790.5/7–1654
No. 231
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- Far Eastern Situation
Participants:
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs
Ambassador Koo inquired as to the prospects for a Far Eastern Collective Security Pact.
Mr. Drumright said that the intention was to push ahead actively with the negotiations of a Collective Security Pact.1 Initially it would probably only include Southeast Asia. But it might be “open-ended” with provision for later adherence by states outside the area of Southeast Asia. There might be some possibility of later adherence of the Chinese Government and other Far Eastern Governments.
[Here follows discussion concerning Indochina and the prospective collective security pact for Southeast Asia.]
The Ambassador asked about the present prospects for the negotiation of a bilateral security pact between his Government and the U.S. Government. He said that his Government had been disappointed by the Secretary’s rejection of the Chinese overture for such a treaty. His Government was still interested in negotiating such a treaty, and had not entirely abandoned the idea since the Secretary had indicated that the matter was subject to reexamination in the light of developing circumstances.
Mr. Drumright said that there had been no change in our position since it had been communicated by the Secretary to the Ambassador. He mentioned that Ambassador Rankin was seeing the Secretary in the course of the following week, and Mr. Rankin expected to put the Chinese position to the Secretary at that time.2
Ambassador Koo remarked that of course if Free China were included in a multilateral Security Pact, this would be even better than a bilateral pact.
[Page 494]Ambassador Koo asked about the Chinese representation issue in the UN.
Mr. Drumright said that the outlook has improved as a result of the recent statement of Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons to the effect that the time was not ripe for the admission of Communist China to the UN.3 We now expect that the “moratorium agreement” will continue for at least a year and that the British will support the exclusion of Communist China in the next session of the General Assembly. Mr. Drumright mentioned the excellent statement made by the Secretary on July 8 setting forth our reasons for opposing the admission of Communist China to the UN.4 He recommended to the Ambassador that he obtain the full text of this statement and transmit it to his Government, if he had not already done so.
The Ambassador remarked that he had recently gone over the situation with T.F. Tsiang, Chinese Ambassador to the UN. They had endeavored to forecast the probable vote, and were endeavoring to contact the delegations of all the doubtful states. Assistance from the U.S. would be needed in contacting some of the Delegations. The Ambassador said that his Government naturally would prefer to have a clean cut and forthright decision on the substance of the representation issue, rather than a mere postponement of the question for another year. Outright rejection of Chinese Communist pretensions on the merits of the issue was highly desirable. However, the Chinese Government recognized that it might be risky to precipitate such a show down. His Government recognized that the prospects of obtaining a favorable vote would be better if the issue were merely one of postponement without a decision on the substance of the issue. Ambassador Koo remarked that in his view the favorable British position as expressed by Churchill in the House of Commons was a direct result of the forthright expression of the U.S. position by the President and the Secretary of State. It was his conclusion that whenever the U.S. took a firm stand on a basic issue, our Allies fell into line. When our position was equivocal or vacillating, the Allies were apt to follow a divergent course with harmful consequences.
The following questions were touched on briefly:
As to the detained Soviet Tanker, the Tuapse, Mr. Drumright mentioned the dubious legal grounds for holding the vessel indefinitely [Page 495] and remarked that there was some risk of Soviet retaliatory action. It was thought that some Soviet built submarines were available for Communist use in the area, under either the Soviet or Chinese Communist flag. The Ambassador said that about two weeks ago he had communicated to his Government urging release of the Soviet tanker.
The Ambassador mentioned the case of the Chinese Marine Officer, Hsuan Wei, who has deserted in the U.S. and expressed the hope that he could soon be returned to Formosa. Mr. Drumright said that under U.S. laws it had been necessary to turn this officer over to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. His case would be processed as rapidly as possible under our deportation laws, but there might be delays and difficulty if Hsuan took the legal steps available to him in this country.
As to the protection of the Off-Shore Islands, Mr. Drumright mentioned that a patrol from the U.S. 7th Fleet occasionally made a sweep in the vicinity of the Ta Chen Islands, and other such sweeps would probably be made in the future.
As to the U.S. Assistance Program, Mr. Drumright said there was some question as to the maintenance of the aid programs at existing levels. But no great change was anticipated in the existing levels. There might be some cut in funds for the next fiscal year because of failure to obligate funds at a maximum level but it was expected that delivery schedules would not be affected. An effort would be made to make up the short fall in deliveries from previous fiscal years. There was some feeling in the Pentagon that the Chinese Combined Service of Supply was not fully efficient and that Chinese combat capabilities could be improved by a reorganization of the Service of Supply. The report of the Van Fleet Mission would probably be made shortly and would probably have some influence on the course of the assistance programs for the Far East. Mr. Drumright noted with gratification the successful inclusion of a large number of Formosans in the Chinese Military Training Program. Mr. Drumright assured the Ambassador that there would be no deviation from our present course of assistance and support to the Chinese Government and authorized him to convey this word to President Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador said that he would be glad to take this message to President Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador expects to leave Washington on July 17 for consultation in Taipei, and to return and resume his post in about a month.
- For documentation concerning these negotiations, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.↩
- A memorandum of July 21 from Drumright to Dulles states that Rankin was to see the Secretary on July 22 and that it was anticipated that the subject of a U.S.-Chinese pact would be discussed. (795.5/6–2254) No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩
- For Churchill’s comments on this subject, made on July 12, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 528, cols. 492–495; see also Eisenhower’s messages of July 7 and 12 to Churchill and Churchill’s message of July 9 to Eisenhower, scheduled for publication in volume vi.↩
- For Dulles’ comments on this subject at a July 8 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, July 19, 1954, pp. 87–89.↩