Office of the Historian

893.49/8–1754

No. 255
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

secret
[Washington,] August 16, 1954.

Subject:

  • Proposal to Assist Chinese National Government to Offer Food to Mainland Flood Victims in Own Name

The Problem:

Embassy/FOA/CIA Taipei propose in Taipei’s Tousfo 232 (Tab A)2 that this Government assist the Chinese National Government in making a food offer to flood victims in Communist China in its own name. I believe that this proposal, on the scale of aid contemplated, would not involve most of the disadvantages of the proposal discussed in my memorandum to you of August 11 (Tab B),3 would produce similar psychological advantages and would in addition enhance the prestige of the Government of China, which is one of our policy objectives.

Discussion:

The Embassy/FOA/CIA proposal in Tab A recommends that FOA agree to purchase 20,000 tons of rice to be shipped in the name of the Government of China from Taiwan direct to mainland ports in Chinese Government or neutral ships under a safe conduct guarantee. This amount is designed to be neither so small as to indicate a purely propaganda move, nor so large as to be obvious to all that Free China is incapable of making such an offer on her own. In addition, it would not be so large as to permit the regime to divert sizeable amounts for barter trade in strategic materials.

I believe that the Nationalist Chinese origin of this food offer, despite probable Communist attempts to hide or twist the facts, would become known to a large number of Chinese on the mainland, who would be reminded that the Chinese National Government is concerned about the needs of its compatriots under Communist domination and that it recognizes its responsibility toward them, consonant with its capabilities.

The anticipated refusal would place the Chinese Communist regime on the defensive. It would show that the regime places its [Page 526] political and prestige interests above the welfare of the flood victims. The rejection could probably be exploited with great effectiveness by U.S. and Chinese Nationalist propaganda organs.

The offer would underscore the important fact (too often overlooked) that the Chinese Nationalist Government asserts sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. The stature of the Chinese Nationalist Government would be increased by the mere making of the offer, and doubly so in the highly unlikely event of acceptance of the offer.

The offer could be convincingly held out as a bona fide one. If it is refused by the Communists, the pressures on us to make a direct relief offer to the Chinese Communists (which we believe to be full of dangers) would be appreciably reduced. The unwillingness of the Chinese Communists to put the welfare of its populace above extraneous considerations would be established.

Recommendation:

That the proposal in Tab A be approved.4

  1. Filed with a memorandum of Aug. 17 from Dulles to Robertson.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Not printed. Robertson’s Aug. 11 memorandum stated that it had been tentatively decided that the United States should offer relief food to the flood victims in China through the International Red Cross and urged that the proposal should be rejected.↩

  4. Dulles’ Aug. 17 memorandum to Robertson (see footnote 1 above) reads as follows:

    “In view of the forceful and cogent objections raised by Allison and Hull to U.S. flood relief aid to Mainland Chinese, I believe that this project should be definitely abandoned. However, I am intrigued by the idea of putting the Chinese Nationalist Government in a position to offer such aid. I do not want definitely to approve it until it has been submitted to Allison and Hull to be sure that it does not encounter the objections of the earlier budget. I think that it would not because there could be no possibility of misconstruing the motivation of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Unless Allison and Hull have serious objections, I would favor proceeding with the project, as outlined in your memorandum to me of August 16.”

    A memorandum of Aug. 25 from Robertson to Under Secretary Smith stated that the matter was under consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board; an OCB working group had recommended adoption of the proposal for U.S. support of a Chinese Nationalist food offer. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “China (Communist)”)

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