Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.90/8–1654

No. 258
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 19, 1954.

Subject:

• Ambassador Allison’s Telegram No. 374 (Tab A)²

The developments discussed in Ambassador Allison’s telegram No. 374 on which additional information appears necessary are discussed separately in the four attachments³ listed below. You will note that in each case our information indicates that Ambassador Allison’s conclusions may be somewhat extreme.

Enclosure No. 1

Tuapse Case

The Chinese Nationalist Navy intercepted the Soviet tanker Tuapse on June 23 between Luzon and Formosa. It was taken to the Formosan port of Kaohsiung, where it is still held. The cargo of kerosene, useable as jet fuel, was unloaded. The Chinese are attempting to induce defections among the crew. Two defectors apparently have already been obtained. The Chinese used maritime intelligence supplied by us in intercepting the vessel, and two Polish vessels seized earlier.

A strong reaction by the Soviets to the seizure, as expressed in two notes of protest addressed to the U.S. Government,⁴ added to oral expressions of concern from the Australian and New Zealand Governments that the incident might afford the Soviets a pretext for naval activity in the Western Pacific,⁵ prompted the Under Secretary on July 9 and August 5 to instruct our Embassy at Taipei to urge the Chinese to release the vessel immediately. We cited the lack of legal grounds for continued detention of the vessel, the risk of Soviet reprisals, the adverse reaction of various countries and the possible impairment of the international position of Nationalist China. To date the Generalissimo has not released the tanker, although our Embassy in Taipei reports that on August 16 he said to our Chargé that he had not been aware of the American viewpoint and that the matter required further consideration. The Embassy believes that this remark may presage early action.

FE understands that the OCB at a luncheon meeting on July 21, with Acting Under Secretary Murphy representing the Department, decided to withhold from the Chinese Nationalists for the time being U.S. intelligence on the position and course of Communist vessels. Presumably this decision will stand at least until the Tuapse is released. Since we have not pressured the Chinese to give up the confiscated cargo of the Tuapse, it can hardly be said that “a complete backdown” has occurred, although we have receded somewhat from our earlier decision to give specific assistance to the Chinese in the interception of Communist shipping.

Enclosure No. 2

Naval Sweep of Last May by Seventh Fleet

According to the Navy Department it knows of no Seventh Fleet naval demonstration “which led to withdrawal in confusion.” This may refer to the sweep made by the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Pride⁶ off the Tachen Islands last May. Although this operation went off without incident, it is surmised that Ambassador Allison’s thought may be that “withdrawal in confusion” might have resulted from this sweep if the Communists had attacked, since Admiral Pride apparently had orders not to shoot.

Enclosure No. 4

Prospective Visit to Tachen Islands by 7th Fleet

The naval operation cited in the second paragraph is scheduled to take place August 19 or 20,⁷ and will involve the landing of a few naval personnel on the Tachen Islands for courtesy calls. It is understood that for this operation the restrictions against shooting which applied to the May operation have been removed, except that fire from Communist Mainland shore batteries may not be returned. Attacks by Communist vessels or aircraft, however, can be met and the attacking craft pursued.⁸ This operation is being carried out in pursuance of NSC action 1136b of May 27, 1954⁹ as amended by NSC action 1146 of June 3, 1954. (Tab A)¹⁰

The planning for this visit is highly classified, and it would be a breach of security, as well as unnecessary, to notify the Japanese Government in advance.¹¹

1. A handwritten notation on the source text by Roderic O’Connor indicates that the memorandum was seen by Secretary Dulles.
2. Document 253.
3. The four attachments, all unsigned and undated, were in effect component parts of Robertson’s memorandum, and the three here printed are so treated. The third, headed “Rastvorov Case,” is not printed.
4. For the first Soviet note, dated June 24, see footnote 5, Document 226; a second note, dated July 2, and the U.S. reply, dated July 4, are printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1954, p. 131.
5. No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.
6. Adm. Alfred M. Pride, Commander, Seventh Fleet.
7. Another memorandum of the same date from Robertson to Dulles stated that he had learned from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that Admiral Stump had reported the completion of his visit to the Tachen Islands, which had taken place without incident. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, “Formosa Book”)

8. Telegram 311749Z from Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC, July 31, 1954, read in part as follows:

   “At discretion, between 15 and 31 August, not over one division DD’s will visit Tachen island group. Visit will be completed during daylight hours. Air recco will be conducted prior to and during visit. Ships will anchor and token personnel landed. No shore leave or liberty will be granted. Carrier based air will provide air cover. Avoid provoking incidents, but if attacked, engage attacking forces with all means available. Retaliatory attacks on Chinese mainland not authorized.” (JCS records, CCS 381 (4–16–49) Sec. 6)

9. See footnote 3, Document 198.
10. See footnote 3, Document 207.
11. A note on the source text in Robertson’s handwriting reads: “This is now water over the dam. WSR”