793.00/10–2354
No. 359
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
Participants:
- Sir Anthony Eden
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Denis Allen
- The Secretary
- Livingston T. Merchant
The Secretary opened the question by asking Sir Anthony Eden whether he had yet heard from London with regard to the off-shore island matter.2
Sir Anthony replied that he had just received the results of the Cabinet’s deliberations. He said they were anxious to help and wanted to go ahead but that there were two points on which he would appreciate further enlightenment.
The first point was whether in the U.S. statement which would publicly announce the intention of proceeding to negotiate a mutual security treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa it was intended to say anything to the effect that Formosa would not under the treaty be established as a privileged sanctuary from which attacks would go forward against the mainland while the island itself was protected by a U.S. guarantee.
The Secretary indicated that in his contemplation it would be impossible to create a situation in which the Nationalists attacked the mainland whereas an attack against Formosa would bring the U.S. into the war, and he indicated that some general statement to this effect would be contained in the public statement of our intentions regarding the treaty. Sir Anthony appeared satisfied by this.
There was then some discussion of the sequence of events and Sir Anthony made clear that they still were contemplating a sequence in which first would come a statement by the U.S. of its intention to negotiate a treaty, then an approach by the British in Moscow and Peiping, a matter only of hours before the initiation by the New Zealand Government of action in the Security Council. The British statement in those two capitals would be designed to prevent the Soviets and Chinese Communists from freezing in an immediate public statement a rigid position as a reaction against the announcement of our intention. The British statement would also inform the other two governments of the impending action in the Security Council and express the view that this was a serious action taken in the interests of peace and should be regarded as such. Eden said that they were still thinking of using a statement along the general lines that he showed to us in London two weeks [Page 792] ago. He said, however, that he would let us see the actual final instructions.
The Secretary for his part indicated that he would inform the British in advance of the general lines of the intended statement of our intention to negotiate.
It was agreed that the Working Group in Washington would promptly go ahead with working out the timing as well as the substance of the UNSC actions to be taken. The Secretary indicated that he was not contemplating the announcement which would set off the train of events for at least 10 days.
Sir Anthony then raised the second matter on which he said the Cabinet desired further elaboration of our views. This question was what we should do if we immediately ran into a veto in the Security Council? Should the matter then be taken to the General Assembly?
The Secretary replied that he had no rigid views on this matter and thought we should proceed on the assumption that success would attend our efforts but his present thinking would be opposed to taking the matter to the General Assembly, but that it was possible he might later change his mind on the point. His general reaction was that it probably would be best to let the matter drop if we encountered a veto in the Security Council. By leaving the subject on the Security Council agenda, we might at least have the benefit of some deterrent effect.
Sir Anthony then asked if there was a veto in the Security Council and no progress possible in the U.N., would we contemplate in our negotiations on the security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists extending our territorial guarantee beyond Formosa and the Pescadores to cover the off-shore islands. The Secretary’s reply was no.
Sir Anthony expressed appreciation for the elaboration of the Secretary’s thinking and indicated that there would be no problems now in proceeding to work out the details in the Working Group in Washington.
- Approved by Secretary Dulles, according to a notation by Roderic O’Connor on a note attached to the source text.↩
- Dulles had reported in Dulte 8 from Paris, Oct. 21, that Eden had told him at lunch that day that he had asked Cabinet consideration of the question of whether the announcement of the U.S. intention to negotiate a mutual security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists should precede the New Zealand initiative and that he hoped to receive the Cabinet’s views while he and Dulles were still in Paris. (793.5/10–2154)↩