Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II

J. C. S. Files

No. 1266
Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret

[Babelsberg, July 23, 1945.]

III. Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the War

U. S. Proposals	British Proposals
4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:— a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan. c. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan. d. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.	Delete a. and b. and substitute:— a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. Delete c. and substitute the following as b:— b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or destined for combat areas.
5. In order to attain the overall objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.
6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:— a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan. d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.	Add at the end of the first sentence: “or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” Delete the last sentence of 6 c. because this is dealt with in paragraph 7 below.
7. The inclusion under Basic Undertakings of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping is undesirable. It is agreeable, however, to include in the text of the report the following paragraph:— cargo shipping Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for an additional amount for civilian requirements. Should a substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.	7. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas and for essential programmes of the Western Hemisphere. Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.

1. Circulated as appendix A to the draft report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, which draft report constituted the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2. This appendix gave a comparison of United States and British proposals which were being referred to Truman and Churchill for decision. For the discussion of these proposals by Truman and Churchill on July 24, see ante, pp. 340–343.