Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.93/10–1454

No. 340
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

October 14, 1954.

There is attached a self-explanatory report from Walter Robertson.² The Acting Secretary held a meeting this morning to get a general consensus about this message and the consensus was as follows:

1. We should notify the New Zealand and United Kingdom representatives that a message has been received from Walter Robertson which indicates that the ChiNat attitude is negative and that Robertson’s report must be brought to your attention before we can proceed further. They are being informed that the message has been dispatched to you and we will be in touch with them later today. (This has already been done.)

2. With regard to the two conditions laid down by the Chinese, it was the consensus that so far as the first condition is concerned we can inform Chiang that in supporting the New Zealand resolution we will make it clear that the situation which has arisen is a result of the intensification of Chinese Communist military activity against Quemoy coupled with threats against other off-shore islands and against Formosa and the Pescadores but that as he will observe the purpose of the New Zealand resolution is to terminate the existing hostilities in the area of Quemoy and not the condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor. (If we adopt the position that the objective of the resolution is to condemn Communist China as an aggressor it seems quite clear that both the U.K. and New Zealand would not proceed as it is not in accordance with our agreed resolution and minute.)

With regard to the second condition relating to a mutual defense treaty we suggest that our reply might be to the effect that the Administration looks with favor on this idea, as long as it is clearly understood that the treaty will be defensive and no offensive action will be taken except by mutual consent. However, it is essential that Congressional leaders be consulted before a final commitment can be made. The Administration would strongly recommend to these leaders conclusion of such a treaty, and would begin such consultations without delay. Chiang should also be informed that if there were leaks on this prior to the consultation of the Congressional leadership the Administration’s task of winning Congressional support for such a treaty would be seriously complicated.

3. If we proceed along the above lines we believe that we would have to inform both the U.K. and New Zealand regarding the position we have taken with respect to the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty. This would most probably mean that the matter would almost certainly have to be referred back again to London and also Wellington.

4. We have telegraphed the text of the proposed resolution to Rankin³ but have instructed him to hold it until further instructions.

5. It is our understanding that Walter Robertson left Taipei last evening at 8:30 p.m. Washington time and will be due in Washington at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow morning Washington time.

6. How would Congressional consultations be undertaken and who would be consulted?

7. Should the President be notified? (Any other cabinet?)

8. Should Lodge have Robertson’s message?⁴

Douglas MacArthur II

1. A notation on the source text indicates that it was shown to Secretary Dulles by MacArthur, who flew to Duck Island on Oct. 14 to consult with him. No place is cited in the dateline of the source text.
2. See telegram 272, supra.
3. Telegram 231 to Taipei, Oct. 14. (793.00/10–1454)
4. A memorandum of Oct. 14 from MacArthur to the Acting Secretary outlined the results of his consultation with Dulles as follows: a draft telegram to Chiang Kai-shek; a covering telegram to Ambassador Rankin; a talking paper to be used that evening with the British and New Zealand representatives (none of the above attached to the memorandum); instructions that the President should be provided copies of Robertson’s telegram from Taipei and Dulles’ message to Chiang and that he should be informed that the Department had told the British and New Zealand representatives of the probability of a U.S.–Chinese security treaty; and instructions that Lodge should be informed verbally that the Chinese reply was negative, that Chiang had raised the question of a security treaty, and that the Department was sympathetic to this but could not take action on it for several weeks and hence did not wish it known publicly. (793.00/10–1454)