793.00/10–1954
No. 354
The United States Representative at
the United Nations (Lodge) to the Under Secretary of State
(Hoover)
Dear Mr. Secretary: Herewith a written report, the essence of which I gave to David Key over the telephone yesterday:1
T.F. Tsiang called at my office today at his request. Tsiang said that the resolution which the Soviets are filing with their agenda item2 could develop in such a way as to call on the parties involved (Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists) to cease military activity against each other. Passage of such language would be the equivalent of recognition of the Chinese Communists. Tsiang stated that anything in the U.N. which calls for any ending of the fighting in or around Formosa is excessively dangerous and that the U.S. can control that issue because of our own close relations and military support and that it should not be brought to the U.N.
I gave Dr. Tsiang no information and I said I knew nothing about it. Dr. Tsiang replied that apparently he (Dr. Tsiang) knew more about what the U.S. Government was doing than did I. “It is [Page 778] clear that you are not informed by your government”, Tsiang said. I said I expected a message today or tomorrow.
Dr. Tsiang further said that what is in the making is an arrangement similar to the 38th Parallel in Korea and similar to the Indochina settlement—to put a line between Formosa and the mainland—and that if this is done it will be the “beginning of the end” as far as the Chinese Nationalists are concerned.
Dr. Tsiang said that if this happened the Nationalists would be “sold down the river”; that the British were behind the whole thing and were egging the Russians on.
He said there was great U.S. pressure on the Nationalists and they had yielded to it; that even though their military action against Quemoy was in retaliation to Communist aggression, they had ceased it in order to cooperate with the U.S. and the campaign statements being made about the whole world being at peace.
Dr. Tsiang stated that they now face a Soviet resolution which, after British amendments, will destroy the Nationalist right to get to the Chinese mainland, and which will in effect recognize the Chinese Communists. He said the Chinese people must want the Nationalists back for their return even to be a possibility and that Nationalist return will be a political rather than a military event.
He said that Secretary Dulles knew that Yeh and Tsiang disagreed with Dulles and that Dulles waited until Yeh was out of the country and then sent Secretary Robertson to Formosa.
As I told David Key, I recommend that unless Tsiang is willing to go along, the whole matter be put off until after election because of Tsiang’s influence with the so-called “China Lobby”, which could have such a disastrous effect on the election. The Generalissimo should straighten Tsiang out before we go any further.
From the beginning of this contemplation I have urged that it not be undertaken before election unless Tsiang would be willing to go along. His conversation yesterday confirms my fears. I have never seen him in such an excited condition.
Very sincerely yours,
- The conversation was recorded in an Oct. 18 memorandum of conversation by Key. (793.00/10–854)↩
- Tsiang’s reference is apparently to the agenda item submitted by the Soviet Union on Oct. 15; see footnote 2, Document 347.↩