794A.5/4–2353: Telegram
No. 101
The Chargé in the Republic of
China (Jones) to
the Department of State1
1118. Reference Deptel 848, April 17; 863, April 22;2 Embtel 1107, repeated Manila 100 April 21. Formal communication committing Chinese Government not to engage in offensive military operations inimical best interests of US handed to me today by Foreign Minister. Text of note follows: “As result of discussions with Government of USA, Government of Republic of China agrees in principle that Government of USA will be consulted for any offensive military operations against mainland of China which would radically alter pattern or tempo of operations hitherto undertaken. As to exact implication of words ‘pattern or tempo of present operations’, Chinese Government has designated General Chow Chih-jou, Chief of General Staff, to enter into further discussion with Major General William C. Chase, Chief of USMAAG in Taipei”.
Pursuant to above General Chow Chih-jou is despatching letter to General Chase, one paragraph of which gives further specific assurance re offensive use of aircraft: “I wish also to reassure you that, with exception of employment of MDAP jet aircraft for defense of Taiwan and necessary reconnaissance patrol missions, prior consultation with US authorities will be made on all future offensive operations involving use of US MDAP jet aircraft.”3
- Repeated for information to Manila for Radford.↩
- Telegram 863 to Taipei, Apr. 22, stated that, assuming the Chinese Government’s formal communication was identical with the Foreign Minister’s oral statement reported in telegram 1107 (supra), the Department concurred that the commitment was acceptable. The Department also reported, with the Navy’s concurrence, that Rankin should be kept informed by CINCPAC concerning matters related to the Chinese commitment and should be consulted in advance on policy questions. (794A.5/4–2153)↩
- Reference is to a letter of Apr. 23 from Chow to Chase, which reads: “With respect to the tempo and pattern of our offensive operations we are willing at the present time not to alter them radically without prior consultation with you as Chief MAAG Taiwan and further consultation by you with higher United States authority.” It also noted that at least one raid prior to February 1953 had involved more than 500 men, suggested that “significant offensive operations” be taken to mean operations involving the use of troops of all 3 services, expressed the hope that opportunities for combat experience would be made available to the Chinese Armed Forces, and requested that delivery of U.S. arms and equipment be speeded up. (Taipei Embassy files, lot 62 F 83) Chow’s letter replied to a letter from Chase dated Apr. 13, which requested a written commitment that the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces would neither “engage in any offensive operations which, after consultation with me and with higher headquarters, are determined to be inimical to the best interests of the United States,” nor “radically alter the tempo or pattern of their offensive operations without prior consultation with me as Chief of MAAG, Formosa, and further consultation by me with higher United States authority.” It specified that the “tempo and pattern of offensive operations” referred to that existing “prior to deneutralization of Formosa on or about 3 February 1953.” Chase’s letter has not been found in Department of State files, but a paragraph is quoted in despatch 646 from Taipei, May 10, 1956. (793.5/5–1056) A letter of June 24, from Chase to Chow stated that he should be informed of any plans for offensive operations involving regular forces, whether or not in conjunction with guerrilla forces, and whether the planned operation was to be mounted from Taiwan, the Pescadores, or the Nationalist-held offshore islands. (Taiwan Embassy files, lot 62 F 83)↩