794A.5/8–353
No. 132
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the
Acting Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Defense of Chinese Off-shore Islands: View of JCS
At the weekly meeting with the JCS on July 31, the matter of the defense of the Chinese off-shore islands was discussed in the light of recent requests from the Chinese Government for greater U.S. assistance in their defense.
General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler stated the view of the JCS that from a strictly military standpoint the islands could not be considered essential to the defense of Formosa. They recognized that there were important political and other considerations involved, which were outside their province. General Bradley said that there were no good harbors on any of the islands suitable as a base for a large amphibious operation such as would be necessary for a major attack on Formosa. The JCS believes that mainland ports would have to be used by the Communists as their principal bases for an amphibious attack on Formosa. Furthermore, the JCS felt that, owing to the usual initial advantages of the offense over the defense, the Chinese Communists could take any of the islands against any defense that could be mustered, if they were willing to commit the requisite forces. The JCS expressed the view, and the State representatives agreed, that no U.S. statement appeared to be called for which would imply any change in the mission of the U.S. 7th Fleet or refer to the patrol activities carried out by that Fleet.
[Page 241]General Bradley acknowledged that the islands are useful to the Chinese Government and that their retention by the Chinese Nationalists was desirable.
. . . . . . .
Admiral Fechteler mentioned that the Cole Bill2 made available 25 naval vessels not larger than destroyer size for transfer to FE nations. Any or all of these could be turned over to the Chinese Government. In addition, an unspecified number of smaller landing craft could be made available under other arrangements for use in patrolling the off-shore island areas. He thought that the cost of these vessels would have to be charged to MDAP. He was not certain whether the full number of 132 small craft requested by the Chinese Government could be made available. He thought there was a rather low limit on the number of vessels the Chinese Navy could usefully employ. He thought they could man two destroyers in six months, and two more three or four months later.
It was agreed that working level officers from Defense, JCS, and State would meet to ascertain what shallow-draft vessels were to be turned over to the Chinese Government, and what other indirect assistance was being made available to the Chinese Government to encourage and assist it to hold the off-shore islands.
Taipei’s No. 593 can be answered on the basis of these findings when they are approved.4
- Sent through Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, whose initials appear on the source text, indicating his concurrence.↩
- Fechteler was referring to S. 2277, a bill authorizing the loan of certain naval vessels to Italy and France, which had been amended in the House on July 27 by the addition of the provision he described; the amended bill had been passed by both the House and Senate. It was approved by the President on Aug. 5 as P.L. 188; for text, see 67 Stat. 363.↩
- Telegram 59 from Taipei, July 28, reported that the Chinese Government was anxious for a reply, even though of an interim nature, to its requests transmitted in telegram 51, Document 127. (793.00/7–2853)↩
- The notation “Yes—but we had better give an interim reply. WBS” appears in Smith’s handwriting on the source text and an attached note.↩