Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.00/11–1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Ward) to the Department of State¹

secret

Kabul, November 13, 1952—6 p.m.

266. King’s formal remarks on occasion my presentation Nov 8² contained no statement of tele import. During our colloquy fol formal presentation King talked almost uninterruptedly for half hour. Remarks limited, however, to statement of admiration for, friendship toward and confidence in US, thanks for US constructive interest in and aid to country, and lengthy dissertation on need fusing interests of isolated areas and diverse peoples this country through improved highway system promoting more rapid travel and goods exchange. Project of warmest interest is building new highway from Charikar to Pul-I-Khumri via Khinjan, some 100 kilometers, thereby shortening present Charikar Pul-I-Khumri highway between Cis and Trans-Hindu Kush by some 150 kilometers.

Delivered message Deptel 141 Oct 11³ yesterday to FonMin, who stated econ development Trans-Hindu Kush will continue as vigorously as physical and fin circumstances permit, but early renewal petroleum exploration not contemplated. He, too (FonMin was present at my conversation with King) voiced need for improved highway between Cis and Trans-Hindu Kush to strengthen natl econ and to give compensatory benefit to country’s most important revenue producing area in North which not being immed benefited by Helmand Project in South.⁴ He voiced country’s thanks and warmest appreciation US and UN assistance, and made passing mention need for assistance in approaching wheat crisis (Embtel 254 Nov 5).⁵FonMin made but passing mention of US démarche of Nov 6, 1950 in his thanks for US interest and assistance his country. He was flowery in comments on US efforts for world peace and betterment of mankind. He stated govt not prepared send Amb Karachi unless Paks indicate willingness discuss Pashtunistan question (in fact, he used word “negotiate” almost as frequently as “discuss”). He held forth in hour long monologue this question, during course which he stated were Paks to evince conciliatory attitude Afghan would probably “tomorrow or day after” send mission or high official to Karachi for exploratory discussions. He referred to Sov threat to Iran and Commie threat to India and implied quite clearly they are influences toward ultimately forcing Pak conciliation in settlement Pashtun question for reason Pak survival dependent on coexistence non-Commie Afghan, and for this reason Pak will continue refrain from econ pressure for throttling which may create want in Afghan sufficient entail discontent and create disorder exploitable by USSR. If FonMin’s contention valid wld seem to explain feeling [I heard?] in conversation with Gov Gen at Karachi and Gov at Peshawar that notwithstanding their bold phrases, inter alia “we could crush Afghan out of hand if we so wanted.” Paks too may feel they are “riding the tiger” in Pashtunistan question.

Delivered Sec State’s greeting (Deptel 72 Sept 4)⁶ to PriMin this morning, which he reciprocates warmly. He stated petroleum explorations suspended for “these days only” and will be resumed shortly because urgent need country bolster its earning power. He made brief mention wheat situation and expressed hope US will see fit give needed assistance. My mention Pashtunistan launched him on half hour uninterrupted dissertation. PriMin stated send Amb to Karachi without prior public statement by Paks that Pashtun question would be discussed would be interpreted by populace as GOA abandonment brother Afghans across border and would arouse populace to excesses (although statement may be far fetched, there is possibility Pashtun creature has become master of creator, as not infrequently happens with artificial bugaboos). He stated Pashtun question has magnified itself in sentiments of Afghans “like pellet of snow rolling down mountain side.” Were GOPak indicate willingness toward conciliation of Pashtun question, GOAf stands prepared send exploratory mission or govt official Karachi, but will not send Amb without unequivocal indication willingness discuss question (PriMin unlike FonMin did not use word “negotiate,” but his command English less broad than FonMin). He added that even though discussions non-productive of result for “a month, a year, two years or more,” GOAf would continue them (Comment: Discussions would break impasse and afford face-saving escape.) PriMin stated whereas no Commies in country 15 years ago, such not case today and young people are falling away from Orthodox Religion and many turning to Communism. Any indication GOAf turning away from Pashtunistan would, PriMin feels, be used by Commies as strong anti-govt propaganda weapon. (Comment: Highly questionable reasoning.) He estimated that “imperialistic tendencies” of and menace mounting Communism in India may cause GOPak evidence conciliatoriness in Pashtun question, but at same time be alleged realization continuation this open sore weakens Afghan vis-à-vis USSR. He referred US Nov 1950 offer good offices, but gave impression he now considers them no longer active. Only sharpness of word and tone throughout conversation was when PriMin commented on vilification of King, govt and Afghan ancestry constantly published in pub Azad Afghan at Peshawar (Embtel 187, Oct 7, para 3).⁷

Ward

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi, London, and Moscow.
2. Angus Ward was appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan on June 27, succeeding George R. Merrell.
3. Post, p. 1462.
4. See footnote 4, p. 1379.
5. See footnote 4, p. 1464.
6. In telegram 72 to Kabul, the Department instructed Ambassador Ward to convey the Secretary’s best wishes to the Afghan Prime Minister and to urge that Afghanistan appoint an ambassador to Pakistan. (123 Angus Ward)
7. In telegram 187 from Kabul, not printed, Chargé Horner reported on a meeting with British Ambassador Lingeman and Pakistan Ambassador Shah to discuss the Pushtunistan problem and Soviet pressure on Afghanistan. (689.90D/ 10–752)