793.11/7–854
No. 228
Memorandum by the Ambassador in the
Republic of China (Rankin) to the Secretary of
State1
Subject:
- Message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
President Chiang asked me to call on him at 9:45 a.m. June 28, just before I left Taipei for Washington, and requested that I transmit a “personal” message to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. The substance of the message, which he gave me orally, punctuated by asides from both the President and the Chinese Foreign Minister, was as follows:
It appears that an agreement will be reached on Indo-China. The President is not disturbed by this because the end result would be the same whether there is partition, or general elections are held and/or Laos and Cambodia are recognized as neutral. The final result would be the taking over of the entire areas by the Communists.
Only by building up anti-Communist strength in East Asia (Republic of Korea, Free China, etc.) can the Indo-China situation be influenced effectively. It is in this area that our military aid funds should be used as much as possible rather than emphasizing Indo-China itself.
As regards any regional defense system for the Far East, the President believed that we should not count on any real support from the U.K. and France. They could be included, of course, but to ask them for any substantial effort in this connection would be like asking a tiger for his skin.
The President did not pretend to be an authority on European affairs, but as seen through Asian eyes he considered it a mistake to base the EDC concept on France. There was too much Communist influence in that country. China’s experience on the Mainland with only three Communists on the PPC indicated how much trouble the much larger Communist representation in the French Chamber of Deputies would influence matters.
President Chiang expressed the opinion that American military aid should be extended only to countries which either had made Communist activities illegal or at the very least excluded them from Government positions, as done in the United States.
He then remarked that he had read press reports of President Eisenhower’s recent speech in which the need was mentioned for Japan to trade with Mainland China.2 President Chiang thought it [Page 491] dangerous for Japan to develop such commerce as long as Communist activity in that country was legal. If it was suppressed and the trade in question strictly controlled, however, perhaps no harm would be done. As matters were developing it seemed to him likely that Communist influence in Japan would grow and that in consequence Japan would become another France. In that event Japan could never serve as a base for an anti-Communist grouping in the Far East.
With regard to a possible bilateral mutual defense agreement between Free China and the United States, the President said that in connection with such an agreement the Chinese Government would be prepared to expand its consultative commitments. He would seek the prior agreement of the United States before undertaking any important military action.
The President again asked that I transmit the foregoing to President Eisenhower and to you.
Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the President transmitting subject message from the Generalissimo.3
- Rankin spent 3 weeks in Washington in July; he briefly describes some of his meetings during that time in China Assignment, pp. 197–198.↩
- Reference is to a speech given by Eisenhower before the National Editorial Association on June 22; see Document 772.↩
- The message was transmitted with a memorandum of July 12 from Dulles to Eisenhower. (793.11/7–1254)↩