Office of the Historian

793.00/12–754

No. 432
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)1

top secret
eyes only
limited distribution
[Washington,] December 7, 1954.

Subject:

  • Timing of Operation “Oracle”

Participants:

  • Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
  • George Laking, New Zealand Charge
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur—Counselor
  • Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, IO
  • Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Amb. Makins said Mr. Eden agreed that the issue as to whether operation “Oracle” should be undertaken was delicately poised. The Foreign Secretary was interested in Mr. Dulles’ suggestion that it might be well to start operation “Oracle” without pressing it to an early conclusion. He still preferred to wait until he saw Mr. Dulles in Paris before definitely making up his mind, but the Secretary’s thinking had modified his own attitude.

Amb. Makins suggested that preparatory work on operation “Oracle” might start at once, without any commitment by anyone. [Page 1002] This would take at least three or four days. Among the questions to be decided were:

1.
Publicity for the exchange of notes with the Chinese Nationalist Government.
2.
What sort of notification the British Government would send to Peiping and Moscow, and when.
3.
Stage management of notification of other interested governments.

He thought we might form a group to work on this and endeavor to have a plan ready by Dec. 13 or 14. Then a definite decision could be taken after the Secretary and Mr. Eden met in Paris.

The Secretary said this was satisfactory. He asked Mr. Laking if this would be acceptable to the New Zealand Government.

Mr. Laking said that he had only had an opportunity to consult Amb. Munro in a preliminary way but he thought it would be safe to assume that the New Zealand Government would be entirely agreeable to this suggestion. He would endeavor to confirm this immediately.

Amb. Makins asked whether the preparatory work should be done in Washington or in New York?

The Secretary said he thought that Washington would be better.

Mr. Laking said that Amb. Munro was open minded and would be guided by the Secretary’s wishes.

Amb. Makins suggested the Secretary might authorize a group to start work.

The Secretary mentioned the problem of publicity for the exchange of notes with the Chinese Government. There was a question whether the handling should be separate and distinct from operation “Oracle”, or identified with it. He thought it might be preferable to handle the exchange of notes as a separate operation.

Amb. Makins agreed but thought there was a question of timing. HMG would not be willing to support operation “Oracle” unless publicity for the exchange of notes preceded “Oracle”.

The Secretary asked Mr. Robertson if we were free to accord publicity to the exchange of notes?

Mr. Robertson said there were certain obligations to the Chinese. We were bound to consult with and inform them. We had told them that we would not reveal the exchange of notes without a definite reason for doing so. We had reserved the right to accord publicity to the notes and mentioned specifically that we would probably have to do this in connection with the Senate hearings on the treaty. We had the right to publicize the notes if we considered such action necessary but we needed to consider how we would present the matter to the Chinese.

[Page 1003]

Amb. Makins reiterated that publicity for the exchange of notes was a necessary prelude to proceeding with “Oracle”.

The Secretary said he understood. He remarked that there was a surprisingly small amount of concern by the U.S. press and public over the question of Chinese Nationalist freedom to carry on offensive operations.

  1. A handwritten note by O’Connor attached to the source text indicates that it was approved by the Secretary.↩