Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429

No. 248
Draft Statement of Policy Prepared by the NSC Planning Board¹

[Extract]

top secret
NSC 5429

[Washington,] August 4, 1954.

Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East

. . . . . . .

iv. communist china²

Alternative A

12. In order to foster free world unity and to remove concern that we will provoke a total war by accident or design, the U.S. should seek, as rapidly as feasible, to put its relations with Communist China on the same footing as those with the Soviet Union. To this end, the U.S. should:

a. Make clear to Communist China our determination to attack Communist China only if it commits armed aggression.^*

b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries.

c. Cease to encourage or support Chinese Nationalist military action against Communist China while continuing to support the right of the Nationalists to retain Formosa.

d. Acquiesce in the entry of Communist China into the U.N. if she adheres to U.N. principles and if Formosa also remains a member.

e. Consider recognition of Communist China as the government of mainland China if she qualifies for entry into the U.N. under subparagraph d. above.

f. Bring trade restrictions into conformity with those applying to the Soviet Union.

g. Seek to impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and covert means.

Alternative B

13. Seek to reduce, by means short of war, the relative power of Communist China in Asia:

a. (1)Make clear to Communist China our determination to attack Communist China only if it commits armed aggression^†

(2) Retaliate promptly and appropriately for any Communist Chinese violation of accepted international behavior, other than armed aggression, directly affecting U.S. security interests.

b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries.

c. Maintain political and economic pressures against Communist China, including the existing embargo and support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions.

d. Support the Chinese National Government on Formosa as the Government of China and the representative of China in all UN agencies.

e. Impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and covert means.

Alternative C

14. Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

a. (1) Prevent, by force if necessary, any further expansion of Communist control in Asia through creeping expansion and subversion or through armed aggression. Make clear to the Communists U.S. determination to take action directly against the source of any such expansion.

(2) React with immediate positive, armed force against any belligerent Communist Chinese move. b,c,d,e. Same as 13–b,c,d,e.

Alternative D

15. Reverse the present trend toward greater Communist Chinese power in Asia by initiating an increasingly positive policy toward Communist China designed to confront the regime with a clear likelihood of U.S. military action against China proper unless Communist China takes public action to change its belligerent support of Communist expansion. To this end:

a. Take such actions as to present Communist China with an obvious casus belli in the face of which the U.S., with such allied support as may exist, can by its preparatory acts and through direct secret warnings threaten military action against China and thus require China to test Soviet willingness to support China in the specific circumstances even though this involves general war.

b. Be prepared and determined to carry out the threat of military action unless China backs down on the issue involved.

c. Exploit by all means such a backing-down by Communist China to make it lose face in the Orient.

d. Prevent, by force if necessary, any further expansion of Communist control in Asia through creeping expansion and subversion or through armed aggression. Make clear to the Communists U.S. determination to take action directly against the source of any such expansion.

e. Maintain all practicable pressures on China, including covert actions, to create internal division in the regime and to intensify conflicts in Sino-Soviet relations.

f. Maintain political and economic pressures against Communist China, including the existing embargo, covert actions and support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions.

g. Support the Chinese National Government on Formosa as the Government of China and the representative of China in all UN agencies.

h. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including development of Japan as a major power to counter-balance Communist China.

1. The full text of NSC 5429, including a covering note to the National Security Council by Lay, is scheduled for publication in volume xii, Part 2. The draft policy statement consisted of a preface on the consequences of the Geneva Conference and a list of potential courses of action, divided into four sections: “The Off-Shore Island Chain,” “General Political and Economic Measures in the Far East,” “Southeast Asia,” and “Communist China.” There were also three annexes, none of which is printed. The source text incorporates three revisions of a later date; the revised pages were sent to holders of the paper with a covering memorandum of Aug. 9 by Lay, which instructed them to insert the revised pages and to burn the pages which were replaced. According to Lay’s memorandum, the changes in the section here printed, requested by the Defense member of the Planning Board, were in the footnotes (in the source text) to paragraphs 12–a and 13–a–(1). (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Far East, U.S. Policy Toward”)

2. Although this section appears as Section IV in the source text, the heading “I. Communist China” also appears in brackets before the heading of Section I, with a footnote which reads as follows:

   “U.S. policy toward Communist China will soon determine the fate of Asia. Accordingly, unless the U.S. is prepared at this time fully to accept the challenge of countering Communist power and influence in Asia, which derives primarily from Communist China, there is the gravest probability that the area will fall under Communist domination. Accordingly, the Defense, JCS and ODM Members believe that U.S. policy with regard to China (Section IV, below) should be considered and determined first and that policy with regard to the peripheral areas should be established in light of this determination.”

3. Because the Defense Member feels that this statement as written and without any definition of “armed aggression” is inherently impossible of being made clear to Communist China, he suggests the addition of the clarifying words “directly or indirectly” at the end of the statement. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Because the Defense Member feels that this statement as written and without any definition of “armed aggression” is inherently impossible of being made clear to Communist China, he suggests the addition of the clarifying words “directly or indirectly” at the end of the statement. [Footnote in the source text.]