Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

460.509/7–2753: Circular telegram

No. 130
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices¹

top secret

Washington, July 29, 1953—7:25 p.m.

67. Excon. Re Paris Polto 137² inquiring US position trade controls following Korean truce:³

1. For your background information and general guidance, US attitude toward economic measures against Communist China following armistice was fixed in cabinet level determination July 7, 1953.⁴ In dealing with general considerations underlying US tactics immediately following armistice in Korea, determination took account of following:

a. Armistice in Korea would not indicate Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness seek these objectives by armed force. Danger of aggression would continue, particularly in Southeast Asia, while Communists would attempt exploit armistice as tactical device to weaken and divide free world.

b. After an armistice major allies of US would be increasingly unwilling support US in maintaining political and economic pressures against Communist China. Consequently, existing differences between US and its major allies over policy toward China would be intensified, and this might lead to serious breach between US and its major allies over the Far East.

c. It is important to our national security as well as to the objective of obtaining acceptable settlement in Korea that political and economic pressures against Communist China be developed and maintained during the immediate post-armistice period, and that the expected opposition of our major allies to such pressures be overcome.

2. Determination then outlined in part following interim courses of action to be pursued during political negotiations for peace and until review of basic US policies toward China and toward Korea completed:

a. Continue US total embargo on trade with Communist China, prohibition of US shipping to Communist China, and current financial controls with respect to Communist China.

b. Continue intensified efforts persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China in event of Korean armistice.

3. Paris-USDel–CHINCOM only: Further instructions will follow shortly concerning handling specific pending and potential trade control problems.

Dulles

1. Sent to 26 missions.
2. Dated July 27. (460.509/7–2753)
3. An armistice agreement had been signed at Panmunjom on July 27. For the text, see 4 UST (pt. 1) 234, or TIAS 2782; for related documentation, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1446 ff.
4. Reference is to NSC 154/1, “United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea,” July 7, 1953; for text, see vol. xv, Part 2, p. 1341.