Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–454

No. 317
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key)

top secret

[Washington,] October 4, 1954.

Subject:

• Quemoy

Participants:

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary¹
• Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
• The Ambassador of New Zealand, Mr. Munro
• Mr. R. H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy

The Secretary opened the meeting by reviewing briefly his talks with Mr. Eden on the subject of the Quemoy Islands as follows:

He had pointed out to the latter the dilemma facing the United States which had either to commit large forces to Quemoy or else risk the loss of Quemoy and other off-shore islands which would constitute a serious blow to the prestige of the United States, particularly if it came on the heels of the Manila Conference. If we did not resist Communist attacks on Quemoy, the Communists might think that we would likewise not resist their attacks on the Pescadores and Formosa. This would be a serious illusion on the part of the Chinese Communists and would lead to extensive war.

Accordingly, if there were any reality to UN pledges, we would be bound to regard the present fighting as a “dangerous situation.” At first we believed that action should be taken under Chapter VII, but Mr. Fitzmaurice, for whose legal opinions the Secretary has a high regard, felt it would be better to operate under both Chapter VI and VII. There were two disadvantages to action solely under Chapter VII. The first was that this would presuppose aggression whereas in the minds of many a struggle between the off-shore islands and the mainland did not constitute aggression but rather a civil war. Secondly there was the possibility for a veto under Chapter VII. All this would be obviated, however, if action were taken under Chapter VI. U.S. thinking was now much in line with UK thinking on this subject. Mr. Merchant mentioned at this point a memorandum, outlining tentative British thinking on this subject which Mr. Caccia had handed him in London but which Mr. Eden had not yet seen.²

Ambassador Munro interrupted to state that New Zealand definitely favored action under Chapter VI, according to a message just received from his Foreign Minister.

Continuing, the Secretary observed that both Chinese sides, though especially the Chinese Communists, would probably be opposed to any UN action. There seemed to be a definite tendency on the part of the Chinese Communists to connect attacks on Quemoy or other off-shore islands with a progressive attack on the Pescadores and Formosa. Khrushchev’s recent declaration about the USSR backing Chinese claims on Formosa raised in Ambassador Bohlen’s mind the question whether the USSR took really seriously our determination to protect Formosa. The Secretary said there was no doubt whatever that we would fight to protect Formosa.

With respect to timing, the Secretary said that there had been a recent lull in the fighting and that it was possible attacks on Quemoy had served as a cover for future attacks to be made on the Tachen Islands and others. In reply to Ambassador Munro’s query as to whether the other islands would come within the Secretary’s proposal, the latter replied in the affirmative. Ambassador Munro then stated that the New Zealand Foreign Minister strongly felt the matter should be presented to the Security Council without delay. He fears that a leak may occur in which event submission of the matter to the Security Council would be “unfortunate”, if not “ignominious.” The Secretary replied that he would not wish to make a decision about timing until he had had an opportunity to consult the President. While he realized that the subject was charged with emotionalism which would have domestic political repercussions, the Secretary felt the proposal had great merit and he would not therefore be afraid to defend it.

The question was raised whether the USSR, Peking and the Chinese Nationalists should be apprised of the contemplated action before it is brought into the Security Council and if so, what timing should be observed. It was revealed that our Embassy in Taipeh has been requested to give its views on this subject but no reply has yet been received. With respect to Moscow and Peking, the U.K. thought they should be informed just two or three hours before action is taken.

Sir Robert Scott asked what would the Secretary expect if the initial move in the Security Council went off well. Ambassador Munro quickly added that he would welcome the Secretary’s views also as to what to expect in the event the matter did not go off well in the Security Council.

The Secretary replied that there would, of course, be a resolution calling for cessation of fighting and calling upon the parties concerned to seek some peaceful solution. It was out of the question, of course, for the two parties to arrive at a solution at some early date, but this would at any rate serve to bring a stop to the fighting which is confronting us all with a very grave situation. If the Chinese Communists would not agree to come to the Security Council, then we would be just where we are now, but it might be that even though not formally agreeing to stop the fighting, they would in fact discontinue their attacks. Furthermore, the danger of the course on which they are embarked would be impressed on them. Also, world opinion would be focused on this dangerous situation. Thus no bad results would come but maybe some good results could be expected.

Ambassador Munro inquired whether, in the Secretary’s opinion, there would be any room for negotiations about the islands at this time. The Secretary replied in the negative but added that it was obvious that some time in the course of future history this situation would have to be straightened out. The main thing for the moment was to stamp out the flames. If the Communists pursued their present line, they would get into war because they do not refer to the isles themselves except as “stepping stones” to Formosa.

Ambassador Munro asked whether the Secretary expected to consult with the President about the desirability of conferring with Congressional leaders. The Secretary stated that this presented certain difficulties, especially if we move forward rapidly, inasmuch as the political campaign is in full swing. However, he had not yet had an opportunity to consult with his advisers here in the Department and in any event this matter would be a long drawn-out affair once it got into the UN. It would perhaps drag along for a year or two or more, although it was to be hoped that it would have an immediate effect in persuading the Communists to slow down. Delay was not objectionable, however. In fact, the more delay, the better: As long as this subject remained on the agenda of the Security Council, it might have a quieting effect and if so, the longer it remained on the agenda, the better. The Chinese Communists incidentally seemed anxious to avoid any open breach with the UN.

Sir Robert Scott expressed the opinion that if this proposal succeeded, the USSR would seek to have the Chinese Nationalists stop their attacks on shipping. The Secretary pointed out that they had already introduced this matter into the UN.³

Ambassador Munro expressed the hope of his government that we would be able to “deal effectively” with the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary pointed out that we had persuaded them to stop bombing Amoy and that they had been very cooperative. While we are not able to give orders either to Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek, the latter nevertheless has been cooperative in most matters.

At the close of the meeting, Ambassador Munro expressed the hope that New Zealand and the UK could be kept informed of the military situation affecting Quemoy and the off-shore islands. It was agreed that the U.S., the U.K. and New Zealand would keep in close touch on this subject. With a view to speeding up preliminary arrangements and in order to make certain that the three governments would be in a position to move rapidly once it was decided to refer the matter to the Security Council, it was agreed that a small “working level group” should be constituted in Washington without delay. It was agreed that in the interests of security this group should be restricted to one or two persons from the two Embassies and the Department and that the work on which they were engaged should be kept most confidential.

1. Herbert Hoover, Jr.
2. Presumably the draft outline instructions referred to in Dulte 23, supra.
3. On Sept. 30, the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations had requested the inclusion on the General Assembly’s agenda of an item entitled “Violation of the freedom of navigation in the area of the China seas”; the request referred to the seizures of the Tuapse, the President Gottwald, and the Praca and stated that the guilty parties were “not only the Chiang Kai-shek forces but also those who encourage them.” For text of the Soviet request, see UN document A/2741.