Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–1754: Telegram

No. 348
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

Taipei, October 17, 1954—7 p.m.

277. Eyes only for Assistant Secretary Robertson. Department’s 244.¹ Secretary’s October 14 message to President (Deptel 237) arrived Friday afternoon and was in Chiang’s hands with Chinese translation 9:30 same evening. Thinking he would wish to study it, word was left that I would call on him anytime during weekend he desired. I have no word and must assume President felt there was nothing he need add to what was said during 7 hours conversation with Robertson October 13. It may be noted Secretary’s message did not ask for reply.

Department’s 243² and 244 arrived this (Sunday) morning. I could find only Finance [Vice?] Minister Shih who was familiar with matter. He has relayed queries to President re his views in light of new Soviet action and again whether I should call on him. This afternoon I learned no reply could be expected before tomorrow.

In response Department’s request for analysis of Soviet maneuver I venture following as probable motivation:

1. To embarrass US in relations with Western allies. Soviets may believe that in Tuapse tanker case and in guerilla activities from off-shore islands, as well as in seizure of Polish ships, they have sufficient substance to lend credence to charge of US aggression (they will exploit Western fears of war over Free China by holding up US as warmongers).

2. To embarrass US relations with anti-Communist Asian countries including Nationalist China. Soviets are making it clear to all that they stand four-square behind Peiping regime. In addition to defense pact of long standing they have now officially espoused “liberation” of Formosa and issued recent joint statement indicating full solidarity and positive program for future. Soviets will see that Asian countries contrast above policies with those of US which withholds defense pact from Free China and appears doubtful whether to help in defending part of latter’s territory, much less any question of liberating mainlands China. They will contrast neutral New Zealand resolution with unequivocal Soviet resolution. (Taipei’s 274)³

3. To determine what course of action US actually would take in case of Communist assault on off-shore islands. Stalin guessed wrong in Korea; Malenkov intends to make sure this time and also to see if islands cannot be won with little or no fighting. When it becomes quite clear US will give no direct support, as Soviets undoubtedly have already guessed, they will expect Free Chinese defense effort to be substantially undermined. Soviets may even hope US will advise Nationalists to abandon some or all off-shore islands without fighting.

I see in present situation no military threat to Formosa in any case and probably no immediate danger to off-shore islands if USNationalist position is sufficiently firm. Unless such firmness is made clear to all, however, I fear US support of New Zealand resolution without significant offsetting action will be interpreted as weakness with most serious results. President Chiang is explicit in regarding it as first step in losing off-shore islands, to be followed in due course by trusteeship for Formosa, entry of Red China into UNO and finally turning over of Formosa to Communists.

In my telegram 244, October 5, I proposed two steps calculated to strengthen position of Free China both internally and externally in present situation. I also advanced proposal re timing. If one of above two steps must be postponed until some time after introduction of New Zealand resolution, then it seems even more important that second be taken at once and certain aspects of it made public.

Meanwhile without involving US in open war, I am confident our navy knows how to support defense off-shore islands effectively against anything short of all-out Communist effort, which I do not believe Moscow or Peiping contemplates at present time. Moreover enough of US intentions in this regard could be made public to have most salutary effect on economy.

Rankin

1. Telegram 244 to Taipei, Oct. 16, requested Rankin’s analysis of the Soviet proposal for a UN agenda item and his assessment of the Chinese Government’s reaction to it. (793.00/10–1654)
2. Telegram 243 to Taipei, Oct. 16, informed the Embassy of the Soviet proposal. (330.13/10–1554)
3. Telegram 274 from Taipei, Oct. 15, stated that two additional features of the New Zealand draft resolution which would probably be objectionable to the Chinese Government were its use of the name “People’s Republic of China” and its treatment of the two parties on a basis of equality although one was a UN member and one had been “branded” as an aggressor and was in this case the aggressor. (793.00/10–1554)