Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations—White House”
No. 239
Memorandum of Telephone
Conversations, by the Secretary of State1
I called Admiral Radford to inquire as to what the instructions were governing the aircraft carriers that had been sent to the scene of the Chinese Communist attack on the Cathay–Pacific airliner. He said that instructions were to defend themselves, but not to engage in “hot pursuit” which might take them into Chinese national air. I said that I thought “hot pursuit” should be permitted even though it did carry into the air above the Communist mainland or territorial waters. He said that the instructions had been given by Sec. Wilson, and that he could not vary them. He suggested that I might call Sec. Wilson.
I then called Sec. Wilson, and told him my views as earlier expressed to Adm. Radford, without however mentioning my prior talk with Adm. Radford. Sec. Wilson felt that he would not want to alter the instructions without authority from the President.
I then called the President at Gettysburg. I expressed the view that the air defense of our carriers should not be so strictly limited to exclude “hot pursuit” into the air above Communist Chinese territory or territorial waters.
The President said he was very much concerned about the situation and had been thinking about it much during the night. He suggested that since the plane was British, the primary responsibility laid upon the UK. He asked what I thought they would do. I said I thought that they would probably limit themselves to the exchange of notes and that they would make every effort to minimize the incident in line with their policy of recognition of Communist China and promoting good relations with it. I said that I planned to get in touch with the British Ambassador to find out what their further plans were. So far, they have told us of the terms of their instructions to Trevelyan at Peiping.
The President said he did not want us to get too far in front and that he questioned the desirability of our planes flying into Chinese Communist air in order to seek a fight. I said I did not have this in mind, but did have in mind that if there were hostile demonstrations against our aircraft carriers, they could be driven off even [Page 507] though our planes in so doing infringed on Chinese Communist air. The President said that he agreed with this, and thought that our ships and planes in that area could be instructed to take “all necessary measures to protect themselves”, and that this would not exclude a pursuit into Chinese air if the initial hostile demonstration occurred in relation to our planes or ships on the high seas. He authorized me to advise Sec. Wilson accordingly.
I next called Sec. Wilson and reported to him the conversation with the President. Sec. Wilson said that he would get in touch with Adm. Radford to discuss the possible desirability of modifying the existing instructions.
I then called Adm. Radford telling him that I had spoken to the President and to Sec. Wilson, and that he would doubtless hear from the latter.
- A note on the source text indicates that the conversations took place between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m.↩