Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–1854

No. 351
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 18, 1954.

Subject:

• China Item: Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand

Participants:

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. David McK. Key, Assistant Secretary
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Sir Robert Scott, British Minister
• Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
• Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary of New Zealand Embassy

The meeting opened with the New Zealand Ambassador asking the Secretary to outline with special reference to its scope, defensive character, etc. the type of security treaty with Nationalist China which he had in mind.

The Secretary stated in reply that it had been decided, subject to the outcome of Congressional consultations, to go ahead with a mutual security treaty covering Formosa and the Pescadores along the lines of the defense treaties negotiated with Korea and ANZUS. This decision had been reached because it was in the U.S. national interest to clarify the status of these islands. They formed a vital part of the chain of islands which were essential to our defense. The decision was not in the nature of a bribe to Nationalist China to induce the latter to go along with the New Zealand proposal.

The Secretary pointed out that our status with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores is not altogether clear. Orders had been issued to the 7th Fleet but these orders had their origin during the Korean war and were designed to protect and preserve the UN flank off Korea. At that time the orders were “two-sided”, i.e., the fleet was to repel any Communist attacks on Formosa but likewise to prevent the launching of any attacks from Formosa against the Communists. However, this latter feature had been suspended by President Eisenhower because of the Korean war and the importance of maintaining a diversionary threat.

With the cessation of hostilities in Korea and Indochina, the motive for the Presidential order had changed and there was some question as to the present basis of the order. The Secretary went on to say that the basic idea of a mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China had been embryonic for some time past. In fact, he had mentioned this as a possibility to Mr. Eden at the time of Mr. Churchill’s visit here.²

Our proceeding with the treaty would depend on the Senate leaders. If we proceed, it would be with the understanding that if Formosa and the Pescadores are defensively protected on the one hand and if the “offshore” islands are covered by the New Zealand resolution on the other, then this combined situation would be regarded by us as possibly creating the basis for a general pacification of the area. It would not be our idea in such event to create a “privileged sanctuary.” Formosa could not be used as a base for offensive operations against Communist China. Of course, if the Communist regime collapsed and there were serious internal uprisings on the mainland, we could not expect Chiang Kai-shek to renounce his hopes of reinstating himself in China.

Reverting to the proposed New Zealand resolution, the Secretary stated that we would want to push ahead with this proposal whenever it is opportune. However, present intelligence reports gave no evidence of any large-scale concentrations such as would presage an assult on Quemoy.

Ambassador Munro observed that this raised certain questions. For example, when would we envisage that the New Zealand proceedings would be launched? What sort of a statement would you make at that time? Also, he understood that the proposed mutual defense security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists would cover Formosa and the Pescadores, but wished to know whether, if the New Zealand draft resolution were not put forward, the treaty would include Quemoy and the other off-shore islands.

Secretary Dulles said he had really wanted to avoid this question. However, there was one point he wished to make entirely clear. The U.S. is not going to let Formosa and the Pescadores fall into hostile hands. He had discussed this matter again with the President this morning, and the President is entirely clear on this. Also, when he was in London and lunched with Prime Minister Churchill,³ the Secretary said he had drawn a rough map on a piece of paper for Churchill showing that in our so-called off-shore island defense system stretching from the Aleutians down through Japan, Korea, to the Phillipines and Australia and New Zealand, Formosa and the Pescadores was he one link not covered by a formal security arrangement. Sir Winston expressed great interest and asked the Secretary for the piece of paper, which he put in his pocket. Our difficulty in concluding a defensive security treaty with Formosa relates to the problem of Quemoy and the other offshore islands. As long as the Communists are attacking these islands we do not feel we can impose on Chiang Kai-shek a prohibition against defending them. The Secretary said when he was in Formosa following the Manila Conference he had had a long talk with Chiang Kai-shek regarding a security treaty. Chiang had urged very strongly that we conclude such a treaty, and the Secretary had pointed out the dilemma in terms of the so-called offshore islands. Upon his return there was a meeting of the National Security Council in Denver, which considered this matter, and the idea had occurred of having the UN throw a protective mantle around Quemoy and the other off-shore islands. Since then, the Secretary said, we had given the whole question considerable thought, and our thinking has been clarified so that in a sense the proposed New Zealand resolution dovetails into our views on the desirability of a defensive security treaty with Formosa.

Regarding the time-table, Ambassador Munro said he had a question. If, for example, the President of the Security Council were notified about this matter on Wednesday, and SC discussions began on the following Monday, Munro said he personally had the very strong feeling that we should not simply unveil the New Zealand resolution covering the status of Quemoy and the off-shore islands without also letting other people in on the defensive security treaty question. In other words, he personally did not feel we should go forward with the New Zealand resolution and then suddenly spring the security treaty on others later. It would open us to charges of bad faith.

On the question of timing, Secretary Dulles said that when he had talked to Mr. Eden about this in September they were both apprehensive that an attack might be imminent. Our intelligence had indicated a build-up. Our present intelligence does not indicate that an attack is imminent in the next two or three weeks. Therefore, we would feel it entirely safe for the U.S. to proceed in completing its studies and consultations with Congressional leaders and then proceed with action on the New Zealand resolution and the defensive security treaty. It was also the Secretary’s understanding that the New Zealand Government wished quick action on its proposed resolution because it feared there might be a leak which could cause embarrassment in connection with the New Zealand elections.

Ambassador Munro said that in reaching its decision New Zealand would, of course, be very much concerned with the position the UK takes. However, from the point of view of public opinion in New Zealand and elsewhere, he thought it would be vitally important that either the President of the United States or the Secretary of State make very clear the defensive nature of the proposed security treaty at the time it is made public.

Secretary Dulles referred again to his conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in September, during the course of which the latter had said he knew we were apprehensive that conclusion of a security treaty with Formosa might result in the U.S. being dragged into hostilities. Chiang Kai-shek had then assured Secretary Dulles that he would abide by any agreement which the U.S. might wish, to ensure that it would not become involved in hostilities initiated by the Chinese Nationalists. Chiang had also stated categorically that the military equipment supplied by the U.S. would not be used for operations against the mainland without the agreement of the U.S. The Secretary said the situation we had with respect to negotiating a defensive security treaty with Formosa was very similar to that we had had when we were negotiating a defensive security agreement with Syngman Rhee in Korea. However, the Korean situation was perhaps even more difficult because Rhee and his forces were located on the mainland where they could commence hostilities unilaterally.

Ambassador Makins said the UK was principally concerned over the effect the proposed defensive security treaty might have on the UN exercise on Quemoy and the off-shore islands. The British had not yet been able to sort out in their own minds all the elements in the problem. This delay had probably been in part caused by the fact that the British Government had recently been very much occupied with the Cabinet changes. However, Mr. Eden had sent word that he would hope very much to be able to talk to Secretary Dulles about this matter while in Paris. The Secretary said he also had been reflecting and hoped to talk with Mr. Eden about this in Paris. There was some discussion as to when such consultation in Paris might take place. In view of his very full schedule Wednesday⁴ afternoon, with a dinner Wednesday night, the Secretary suggested that he and Mr. Eden might breakfast together Thursday morning, but it was left that the exact time would be worked out in Paris.

Ambassador Munro requested that the British Foreign Office keep the New Zealand High Commissioner in London fully informed on all developments, particularly those relating to timing.

Ambassador Makins went on to say that one of Mr. Eden’s difficulties about the treaty was that if no announcement about it were made until some time later, he would be open to criticism for a lack of frankness.

Reverting to Formosa the Secretary stated that the U.S. has an inchoate but legitimate interest in Formosa, title to which was renounced by Japan but was not transferred to China. From an international standpoint it would seem therefore that we are in a better position to defend Formosa than would be the case if Formosa were a part of China. The Secretary mentioned that the case of the Kuriles was not dissimilar: title had been renounced by Japan but it had not passed to the U.S.S.R.

1. Both Key and MacArthur are indicated as drafters on the source text; presumably the document was drafted by Key and revised by MacArthur.
2. For documentation concerning the Churchill–Eden visit to Washington, June 25–29, 1954, see volume vi. There is no indication of any discussion of this subject in Department of State records of the meetings.
3. Presumably when Dulles was in London for the Nine-Power Conference, Sept. 28–Oct. 3. A Sept. 30 memorandum of conversation by Dulles refers to a luncheon and two other conversations with Churchill but does not mention any discussion of China; for text, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1368.
4. Oct. 20.