793.5 MSP/5–2653: Telegram
No. 104
The Chargé in the Republic of
China (Jones) to
the Department of State
1215. For Ambassador Rankin, CA.1 Foreign Office has submitted following corrections memo handed you by Foreign Minister Yeh May 21.2 Following is corrected text for pages 2 and 3.
“As to meet[ing] the requirements for the defense of the island. It has also sought to develop the strength of its armed forces in anticipation of their possible strategic employment in times of emergency. More progress along these lines would have been achieved had there been no delay in the delivery of certain allocated military equipment. The current military aid program provides mainly for the equipment and training of ten armies of 20 divisions, one independent division, and one armored brigade consisting of three combined groups, each group being equivalent to one infantry division in strength. Besides, 345 aircraft of various types have been approved in the programs for fiscal year 1951, 1952 and fiscal year 1953. Roughly, up to the end of March 1953 only 40 percent of the army equipment and 25 percent of the aircraft and equipment have been delivered.
“The off-shore islands form an integral part of the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. Owing to the confinement of the military aid to the armed forces on Taiwan, the Chinese Government has had no choice but to maintain its armed forces on the off-shore islands as separate units. To strengthen the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, it is imperative to have them integrated with the forces on Taiwan into one single fighting unit and given the same training and equipment. It is proposed that the program for the fiscal year 1954 be extended to include the armed forces on the offshore islands, which consist of one paratroop division, two armies of four divisions and one independent division. It is also proposed that all the above divisions be brought up to T/O and E strength as early as possible. In view of the absence of a pipeline of supply within the operating range, it is recommended that the stock of expendable materials should be maintained at a 120- to 180-day level instead of the 60-day level as maintained by the United States armed forces. The reasons for this proposal are already familiar to General Chase.
“It will be recalled that no naval craft has been included in the United States aid program for China in recent years. It is considered essential to the defense of the island to have an additional number of ships of various types, including 6 DD’s and other auxiliary [Page 197] vessels. The Chinese Air Force is well organized and has every potential—.”
Following additional corrections should be made:
[Here follows a list of minor corrections.]
Copies these corrections will be forwarded by pouch May 27.3
- Rankin was in Washington for consultation.↩
- The memorandum, a Chinese proposal for the U.S. aid program for fiscal year 1954, was sent to the Department under cover of despatch 618, May 21, but is not filed with the latter. (794A.5 MSP/5–2153)↩
- They were enclosed with despatch 624 from Taipei, May 26. (794A.5 MSP/52153)↩