Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.5/3–2054

No. 266
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 27, 1954.

1. Since the U.S. is committed to defend Formosa and the absence of a treaty after formation of SEAP might be misconstrued, it seems appropriate to negotiate such a treaty after the Manila Conference as recommended by FE.

2. In doing so, it will be necessary to clarify the U.S. position with relation to the close-in islands. S/P tends to believe that the U.S. should not be committed to defend these islands.

3. In the treaty, however, it might be desirable to use some formula such as agreeing to defend Formosa and the Pescadores “and such other islands as are mutually agreed to be militarily important to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.”

4. If such a formal treaty is concluded, it also seems desirable to clarify the United States attitude toward raids and other harassing actions from Formosa which might provoke an attack from the mainland. If such actions are continued after the treaty becomes effective, it may feed the doubts in Asia and Europe as to whether the purpose of the treaty is really defensive.

RRB

1. Sent to Secretary Dulles as an attachment to Document 262.