793.00/8–3154
No. 268
Memorandum for the Record, by
Morris Draper, Jr., of the Reports and
Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat
During a meeting in the Secretary’s office on August 31, attended by General Smith, Messrs. Murphy, Merchant, and Bowie, Mr. Merchant mentioned that Sir Robert Scott of the U.K. Embassy had conveyed Eden’s concern that political factors as well as military were being duly considered with regard to our stand vis-à-vis the islands off the China coast.1
The Secretary said it is highly important that we do not lose any more prestige in this area of the world and referred in this respect to the current situation in France and Indochina. Therefore he is willing to take a strong line militarily which might involve de facto belligerency for a certain period. However, this must be a flexible position; it should not commit the U.S. to a long-range, permanent defense of these islands. It is in our national security interests to keep Formosa permanently out of Communist hands. This is not true to the same degree for the off-shore islands, the defense of which must be determined in the light of the then applicable political and military considerations for the area.
The Secretary said that Admiral Radford wished to discuss the subject at this week’s NSC meeting. Mr. Bowie, however, said that the question was to be deferred a week so that the Department could look over the JCS written views on the subject. General Smith discussed in some detail the military considerations involved in the Secretary’s “hard” policy. He explained that we are not likely to lose an air or sea battle in the vicinity although there may be losses. We have an able Admiral out there who can make sound judgments. He recommended, however, that the Navy be given appropriate written instructions so that they will do neither too much or too little should the Chinese Communists precipitate a military issue. He said that Admiral Radford certainly understands the Secretary’s position on this question.
Messrs. Murphy, Bowie and Merchant questioned whether by committing our prestige we might involve ourselves in a situation which would build up momentum to the eventual detriment of U.S. interests. Mr. Murphy suggested that we should not assume that a local military incident necessarily would lead to a generalized conflict. [Page 555] Historically there have been a number of incidents which, even though large-scale operations were involved such as the hostilities between the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria involving several divisions of troops on both sides, did not lead to general war. Mr. Bowie said we certainly could not defend Quemoy by “air battles”. The Secretary was not too impressed with the dangers of this policy, citing the historical precedents in the Far East area, and concluded that for prestige purposes his outlined policy was necessary.
Sir Robert had told Mr. Merchant that the UK would back up the US completely and that they therefore wanted our thinking on this question.
- A memorandum of that portion of the conversation, which took place on Aug. 31, is in file 794A.00/8–3154.↩