Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 364
Memorandum of Discussion at the 220th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 28, 1954¹

top secret

Washington, October 28, 1954

[Extract]

Present at the 220th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; General White for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

4 The Far East (NSC 5429/2; NSC 146/2;NSC 166/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government”, dated September 28 and October 5, 1954;² NSC Actions Nos. 1224, 1233-c, 1234, and 1235³)

Mr. Cutler explained the motives which had prompted him to prepare a summary statement presenting as objectively as possible certain findings of General Van Fleet’s report⁴ which had particular bearing on national security policy with respect to the Far East. He then proceeded to read this statement to the members of the Council (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁵

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s statement, the President inquired whether General Van Fleet’s conclusions, as summarized by Mr. Cutler, were his own individual views or those of the mission as a whole. He also inquired as to who beside General Van Fleet had composed the mission. In reply, Mr. Cutler read to the President the names of the most prominent members of the Van Fleet mission, and expressed the opinion that the views which he had just summarized in his statement were those of General Van Fleet himself.

Secretary Wilson partially confirmed Mr. Cutler’s opinion by pointing out that Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil had expressed himself as out of sympathy with much of the content of General Van Fleet’s report. Secretary Wilson added that he had asked Secretary McNeil to join the Van Fleet mission largely in order to handle the aspects of technical and financial assistance.

Mr. Cutler then commented briefly on the force levels recommended in the Van Fleet report for the various countries concerned, and added that with at least one aspect of current U.S. policy toward the Far East General Van Fleet was in agreement—namely, that he favored redeployment of U.S. armed forces from Korea.

Secretary Wilson said he believed he should point out that in simple fairness to General Van Fleet there were many people in the United States who felt that we had made a mistake in not backing Chiang Kai-shek to the hilt and going to war against Communist China. The problem was, however, how we should be able to end such a war against Communist China.

The President said that he was trying to decide what disposition to make of the Van Fleet report. He also inquired whether there was anything in the original directive to General Van Fleet which would have permitted him to go so far afield in his report. Mr. Cutler replied that there was nothing which would have so authorized General Van Fleet.

Mr. Cutler then informed the Council that the Secretary of State desired to make certain specific points in today’s discussion of Far Eastern policy, with regard to Formosa and the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Discussion of these specific points at today’s meeting would be followed by a more general discussion of U.S. policy in the Far East at the special meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, November 2. The Executive Secretary then proceeded to hand out copies of the report which the Secretary of State proposed to read to the members of the Council (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting⁶).

Before commencing to read his report, Secretary Dulles reminded the Council of the decision it had taken with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands at the Denver meeting,⁷ and of Assistant Secretary Robertson’s recent mission to Formosa with respect to the possibility of negotiating a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Chinese National Government. Both of these matters were under active discussion at the present time, said the Secretary, and he had prepared his present report not with the objective of obtaining Council approval at this meeting, but rather to indicate how our current moves fit into the overall picture. He then proceeded to read his report.

In the course of reading the report, Secretary Dulles was interrupted by Secretary Wilson, who expressed anxiety over the proposal to have the UN stabilize the status quo in the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles replied that the proposal also worried him, but that it was the best solution to the problem that he could foresee at present. Secretary Dulles reiterated his previous arguments on behalf of this proposal, concluding with the argument that if we did ultimately decide to engage our armed forces in the defense of the offshore islands against Chinese Communist attack, it would be better to do so under the aegis of a UN resolution.

The President said that he did not understand that this procedure would commit the United States in advance to resorting to war to defend these islands, and Secretary Dulles said that the President’s understanding was correct.

Secretary Wilson inquired whether, if the problem of the offshore islands was put up to the UN, the latter would have the power to recommend that these islands be turned over to the Chinese Communists. Secretary Dulles replied that no such recommendation would be made, since the United States has an agreement with its major allies in the UN with regard to the scope and wording of a UN resolution respecting these islands.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether there was not a real danger that when the issue came up in the UN the Chinese Communists would say that they would refuse to participate in the UN proceedings until they themselves became members of the UN. Secretary Dulles replied that he thought there was little danger of such an eventuality. They will not manage to pry themselves thus into the UN, although they may very well try.

Secretary Humphrey nevertheless feared that the Chinese Communists would be building up a case for themselves. Secretary Dulles countered by stating that the odds were tremendous that such an exercise would weaken rather than strengthen the claims of Communist China to membership in the United Nations. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed with Secretary Dulles, except in the improbable event that the Chinese Communists accepted the UN resolution on the offshore islands.

Secretary Dulles then went on with the reading of his report, and was again interrupted by Secretary Wilson, with an inquiry as to whether our embargo on trade with Communist China differed from the restrictions we placed on our trade with the USSR. Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, and Secretary Wilson said that he could see no reason for such a distinction.

Secretary Dulles noted the increasing difficulty encountered by the United States in continuing the embargo on Western trade with Communist China in the face of allied and neutral pressure to lighten the restrictions on this trade and to make them conform with the less stringent restrictions applied to trade with the Soviet Union. When Secretary Wilson said that he could see no objection to equalizing the two policies, Secretary Dulles reminded him that the Chinese Communists were still aggressive and heavily engaged in building up their military strength and war potential. With respect to the difficulties of maintaining the U.S. position on trade with Communist China, Secretary Dulles referred to an earlier statement of the Director of Central Intelligence indicating that many of the embargoed products are actually reaching Communist China via the Soviet Union.⁸ Railroad capacity from Russia into China was not now severely taxed.

The President, who had been provided with a map of China indicating the main rail routes, asked the members of the Council if they ever stopped to think how the Chinese Communists must shudder over the prospects of general war, in view of the small number of railroad routes and their exposure to attack.

Secretary Dulles completed the reading of his report, and said that it raised two broad questions with respect to two aspects of U.S. policy in the Far East on which we were already moving ahead. In the first place, if the United States could put it in the right setting, we may try to move after the elections are over to secure a defensive treaty with Formosa; and secondly, we may proceed with the proposal for UN support of a program to preserve the status quo in the Nationalist-held offshore islands. He would like, so to say, for the Council to speak up now on these two issues, or thereafter hold its peace.

Mr. Cutler said that in so far as the issue of our policy toward Formosa was concerned, could the Secretary of State tell the Council what view the Generalissimo took about a defense treaty with the United States? Secretary Dulles replied that Chiang had indicated to Robertson his willingness to go along with such a treaty. From the point of view of the Chinese Nationalists there were two factors to consider in this matter—offensive and defensive. The proposed treaty would certainly limit Chinese Nationalist aspirations in the direction of offensive action against the mainland, and of course they would not like this. On the other hand, they were pleased by the defensive aspect of the treaty because it would avoid any future danger that Formosa would be returned to Communist China or would be put under some sort of UN trusteeship. Obviously they would regard the assurances provided by such a defensive treaty as much safer than the assurance now provided by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whose mission to protect Formosa would be in increasing jeopardy as the truce in Korea continued. Furthermore, such a mutual defense treaty with the United States would put Formosa in the same category with respect to relations with the United States as were Korea, Japan and the Philippines. This was a status which the Chinese Nationalists had long desired, and accordingly they may well be willing to pay the required price, which would be the psychological loss of their hopes of returning to the mainland. But, after all, they did not have very much real hope of realizing such an objective, since their return to the mainland was inconceivable without tremendous U.S. support. Thus, concluded Secretary Dulles, while he could not honestly state that Chiang Kai-shek would welcome such a program as he had outlined, and while he would not wish to forecast exactly how Chiang would react to it, on balance he believed the Chinese Nationalists would accept it as desirable.

Mr. Cutler then queried Secretary Dulles on the situation at Quemoy. If the UN resolution went through and the Chinese Communists thereafter attacked Quemoy, would not the Chinese Nationalists have a right to defend the island? Secretary Dulles replied that they most certainly would have such a right. Mr. Cutler inquired whether this right would extend to a Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland. Secretary Dulles replied that they would certainly have such rights as to pursue attacking Chinese Communist planes into mainland China.

Secretary Wilson expressed the opinion that such a treaty with Formosa as was being proposed by Secretary Dulles would prove very dangerous for the United States until such time as these offshore islands were returned to Communist China, which must be, he believed, the final position.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether the UN proposal for neutralizing the offshore islands would be acceptable to Nationalist China, and Secretary Dulles replied that he believed that the Nationalists would reluctantly accept this program if it were coupled with the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Formosa.

Secretary Dulles then inquired of the Council whether he was authorized to go further with the negotiation of the two programs outlined in his report. He pointed out that things were moving fast in the Far East, and while he was perfectly willing to talk next Tuesday in a more general way about our Far Eastern policy, he felt that he needed Council approval of these two specific programs at this time.

The President indicated his sympathy, and suggested that what the Secretary of State was proposing was the least bad of bad choices. Secretary Wilson inquired whether, if Chiang Kai-shek wished to, he could pull his troops out of the offshore islands. The President replied that he could if he wanted to.

Mr. Cutler then inquired of the Secretary of State whether he had discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the proposal for a mutual defense treaty with Formosa. Mr. Cutler thought that the Joint Chiefs would doubtless desire to express their views on this subject. Admiral Radford commented that there had been a very brief and informal discussion of the subject by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that there had been no formal expression of their views, even though a request for such formal opinion had been received from the Secretary of Defense.⁹ Admiral Radford explained this by pointing out that before the Joint Chiefs could present their formal views to the Secretary of Defense on the subject, Secretary Robertson had gone off to Formosa, and Admiral Radford thought that this was all water over the dam. Nevertheless, he added, the reaction of the Chiefs of Staff, or of most of them, had not been favorable to the idea of a mutual defense treaty with Formosa.

General Ridgway interrupted to state that this subject had not really been discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President ended the discussion by pointing out that if the United States considered Formosa vital to its security interests and that, accordingly, the island must be defended, it was essential that we enter into such a treaty, not least of all because continued reliance on the use of the Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa could conceivably lead to impeachment.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Noted and discussed a summary of that part of General Van Fleet’s personal report on his recent mission to the Far East which dealt with national security policy, as read at the meeting by Mr. Cutler.

b. Noted and discussed a report by the Secretary of State on U.S. policies in relation to China (Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists), as distributed and read at the meeting.

c. Noted the President’s authorization to the Secretary of State to proceed as recommended in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, pages 4–7, of the report referred to in b above.¹¹

d. Agreed to continue, at the special meeting of the Council to be held on Tuesday, November 2, discussion of further aspects of Far Eastern policy, including views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence on the report referred to in b above.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Dated Oct. 28 and drafted by Gleason.
2. Neither printed, but see footnote 5, Document 303, and footnote 1, Document 321.
3. For NSC Action No. 1224, see footnote 9, Document 293; for NSC Action Nos. 1233, 1234, and 1235, see footnotes 7, 10, and 12, Document 322.
4. The “Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East,” submitted to the President through the Secretary of Defense on Sept. 30, is not printed. Its recommendations pertaining to China included the prompt negotiation of a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China; negotiation of a regional alliance composed of China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and United States; and the extension of U.S. protection to the offshore islands. (611.90/10–754) For a memorandum from Robertson to Dulles, Oct. 25, assessing the Van Fleet report, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 953.
5. Not attached to the source text.
6. Infra. The report is not attached to the source text.
7. Sept. 12; see Document 293.
8. No such statement is recorded in the memorandum of discussion at this meeting.
9. See footnote 4, Document 340.
10. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1258. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)
11. Arabic-numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 in the report, infra.