740.00119 Control
(Germany)/7–1745
No. 855
Memorandum by the Central
Secretariat1
top secret
SC–145b
[Washington,] July 18,
1945.
Proposed Communication to
the Secretary at the Berlin Meeting on the Objective of the
United States Government in the Occupation of
Germany
There is attached a redraft of the proposed communication to the
Secretary on the objective of the United States Government in
the occupation of Germany.
This redraft has been prepared by Mr. MacLeish in the light of comments in the
meetings of the Staff Committee on July 16 and July 17.2
Subject: Objective of the United States
Government in the Occupation of Germany
- (1)
- The Allied purpose with respect to the future of
Germany was stated in the communiqué issued at the close
of the Crimea Conference
[Page 781]
as being “to ensure that Germany
will never again be able to disturb the peace of the
world”.4
- (2)
- This objective was to be achieved by the unconditional
surrender of Germany and its occupation by the Allied
armies which would apply certain measures of control,
political, economic, and social. The achievement of the
objective by the destruction of the German people was
never considered as a possibility. Even the partition of
Germany was rejected. Reliance was put upon the
occupation as the means of attaining the end in
view.
- (3)
- Programs of occupation have been developed by the
Allied governments, but their relation to the overall
purpose “to ensure that Germany will never again be able
to disturb the peace of the world” has not been defined.
It is essential to the successful administration of any
program or programs of occupation ultimately approved
that their relation to the end purpose should be clearly
understood by those responsible for their
direction.
- (4)
- It is sometimes assumed that the occupation of Germany
will remove the German threat to the peace of the world
solely by destroying the German war potential. It is undoubtedly true that
certain measures contemplated will deprive Germany not
only of existing arms but of the materials and machines
necessary to the waging of modern war. It is highly
improbable, however, that the occupation will deprive
Germany permanently of the material means of waging
war, since it is
highly doubtful that the occupation itself will be
permanent.
- (5)
- An illustrative parallel can be drawn between the
treatment of Germany and the treatment of individual
criminals in modern penal institutions. It is well-known
to penologists that, although numerous criminals are
condemned to prison for life, and even for terms beyond
life expectancy, few such criminals ever die in prison.
The violence of the public demand for severe punishment
declines rapidly as time passes, and life-term convicts
are commonly released, at first under parole and then
completely, after fifteen to eighteen years. There are
already signs that the violence of the demand for German
punishment is subsiding, and it is highly improbable
that Allied occupation of Germany—at least American
occupation—can be continued beyond the period of a few
years.
- (6)
- Furthermore, the principal war potential of Germany is not German
industry or German raw materials. The principal war potential of Germany is
the German people whose industrial and scientific
aptitude and whose docility in accepting military and
social discipline have been demonstrated over a
considerable period of time.
[Page 782]
Since the destruction of the
German people is not thinkable, and since it is
unlikely, not to say inconceivable, that the German
people will be kept under permanent control and
surveillance from without, it would follow that the
Allies cannot put their sole or even their principal
reliance, for the achievement of their over-all purpose,
on the destruction of the material means of making
war.
- (7)
- Over and above their reliance upon the destruction of
the material means of waging war, the Allies will be obliged to attempt
to bring about a change in the attitude toward war of the German people.
If we are not prepared to destroy the German people, and
if we are not prepared to police the German people
permanently, we must attempt to change the German people
in such a way that the German nation, when finally freed
of occupation and surveillance, will be a nation which
will not be a threat to the peace of the world.
- (8)
- A relevant consideration is the fact that weapons
developed, or in the course of development, during the
present war indicate not
only that future wars will be increasingly destructive
but that they will be waged with weapons which a
scientifically and industrially minded people can
produce under conditions which will make surveillance
difficult.
- (9)
- If this analysis is substantially correct, then the
purpose of the German occupation is to remove the German
threat to peace by changing the German attitude toward
peace. We are occupying Germany, in other words, with a
view to changing the social and political character of
the nation to such an extent that Germany can be trusted
at some future time with independent existence as a
nation in a world in which weapons will be more
destructive and more difficult to control than they have
ever been before.
- (10)
- It should be noted that this objective conforms to the
objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the
situation which the establishment of that Organization
will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could
be introduced at some appropriate time into the United
Nations where the measures of the Organization for
security and for peace could be brought to play
affirmatively rather than negatively.
- (11)
- The explicit recognition that the occupation of
Germany is intended to produce a change in the German
people would enable us to plan the various measures of
occupation more intelligently and to administer them
more effectively. At the present time, there is a
tendency to make a distinction between political,
economic, and military measures for Germany, on the one
hand, and measures for what is called the “reeducation”
of the German people on the other. Actually, if the
present analysis is correct, all aspects of the
occupation, whether military, or economic, or political,
or social, have one end
[Page 783]
objective, which is largely
psychological: to create a Germany which can be trusted
to exist without continuing occupation and
surveillance—a Germany which can be re-admitted to the
society of peaceful nations. The success of all measures
taken in the occupation should therefore be judged not
by their immediate consequences alone but by their
ultimate effect upon the social and political structure
of Germany.
- (12)
- There will, of course, be conflicts from time to time
between the short-term objectives and the long-range
purpose of the occupation. For example, the use of
German output for the relief of liberated areas may
create economic distress in Germany which will make the
labor of the conversion of Germany to our views and our
outlook more difficult. However, the explicit
recognition of the true long-range objective of the
occupation, whether or not in conflict with certain
short-term purposes, is essential to the success of the
undertaking.
- (13)
- Something more is required, however, than the explicit
declaration of this purpose. The purpose must also be
warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. It is our
intention to employ every means at our disposition,
economic and political means as well as the more direct
means of education and information, to produce the
change in German thinking and German beliefs and German
psychology which we desire.
- (14)
- Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not
only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the
Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man
abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You
cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an
individual or the mind of a nation. We must assume,
although we have no explicit knowledge, that the
Russians are clear as to their intentions on this point.
Presumably they propose to substitute for Nazi Germany a
Germany at least sympathetic to Communism. We presumably
believe that a Germany converted to respect for the
worth and dignity of human beings and a belief in the
basic principles of justice and in the right of men to
govern themselves would be a Germany which we could
trust. If this, however, is our purpose, we must
recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must play
again the role we played at the beginning of our
history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas
of liberty and justice and human dignity.
- (15)
- The important point, however, is to ascertain at the
earliest possible moment what the other occupying powers
have in mind with reference to the kind of Germany to be
set up and the means by which it is to be established.
It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the
Secretary on the subject of German reeducation5 that it is highly
[Page 784]
desirable that
the occupying powers should reach an understanding as to
the common denominators of a policy for reeducation in
order that Germany may not be turned, under the
occupation, into an ideological cockpit. If the analysis
of the present paper is correct, the same considerations
would lead to the same conclusion as to the entire
program of occupation. It is therefore recommended that
conversations be undertaken in the early future to
determine, if possible, a common Allied position as to
the question of the kind of Germany we wish to see
established and the means by which we propose to bring
it about.
