Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”

No. 196
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 22, 1954—9:15 a.m.

Present:

• The President, J.F. Dulles, A.W. Dulles, Anderson,²Radford, and Cutler

The first question taken up was the position of the US relative to Communist attacks on the island chains bordering the China Coast between Formosa and the mainland. The position of the US as publicly stated up to the present time has related to the defense of Formosa, and there has not been any specific reference to the outlying island chains. However, it is obviously implicit in the defense of Formosa to hold some of the outlying islands. To that end, the US has for some time been flying air patrols, particularly with reference to the islands in the various chains which are held by the ChiNats, and where there is some US personnel or radar installation. These visits are entirely proper, as the US has formally recognized Formosa and has publicly announced its position in regard thereto.

Intelligence estimates make clear that the Chinese Communists are massing considerable air and naval forces in East China, including US LST’s (which fell into their hands when the ChiNats abandoned the mainland). It is estimated that it would take 25,000 ground troops to seize the Tachens group. If such an attack were made by Red China, the Tachens could not be held by the ChiNat forces without US air power for the purpose of destroying attacking amphibious craft and supporting Red Chinese aircraft.

The US has as yet no mutual security pact with Formosa. One reason for this is that the US has not wished publicly to make any declaration about the outlying island chains. (The Pescadores group has been dealt with differently, and as a part of Formosa.) The President seriously questioned any public statement as to the US attempting to try to hold any part of the outlying island chains, as too big a commitment of US prestige and forces. It was agreed that no such public statement should be made. Radford pointed out that some of the islands, like Chinmen, off Amoy, can be defended by the ChiNats from Formosa. He pointed out that the problem facing the US was rather a psychological one at this juncture. We would not wish the Reds to have any more victories in the Far East.

The President suggested that elements of the US Seventh Fleet, such as destroyers or light carriers and possibly a cruiser, visit the Tachens and other islands held by the ChiNats, make calls on these islands and perhaps stay for a few days. This show of US strength would make our position clear.

The question was then raised as to what would happen if our Fleet was attacked by the Reds. Radford pointed out that it might not be necessary to report such an attack. He said that our air patrols were quite frequently attacked, although they kept beyond the 20 mile limit, yet neither side had reported these events. He said that the Navy, if attacked, would of course defend itself.

The President made the point that the US was acting perfectly within its rights in having its armed forces visit territory occupied by a friendly power; that the US had publicly announced its position that it would defend Formosa; that it was merely routine to such defense (whether or not a public announcement had already been made) to defend also outlying islands, the loss of which would make the defense of Formosa much more difficult, or perhaps impossible. Some of these islands, with their radar stations and air fields, are really an integral part of the Formosa defense. He went on to say that we should not offensively attack the mainland of China in defending Formosa and the outlying islands, unless the security of our forces should require such an attack.

(As this matter seemed somewhat obscure to RC, we had a meeting outside the President’s office later. The understanding arrived at in this matter was as follows:

If our Fleet on a patrolling mission, such as has been described, or if engaged in defending outlying islands against attack, was drawn into conflict with the Chinese enemy attacking such islands, our planes would not be justified in striking at targets on the Chinese Mainland. If, however, the Chinese Reds made an attack from the mainland on our carrier fleet, perhaps 100 or more miles at sea, then our security would permit us to follow such an attack in hot pursuit to the mainland bases.)

The President asked me to give him a memorandum to speak to the [Legislative] Leaders on Monday, May 24,³ on this matter. He wants to speak of this in a casual way, as a recital of a continuance of action that we have been taking for some time,—that no new policy question is raised, that we are only continuing to take steps to protect Formosa and the necessary integral territories outlying Formosa. The Seventh Fleet would be continuing the mission which it has held to date. Of course, if the US Fleet, going where it has a right to go, is attacked by an enemy, it would defend itself. Radford pointed out that the Congress had tacitly approved of the defense of Formosa, and had appropriated money specifically for that purpose. The Secretary of State will mention to the bipartisan group when he speaks on the afternoon of May 24⁴ about this matter, making clear that no new question of policy is raised, and that he is merely bringing them up to date on developments in a continuing situation. The President also asked Secretary Anderson casually to mention the matter the next time he testifies before the Armed Services Committee.

[Here follows discussion pertaining to Guatemala.]

1. Sent to Dulles with a covering memorandum of May 24 from Cutler. A memorandum of the same conversation by Dulles is also in the Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”.
2. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson.

3. The memorandum from Cutler to Eisenhower, dated May 24, not printed, is attached to the source text. One of the President’s regular meetings with Congressional leaders was held on May 24; notes of the meeting, prepared by Assistant Staff Secretary L. Arthur Minnich, read in part as follows:

   “The President told the Leaders he hoped they would be alert to the problems of the defense of Formosa and the outpost islands. He was not requesting any specific action of them at this point.

   “Sen. Saltonstall asked what was involved—was it a matter of putting men on the islands? The President replied that it was not that at all. He recalled the Seventh Fleet order, and added that we are trying to protect the islands with the Seventh Fleet—not to establish bases. It was merely that if the question should arise, it would be good to give a ‘matter of course’ statement that the islands are part of the Formosa complex.” (Supplementary Notes of Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 24, 1954, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

4. A memorandum by Dulles, dated May 24, of his meeting that day with a bipartisan group of House leaders, reads in part as follows: “I mentioned the responsibilities of the US and the position of the Nationalists on Formosa and the Pescadores and other offshore islands, indicating that certain eventualities might lead to the desirability of bolstering up these positions which we were attempting to defend.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”)