Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

J. C. S. Files

No. 1280
Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union (Deane)¹

top secret

[Undated.]

Agenda and Procedure for U. S.–U. S. S. R. Chiefs of Staff Conference at “Terminal”

1. It is recommended that, immediately after the meeting opens, the Soviet Chiefs of Staff be asked whether they are prepared to answer the questions handed them on Tuesday.² If not, or if the answers are not satisfactory, Admiral Leahy might then inform them that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to comment briefly on the questions. (Comments following each question are intended as suggestions for use by the United States Chiefs of Staff.)

First Question—Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish U. S. weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimus Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945?³

Comment—It is suggested that at this point, Admiral King hand to the Russian General Staff a memorandum covering the details of this proposal, and, at the same time, make such comment as he considers desirable.

Second Question—U. S. naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. U. S. submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of Korea at Lat. 38° N, thence to Lat. 40° N Long. 135° E, thence to Lat. 45°–45′ N Long. 140° E, thence along the parallel of Latitude 45°–45′ N. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations?

Comment—We feel that unrestricted operations of U. S. naval surface forces can be accomplished with very little danger of conflict and will contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan.

We consider that a line delineating the areas of submarine operations is necessary and that the line selected will provide areas suitable for submarine warfare in support of our respective strategic and tactical aims. This line can be modified and operations across the line facilitated through Soviet liaison between commanders in the field.

Third Question—U. S. air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at Lat. 51° 10′ N Long. 147° E, thence to point at Lat. 45° 45′ N Long. 144° 20′ E, thence to point at Lat. 45° 45′ N Long. 139° 30′ E, thence to point at Lat. 41° 20′ N Long. 133° 20′ E, thence westward to Seishin [Chongjin], Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan [Kalgan], Tatung, Fengchen, Tsining [Chining] to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?

Comment—We consider that a limiting line for unrestricted operations of U. S. Air Forces is necessary until effective operational liaison is established and that the line selected will give U. S. air operations maximum effectiveness in the defeat of Japan. Variations or adjustments of this line can best be made as the developing military situation requires, and operations across the line most satisfactorily coordinated, through direct liaison between commanders in the field.

Fourth Question—Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945 (J. C. S. 1420)?⁴

Comment—The following reasons for this question should be brought out in discussion:

a. Rapid communication between field commanders concerning Japanese naval and air forces, the activities of our own sea and air forces, and the safety of supply ships at sea will be of great importance on and after D–Day.

b. Direct operational liaison is essential for arranging quickly and efficiently changes in the boundaries stated in questions two and three, and operations across the boundary line.

c. The present communications system, which requires the processing of information around the world through Washington and Moscow, is too slow for operational liaison between our respective field commanders.

d. This operational liaison machinery would not concern itself with matters of policy which would continue to be decided in Washington and Moscow.

Fifth Question—It is assumed that, after D–Day, Soviet or U. S. air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or U. S. ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet aircraft.

2. It is recommended that the following lines of action be taken with the Soviet General Staff only in the event they raise the subjects:

a. Pacific Convoys after D–Day.

The following questions should be asked the Russians, indicating that our views cannot be given until the answers are received:

(1) What will be the Soviet status of supply in the Far East at the outbreak of hostilities?

(2) What supplies necessary to the operations in the Far East and still to be delivered could be sent via the Atlantic and Trans-Sib[erian] Railroad after the outbreak of hostilities?

(3) What plans have the Soviets for the vessels en route to Siberia or loading in U. S. West Coast ports at the outbreak of war?

(4) What are Soviet views with regard to composition, assembly, escort, timing, routing and control of convoys from U. S. West Coast to Siberia?

(5) What assistance will the Soviets require from the U. S. for escort and cover for these convoys?

(6) If U. S. assistance is required, what are Soviet views as to methods of liaison and communications between U. S. and Soviet forces?

b. Diversion of the Pacific Supply Program to the Atlantic after D–Day.

The United States Chiefs of Staff should inform the Soviet Chiefs of Staff that as a general policy we shall not ship via the Atlantic any items which are now on hand in Western Russia, either from Soviet production or from stockpiles of U. S. goods previously delivered. Subject to that policy, once the Pacific supply route is closed, and provided Trans-Siberian rail capacity is available, we will ship those items to Russia via the Atlantic which remain undelivered under Annex III of the Fourth Protocol.⁵ Likewise with regard to the request for supplies and equipment submitted by the Soviet Government on 28 May,⁶ we shall ship via the Atlantic rolling stock previously planned for shipment via the Pacific, petroleum products, medical supplies and certain categories of food.

Comment—In connection with the above policy it is recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff advise the Soviet Chiefs of Staff that planning for a revised shipping program after D–Day should be initiated at once, and that any Soviet requests should be submitted without delay. It should be emphasized that we cannot deliver supplies on the spur of the moment regardless of the degree of urgency.

c. Provision of U. S. Heavy Bombers to Russia.

(1) As it would be at least five months before heavy bombers supplied to Russia could be operational in any significant number and as the contribution therefrom to U. S. effort would be negligible, it is recommended that any request for heavy bombers be refused.

Comment—Since previous U. S. offers of heavy bombers were not accepted, U. S. production has been readjusted to provide only for the support of the U. S. Pacific air operations.

(2) Should it become necessary, for any reason, to accede to a request for heavy bombers, it is recommended that the Soviet Chiefs of Staff be informed as follows:

There are available a number of used B–24’s which are serviceable. However, the U. S. cannot commit itself to the support and maintenance of a Russian heavy bomber force by provision of additional replacement aircraft, engines, spare parts, tools, armament, radio equipment, ground accessory equipment and special airdrome equipment and is not prepared to participate in a training program.

d. Milepost.. (Including list of 28 May)

If the Soviets bring up the subject of delivery of specific supplies it is recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff listen to what they have to say and agree to furnish answers to any questions later through the Military Mission.

1. Printed from a mimeographed copy circulated on July 24 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by informal action on July 26.
2. See document No. 1279.
3. See document No. 1278.
4. Document No. 185, printed in vol. i.
5. Text in Wartime International Agreements: Soviet Supply Protocols (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2759), p. 89.
6. Not printed.