Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945

Bohlen Collection

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon

top secret

Subjects:¹

1. The Polish Formula.

2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

3. Yugoslavia.

4. Reparations.

5. Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.

6. World Organization.

7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.

8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.

9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.

10. Iran.

Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

1. The Polish Formula.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula² and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that “as soon as practicable” be changed to “as soon as possible.” He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: “the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.”³

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this second change.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night’s and today’s discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.⁴

2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov’s amendment is attached hereto.⁵

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words “they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration,” be replaced by the words “they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation.”

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov’s amendment of February 9.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the British proposals⁶ regarding French association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o’clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

3. Yugoslavia.

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin’s proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

Mr. Eden suggested that both courses might be advisable.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.⁷

4. Reparations.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Maisky interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9,⁸ the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.⁹

Mr. Eden stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile—the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this last statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that Mr. Eden’s reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

Mr. Eden interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

5. Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

6. World Organization.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of the subcommittee.¹⁰

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i. e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.

7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.

Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of “Athens”. He wished to submit a small paper on the question.¹¹

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.¹²

9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.

In accordance with Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.¹³

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden’s views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice¹⁴ and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

10. Iran.

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.¹⁵

Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and re-examined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov opposed this suggestion.

1. For the United States Delegation memorandum on the items still before the Foreign Ministers, see post, p. 882.
2. Ante, p. 867.
3. See the United States Delegation memorandum, post, p. 884.
4. For the formula on Poland as amended by the Foreign Ministers, see the United States Delegation memorandum, post, pp. 883–884, and Eden’s report to the Seventh Plenary Meeting, post, p. 898.
5. Ante, pp. 862–863.
6. Post, p. 884.
7. Post, pp. 919–920.
8. Ante, p. 808.
9. Post, p. 885.
10. Post, pp. 885–886.
11. Post, p. 887.
12. Post, pp. 888–889.
13. Post, pp. 891–893.
14. For the text of the armistice with Bulgaria, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, pp. 1–4, 17, or 58 Stat. 1498.
15. Ante, pp. 819–820.