Office of the Historian

794A.5/6–1953

No. 112
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State

secret
No. 660
Taipei, June 19, 1953.

Ref:

  • Taipei Despatch 657 of June 18, 1953
[Page 211]

Subject:

  • Sino-American Military Discussions of Problems Related to the Joint Defense of Formosa

During the week of May 25–31, 1953 a team of United States officers from CINCPAC, United States Air Forces in the Far East and MAAG, Formosa met with Chinese military staff representatives to develop mutually acceptable arrangements for closer coordination of the defense of Formosa by United States and Chinese armed forces. The staff team was directed by Admirals Hedding, Williamson and Storrs and its work was preparatory to the visit of Admiral Radford (June 2–6, 1953), reported in the referenced despatch.

A wide range of agreement was achieved through intensive staff work in two joint committees; one for operations and planning, the second for logistics. The following were the topics covered:

1.
The nature of the threat to the military security of Formosa and the pattern of defense required to meet it.
2.
Coordination of defense plans.
3.
Coordination of operations.
4.
Establishment of a combined staff organization.
5.
Timing for participation of United States forces and conditions under which they would become engaged in action to defend Formosa.
6.
Exchange of intelligence.
7.
Combined training.
8.
Logistics (bases and supplies).
9.
Communications.

The details of these recommendations which will presumably form the basis for future JCS and CINCPAC directives are contained in the enclosed reports of the two Sino-American staff committees. Admiral Radford is understood to have given his tentative approval to the agreed recommendations.

The principal areas of disagreement between American and Chinese staff representatives concerned the form which a combined staff Organization should take and the conditions under which United States forces would become actively engaged. As indicated in the attached report of Committee One,1 the Chinese favor a single combined staff organization responsible to both United States and Chinese commanding officers, while United States representatives consider that separate units with close liaison would be preferable. As indicated in the despatch under reference, Admiral Radford plans to establish a separate CINCPAC operational commander on Formosa for matters relating to tactical planning and operations, leaving MAAG the technical functions of military [Page 212] training. Details of the Sino-American command relationship for the defense of Formosa remain to be worked out on a higher level.

On the question of United States forces, the Chinese were anxious for the United States to commit itself to a precise set of conditions which would be interpreted as an imminent threat of attack on Formosa and which would be the signal for immediate deployment of United States forces for active defense participation. The request was rejected, however, and the commitment left in the general terms of “defense in the event of attack”. It was agreed, however, that adequate provision should be made through the exchange of intelligence and other advance preparations for timely despatch of United States air and naval forces whenever an attack in force appeared imminent.

The problem of utilization of airbase facilities on Formosa by United States Air Force and Navy aircraft was discussed in general terms. All United States proposals in this connection were agreed to by the Ministry of National Defense. MAAG, Air Section, is to determine actual requirements and clear with the Chinese Air Force. United States Air Force representatives from Tokyo did not take an active part in this or other decisions since their command had not authorized them to act except as observers.

Comment: The Embassy did not participate in the discussions and negotiations leading to the agreements outlined above. There has been no exchange of notes with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding United States utilization of air bases. It is assumed that the informal understanding in principle between CINCPAC and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (see enclosed report of Committee No. 2,2 Section I, Paragraph B–3) will suffice until United States Air Force and Navy requirements have been determined by MAAG as recommended in the report of Committee No. 2.

HP Jones
  1. Not printed, but see the memorandum of conversation by Martin, Document 296.↩
  2. Not printed.↩