Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199
No. 226
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- Far Eastern Situation
Participants:
- Dr. Wellington V. Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- The Secretary
- Walter P. McConaughy, Director for Chinese Affairs
Ambassador Koo said he was leaving Washington about July 15 for approximately a month of consultations with his Government in Taipei.
He asked if the Secretary could tell him anything about the recent high-level talks with Churchill and Eden.1
The Secretary said that the Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister2 set forth joint principles and purposes which should have some value. It was unfortunate that the British had been unwilling to enter into “United Action” discussions in early April, as proposed by the United States.3 The British had made a mistake in insisting that action be postponed until the attitude of the Communists at the Geneva Conference was known. The Secretary said he knew before hand what the attitude would be. The situation is far more difficult now than it was in early April. At that time a strong joint stand might have been effective. Now we are trying to pick up where we left off in early April, under far more disadvantageous circumstances. The British were rather annoyed at the reference in the Secretary’s speech at Los Angeles on June 11, to Secretary Stimson’s effort in 1931 to obtain collective action to restrain Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The Secretary said that he felt he has received “a plain rebuff”, as Stimson had in 1931. He felt history is repeating itself.
The Secretary said that the outlook on the Chinese Communist recognition and UN membership issue was not reassuring. It is feared that the French will recognize Communist China as a part of any political settlement which they may reach. The Canadian [Page 487] position on the issue is becoming very soft. Churchill and Eden had indicated that they felt it would be difficult to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN indefinitely, if a settlement should be reached in Indochina. Both the President and the Secretary had been very firm on this issue in the conversations. They had taken a strong position, which possibly had made some impression on Churchill and Eden. There was some difference of approach to the problem as between Churchill and Eden. Churchill showed more understanding of the U.S. position, while Eden seemed more responsive to the influence of India.
In response to a question from the Ambassador, the Secretary said that there was some hope that the British would continue to observe the informal “moratorium” agreement,4 at least until the next regular session of the GA in September, and possibly for a time beyond that. However, there is no commitment on the part of the British. In answer to another question, the Secretary said that the issue unquestionably was substantive rather than procedural, and should be decided by a two-thirds vote. The question was of fundamental importance and was not a mere question of accreditation to be decided by a Credentials Committee. It was in no way comparable to a question of accepting or rejecting the credentials of rival delegations from, say a small Central American country. The Secretary said he felt the question was subject to a veto in the Security Council.
[Here follows discussion relating to Indochina.]
The Ambassador asked if the U.S. Government could not make some official statement which would show its interest in the protection of the offshore islands. A U.S. statement would have psychological value. The Chinese thought if we could not formally include the islands in the U.S. defense zone, at least a statement that the U.S. Navy would patrol the waters adjacent to the offshore islands, would have a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communists.
The Secretary remarked that vessels of the 7th Fleet had recently conducted a patrol in the vicinity of the Ta’chen Islands. This had undoubtedly been observed by the Chinese Communists. He felt that actions spoke louder than words. He thought there would undoubtedly be other U.S. naval patrols in the vicinity of the offshore islands. In response to a question from the Secretary, Mr. McConaughy confirmed that the Chinese are free to use the military hardware provided through MAAG on the offshore islands if [Page 488] they wish to do so. Also by a system of rotation, Chinese forces who have benefited from MAAG training on Formosa, can be used on the offshore islands. There is no geographic limitation on the use of MAAG assistance in the areas controlled by the Chinese Government. It is true that MAAG officers are not stationed on the offshore islands, but it is presumed that the Chinese Government is not suggesting any change in this respect.
The Ambassador confirmed that he was not requesting that MAAG officers actually be stationed on the offshore islands. He seemed satisfied with the reply given him.
The Secretary mentioned the recent seizure of a Soviet tanker by the Chinese Navy, and jokingly said, “You may get yourselves in a real war that way”. The Secretary mentioned Soviet complaints at the reconnaissance activities of U.S. planes over the high seas in the Far East.5 The Secretary said that there was no foundation for the complaints, and said that our planes would continue to carry on reconnaissance over the high seas where it was part of their mission to do so. He said it was probably true that U.S. planes had observed Soviet ship movements in Far Eastern waters.
The Ambassador asked the Secretary if he could clarify a statement reportedly made by the President in a press conference the preceeding day, to the general effect that the United States would not be a party to the enslavement of any people. Specifically, the Ambassador wanted to know what would be the U.S. attitude following a partition of Viet Nam if the Vietnamese south of the demarcation line should endeavor to come to the assistance of their enslaved fellow countrymen on the Communist side of the line.
The Secretary said that he would not attempt to enlarge upon the President’s remarks, since he did not know the context, or precisely what the President had in mind. An impromptu answer to a press inquiry could not be formulated with the accuracy or precision of a State document. Generally speaking, it could be stated that this Government, while it might not be able to do all it would like to assist victims of Communist enslavement, did not approve any arrangement which subjected free people to Communist enslavement, nor was it disposed to interfere with peaceful efforts to bring about their liberation.
- For documentation concerning the Churchill–Eden visit to Washington, June 25–29, see volume vi.↩
- The text of the Joint Declaration issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill on June 29 is in Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.↩
- Dulles proposed “united action” in opposition to aggression in Southeast Asia in his speech of Mar. 29, 1954; for text of this speech, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539–542. Related documentation is in volume xii, Part 1.↩
- For documentation concerning the informal U.S.-British agreement of June 1, 1951, that both would support postponement of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 245 ff.; for documentation concerning the continuation of the “moratorium”, see vol. iii, pp. 620 ff.↩
- In a note of June 24 concerning the seizure of the Tuapse, the Soviet Union had charged that “seizure of a Soviet tanker by a war vessel in waters controlled by the U.S. naval fleet could be carried out only by naval forces of the U.S.” The texts of the Soviet note and the U.S. reply of June 26, which rejected the Soviet allegation that U.S. Naval Forces had seized or interfered with the Tuapse, are printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, p. 51. Documentation on earlier Soviet protests at the reconnaissance activities of U.S. planes in the Far East is scheduled for publication in volume viii.↩