Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.00/8–2054: Telegram

No. 260
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan

secret

Washington, August 20, 1954—8:38 p.m.

395. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

Dear John:

It is difficult to avoid confusion because it is hard to keep separate the theories which the columnists portray and the genuine official positions.

I suggest that for background you reread the President’s statement of December 26, 1953,¹ my speech of January 12, 1954² and my March 16, 1954 article in Foreign Affairs on “Policy for Security and Peace.”

I refer particularly to our thesis that potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. The way to deter aggression is to be willing and able to respond at places and by means of our choosing. I also put it that the heart of the problem of deterring attack is to leave a potential aggressor in no doubt that he would suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression. I go on to say that “the Soviet Chinese bloc does not lack manpower and spends it as something that is cheap.” On the other hand I refer to our assets including especially “air and naval power and atomic weapons” and say that the “free world must make imaginative use of the deterrent capabilities of these new weapons and mobilities.”

We do not care to meet the aggressors’ third team by pitting our foot soldiers against those of Vietminh in Indochina or those of North Korea in Korea. Thus, we were never willing to commit substantial ground forces in Indochina, and we do not intend to do so under SEATO (see our 184, July 23).³ We are redeploying from Korea in accordance with the basic policy above described and which was in condensed form expressed in the President’s statement of December 26, 1953.

On the other hand lest our actions described in the above paragraph be misinterpreted as weakness or fear, it seemed important actively to show Communist China, the source of the past and potentially future aggressions in Korea and Indochina that we are “willing and able” to make the aggressor suffer at places and by means of our choosing, i.e., where our sea and air power are preponderant. Some of the recent actions to which you refer were designed to convey this fact to the Communists and to counteract any erroneous conclusions they may have drawn from Indochina and our troop withdrawals. Thus, we did not attempt to stop the Nationalists from taking the Soviet tanker. We have authorized the Navy to patrol periodically the Free China held offshore islands, with instructions to shoot if attacked. We sent carrier planes into the Hainan rescue operation with similar orders and they did shoot when attacked, not as provocation but as retribution.

I can see that the broad policy of showing strength at places and by means of our choosing lends itself to confusion on the part of those who are close only to bits of the picture and who do not see the whole sweep of our policy from Korea to Indochina. I suspect that those at Moscow and Peiping who see the picture as a whole and who read our policy speeches carefully, do not suffer from such confusion. Our refusal to match ground forces with them in Korea and Indochina could readily have been misinterpreted by them were there not a concurrent demonstration of our sea and air power and of willingness, if need be, to use it. The prevention of miscalculation by what is going on off the China coast will I feel give the best chance of deterring further aggression in Korea and Indochina. Once these actions have conveyed this message they will have served their purpose and they need not be continued, although the basic question of precisely what Nationalist-held China island we defend has never been clearly resolved and is now under study.

I do not think that the Japanese need be alarmed because I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are in fact now prepared to challenge us in any major or sustained way and provoke further our sea and air power along their coast.

There are three specifications of your cable which I do not understand.

(1) You refer, in the case of the Soviet tanker, to our “complete backdown when Soviets made loud noises”. As far as I am aware we are advising the National Government to pursue in this matter the same policies they recently pursued in relation to the Polish tanker, namely, after unloading the cargo to release the vessel itself.

(2) You refer to the earlier patrol of the 7th Fleet under conditions which you say “led to withdrawal in confusion”. I find no one in State or Defense has the remotest idea of what this refers to.

(3) Surfacing of Rastvorov was not, as you suggest, a “sudden” determination, but the result of a policy deliberately arrived at months ago to surface defectors on the theory that otherwise the Soviets would multiply forceful kidnappings which they would allege to be defections, knowing that we could not challenge them to surface the victims. As it turned out this policy enabled us quickly to match the surfacing of John⁴ in Berlin.

I am glad you cabled me as it is better to have misunderstanding exposed so that I hope it can be corrected.

I may be seeing you soon. Regards. Foster.

Dulles

1. The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 14.
2. The text of the speech, made before the Council on Foreign Relations, is printed ibid., Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 107–110.
3. The reference telegram, sent to a number of European and Asian posts, outlined the U.S. concept of the proposed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. (790.5/7–2854)
4. Otto John, former head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the Federal Republic of Germany; information concerning his disappearance in July 1954 is scheduled for publication in volume vii.