Mr. Kimball: We are not doing very well with an armistice now. Maybe a change would help.

Mr. Lovett: Do you mean holding on to the anchor and throwing over the rope?

Let’s settle on fundamentals. We have people fighting there who shouldn’t be there if others, whom we could equip and who want to fight, could replace them. We would like to see more Asians fighting Asians. Within a few months, with no further steel strike and no further assists of that sort, we will be getting more equipment.

Mr. Bruce: We are in complete agreement in having more Asians fighting in that territory, but in Korea we think it would be better to have South Koreans, since then you would have a force on the ground capable of taking care of their own country. They would not have to withdraw if the fighting ended; the Chinese, I presume, would. We would like a strong force in Korea after the fighting stops, so there are advantages in having South Koreans. There are other things, such as the training of South Koreans, that is already going on, and the language problem, which would make it more feasible to equip more South Koreans.

Mr. Lovett: As to the use of the Chinese in other places, let’s say against the mainland, what would the view of the Government and our allies be?

Mr. Bruce: If you equip them for that, I would hope you wouldn’t let this be known, or let it become an issue with the allies.

Speaking personally, I would like two more Chinese divisions, but we are specifically against their use in Korea. As against the mainland, it would require far more consideration, at least in the State Department. But if you had two ready divisions, that would be another question. Do you have to decide what you are going to do with them now?

Mr. Lovett: I am not sure. I rather think we should have something definite in mind before we kick off into the wild blue. We don’t have enough equipment to leave it on a standby basis with no use in mind. If we only equip the Chinese divisions up to the MAAG level, which is less than a full combat level, we would be better off facing up to the fact that we cannot get much out of these divisions and take our additional equipment and give it to additional South Korean troops.

Mr. Bruce: You are faced with the problem of what to do with these Formosan forces, which have been called a “wasting asset”. I believe General Chase reported that the average age of these troops was less than our own that he commanded in the last war. That there is waste however, if you have no objective in mind for these forces is no doubt true. But speaking for the State Department, we are opposed to sending the Chinese Nationalists to Korea. Second, we would want to know more of what is involved in action against the mainland before reaching a decision. Third, if you want to bring two divisions up to strength for use against Communist-held territory, or possibly Indochina, we would favor that. There would be a complication on their use in Indochina. However, an agreement to use these troops against the Chinese mainland is something we cannot decide at this time.

Mr. Lovett: Then to summarize:

The Department of State is now opposed to the idea of using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea on rotation or in other programs.

The Department would welcome, if that is not too strong, the combat readiness of two additional Chinese divisions if that can be achieved without associating it with a statement of intent or decision to use them in any particular way.

Any undertaking with Chiang as to the ultimate use of these forces would be dangerous.

Mr. Bruce: I would question the word “welcome”, but we would certainly agree.

Mr. Foster: Why don’t you welcome that?

Mr. Bruce: There have been long conversations on this. I can’t pass on the merits of arming two divisions completely or going ahead with twenty-one Chinese divisions under present programs.

Mr. Lovett: I’ll settle for “agree” but I think Bill is right that there is a question whether we should go ahead and arm these divisions without knowing where to use them. Of course, everyone is aware of the importance of Formosa.

Mr. Matthews: There is certainly no doubt about the importance of Formosa, and I gather these two divisions are not necessary for its defense.

Mr. Lovett: They could be spared.

Mr. Allison: There is one other point. Unless there is an outbreak of Chinese aggression outside of Korea or a renewal of hostilities in Korea we would have a very difficult time. But if there is new aggression outside of Korea or a new offensive there, we would have a very different situation with our allies.

Mr. Foster: You would wait until after the event?

Mr. Allison: I agree, Bill, that this is a difficulty.

Mr. Lovett: You would favor getting them ready?

Mr. Allison: Yes, so you could use them.

Mr. Foster: We have fumbled this along and I favor getting them ready. I think you can train them best in the field, so I have felt that rotation in Korea would be a good thing. We are getting a dilute force now that isn’t much use. I would like a cutting tool.

Mr. Kimball: Would it be advantageous to inquire how the British and French would feel?

Mr. Allison: It is a safe speculation that they would oppose the thing now.

Mr. Matthews: There isn’t much speculation there.

Mr. Lovett: I think that is practically a safe bet.

Mr. Bruce: May I ask Bill one thing. Our position is limited to opposition to the use of Chinese troops in Korea because we think there are over-riding considerations which make it not in the national interest. I admit that is argumentative, but as to what you do on Formosa we think we should build them up. The only hedge I make on welcoming this is that we cannot be enthusiastic about saying at this time that one of the reasons would be the employment of these forces on the mainland. It might well be that they would be a godsend, but we can’t say that now.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Matthews: I don’t believe this problem has been up before us recently.

Mr. Bruce: We have never objected to hit-and-run raids.

Mr. Lovett: No, this would be an actual lodgment on the shore, where they would try to seize and hold territory.

I think unless others have something to contribute, we have explored some of this in an illuminating way and we can come back to it again later.

Mr. Bohlen: There is one thing I should like to add. I had not understood that this was a problem in which the military considerations were all on one side and the political on the other. I thought the military considerations involved in this problem were balanced. I don’t think we should look at it as being a case where all the military factors are favorable and only the political are against.

Mr. Lovett: I agree it would not be fair to say that all of the military considerations are favorable.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to put in a plug for enthusiastically building up the South Koreans to hold their homeland and eventually permit a reduction of American forces.

Mr. Lovett: That’s the fundamental interest we have.

One question which interested us was the psychological effects of having Chinese Nationalist troops fighting Chinese Communist troops.

Mr. Bruce: Is it very important, if you decide to bring the divisions to combat readiness, to have a plan of campaign fixed at this time?

Mr. Lovett: I would say no as to the plan of campaign, but you shouldn’t divert equipment if it is only for the defense of Formosa per se. It would take a rugged enemy to get on the Island with the Seventh Fleet there.

Mr. Bruce: I would like to ask the following question: Have you determined here that there would be effective Nationalist troops capable of getting a lodgment on the mainland and maintaining themselves there without American ground forces?

Mr. Lovett: Yes, I think they would not require ground forces.

General Collins: I don’t think the Chiefs have ever passed judgment on whether the Chinese could stay on the mainland with logistic support alone. They would certainly require air support.

Admiral Duncan: They would require active Navy and Air support.

General Collins: I am not prepared to say that solely with the Naval and Air support that could be made available they could stay ashore. My personal judgment is that it would be highly doubtful. It would depend on the amount of opposing air, so it is a debatable problem.

If it is at all contemplated that these troops should be used in Korea, the earlier the decision is made the better. The kind of equipment the Chinese need for the defense of Formosa and light raids, is not the kind they would need in Korea. For example, if these two divisions were to be used in Korea, or large-scale operations elsewhere, it would be better to give them 105s instead of their present 75s which are outmoded. The equipment and training would both be different. I would say if we have in mind their potential use in Korea we should spend some of the $165 millions to bring them up to a better T/O and E. This could be done, I think, without disclosing the use we wanted to make of them. As to winter equipment, this could be stockpiled. If you gave it to them Chiang would know where they were going and it would leak.

Mr. Bruce: Wouldn’t the same desiderata apply if you used these forces against the mainland?

General Collins: Not necessarily. You wouldn’t need winter equipment, for instance. It would be hard to fight on the mainland without tanks against forces who had tanks.

Mr. Kimball: Wouldn’t the Communists have as much trouble bringing tanks against them in China?

General Collins: My, no. They could bring them by rail.

Mr. Lovett: They could bring them by ship and off-load them.

Mr. Bruce: I think I ought to make it clear that except for the use of these troops in Korea at this time, which I think inadvisable, we have no idea that it is wise to spend great amounts of money to train these troops just to hold Formosa.

Mr. Kimball: Smith (?)⁴ and Radford think the Formosa troops could hold one and one-half million to two million troops on the mainland.

Mr. Bruce: These two divisions cannot do that.

Mr. Kimball: No.

Mr. Lovett: Thank you very much. We will go on with the consideration of this problem and get together further material here.⁵

1. Probably the Armed Forces Policy Council, which consisted of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Reference is to a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on Aug. 13, a record of which is in State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417.
3. Neither printed.
4. Question mark in the source text; the reference is probably to Walter Bedell Smith.
5. The subject was briefly discussed at a White House meeting on Sept. 24; see the memorandum by James S. Lay, Jr., Sept. 24, 1952, in vol. xv, Part 1, p. 532.