Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 121
Memorandum of Discussion at the 153d
Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 9,
19531
eyes only
The following were present at the 153rd meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (for Item 1); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; Ralph Clark, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); Commander Perry Johnson, USN, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); J. J. Hitchcock, [Page 227] Central Intelligence Agency (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion concerning electromagnetic communications and the first portion of an intelligence briefing concerning the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles.]
Lastly, Mr. Dulles stated that he wished to call to the Council’s attention and discuss briefly the threat posed by the Chinese Communists to the off-shore islands held by the Chinese Nationalist forces. He pointed out that some of the lesser islands had been captured since the threat became apparent on June 21, and while the main islands, the Tachens, etc., were still under Nationalist control, there was obvious danger that they would presently fall into Communist hands. This would be serious, since the Tachens, for example, have some 7000 Nationalist soldiers and guerrillas.
The President inquired what kind of naval vessels to mount an attack were possessed by the Chinese Communists, and what in the way of a naval force Chiang Kai-shek could dispose for resisting Communist attack by sea.
General Collins replied to the President’s question by pointing out that each side had roughly the same collection of motley vessels, small craft, motorized junks, and the like. He added that he had glanced, before he left his office, at a message from Admiral Radford which proposed to authorize the Chinese Nationalists to extend their operations in defense of the islands.2
The President then inquired whether it would not be possible to give Chiang Kai-shek a half dozen or so small light U.S. naval vessels—destroyers, escort vessels, or frigates. He said he felt that it would be easy to get Congressional permission to effect such a transfer in order to help defend these islands.
Mr. Dulles replied that he thought this an excellent suggestion, pointing out that the Chinese Communists had more than enough soldiers to capture these islands once they had managed to get together the necessary vessels to transport the troops. Accordingly, [Page 228] the islands were doomed unless they could be defended by air and sea.…
The President then returned to his previously expressed idea, and suggested that Admiral Radford be asked to provide the Council with his views as to the make-up and character of a small but effective navy for Chiang Kai-shek. As long, said the President, as it was our policy to support Chiang Kai-shek, we ought at least to provide a few small vessels to assist in this emergency.
General Collins pointed out that the training and maintenance of such naval forces would present some little difficulty, but the President brushed aside this point as only to be expected.
Secretary Dulles inquired whether such a transfer could be carried out under existing legislation.
General Collins thought it probable, but suggested that the matter should be investigated.
The National Security Council:3
- a.
- Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, with particular reference to unrest in the satellite countries and to the impending danger to Chinese Nationalist forces on the off-shore islands along the central China coast.
- b.
- Noted the President’s desire that the Department of Defense report to the Council on July 23 as to the feasibility of transferring to the Chinese National Government such number of light U.S. naval ships as Admiral Radford might deem appropriate.
Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.
[Here follows discussion of other agenda items, including Korea, the Middle East, and foreign reactions to administration policies.]
- Drafted by Gleason as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC on July 10.↩
- Reference is apparently to telegram 080525Z from CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 8, which reported steps he had taken to encourage Nationalist defense of the offshore islands and stated that the Nationalists would require firm counsel and more positive indications of U.S. support. (Enclosure “C” to JCS 1259/293, July 14; JCS records, CCS 381 (1–24–42) Sec. 40) Radford had previously recommended in telegram 260358Z from CINCPAC to CNO, June 26, that he should be assigned the responsibility of assisting in the defense of those Nationalist-held offshore islands which were determined by the United States to be essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. (JCS records, CCS 381 (1–24–42) Sec. 40)↩
- The lettered subparagraphs below constitute NSC Action No. 841. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 65 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1953”)↩