795.5/6–2254
No. 223
The Ambassador in the Republic of
China (Rankin) to the Secretary of
State1
official–informal
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked me to forward for your personal attention the “Agreed Minutes,”2 which he prepared and which correctly summarize his talk with me on June 17. This referred to your conversation of May 19 with Ambassador Koo regarding a proposed Chinese-American Security Pact.
[Page 482]After the Minister handed the enclosed minutes to me yesterday, we discussed the dilemma now facing Free China: As far as its leaders can see, present United States policy envisages neither enough military aid to create significant offensive power on Formosa, nor yet the extension of such security and political support as a bilateral pact would provide.
While fighting continued in Korea, of course, Free China had certain offensive capabilities relative to available Communist strength. As you know, the military effort of Red China in the Korean theater represented nearly the limit of its capabilities. While maintaining large forces in other areas, the Chinese Communists possessed neither the military equipment nor the supply facilities to carry on sustained combat outside Korea, except on a very minor scale. During that period it was quite feasible and desirable that Free China should mount raids on Communist-held territory, for diversionary and other purposes. Formosa could not only have spared the three divisions, without equipment, which were offered for Korea, but could have undertaken larger offensive operations against the mainland, had the United States been willing to provide naval and logistic support.
During the past year, however, the picture has changed more than most people realize. Communist military strength on the mainland opposite Formosa has grown faster than that of Free China. Future raids on Red territory are liable to be very costly, except for small scale intelligence and sabotage operations. In fact, it seems prudent to assume that total Chinese Communist military strength today is not only greater than that of our friends and allies in this area, but that it is growing faster. Any possibility of significant offensive operations by Free China, therefore, would seem to be contingent upon one or more of the following:
- a.
- Involvement of Red China in large scale hostilities in another theater.
- b.
- Development of serious internal weaknesses behind the Curtain.
- c.
- Modification of American policies and amplification of aid programs.
The Chinese Communists doubtless are aware that Free China presents no serious military threat to them under present conditions, and that there is no indication of any change in this situation which would be other than to their advantage.
In general, the United States seems not to have followed a policy of assisting its friends abroad to develop offensive military capabilities. Something of the kind is foreseen for Free China in our policy papers, however, and it still would be possible to create a Chinese army on Formosa which would have significant offensive power. [Page 483] Under various circumstances, the mere existence of such an army, and the possibility of its being used offensively with United States naval, air and logistic support, might make unnecessary its actual employment in combat. The Chinese Reds would have something very serious to worry about.
But if we were to give Free China important offensive military capabilities, we should not want them to be used offensively without our consent. In informing President Chiang, on February 1, 1953, of the “deneutralization of Formosa,” I felt it wise to take the initiative in obtaining his promise to “undertake no significant attacks on Communist-held territory, especially if aircraft, tanks etc. (were) involved, without first consulting General Chase.” (Taipei telegram 784 of February 1, 1953.)
My conversation with the Foreign Minister on June 17 seemed an appropriate occasion to stimulate Chinese official thinking about a possible further commitment on their part not to initiate major military action independently. You will note in the last paragraph of the enclosed minutes that I inquired whether they would give us a firm undertaking to avoid such action if we objected. (Understandings to date have provided simply for prior consultation under specified conditions.) The Minister raised the question with President Chiang and later told me that the President preferred to discuss this point only after the conclusion of a bilateral treaty was substantially assured. I am confident, however, that guarantees could be obtained on this point in the event that we should decide to give Free China offensive military power, or a bilateral security pact, or both.
Kindest personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
- Filed with a memorandum dated July 21 from Drumright to Dulles.↩
- The “Agreed Minutes”, attached to the source text, summarized a conversation on June 17 between Rankin and Foreign Minister Yeh, in which Yeh commented on Secretary Dulles’ May 19 conversation with Ambassador Koo (see McConaughy’s memorandum of conversation, Document 193). Yeh stated that the purpose of the proposed pact was political rather than military, that it would not increase U.S. military commitments, and that if Dulles was concerned that an attack on Taiwan might be brought about by a Nationalist attack on the mainland, his attention should be drawn to President Chiang’s promise that the Chinese would not launch any major military operation against the mainland without prior consultation with the United States. Rankin then asked whether the Chinese Government would be prepared to enter into a firm understanding that it would not take major offensive action against the mainland in the face of U.S. objections; Yeh replied that such an understanding should not be incorporated in the pact but said that he would consult President Chiang.↩