500.A15c/5: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson)

[Paraphrase]

54. Your 76, October 27, 1 p.m. By resolution of the Assembly and of the Council of the League of Nations, the Preparatory Commission is requested to create a subcommittee or commission composed of representatives of all the states participating in the Conference. Consideration of the subjects of security and arbitration is the declared object. It appears from a reading of the resolutions both of the Assembly and of the Council together that scope of inquiry is broad one; that it includes mutual covenants and guarantees of security, treaties of arbitration both bilateral and multilateral, and also question of sanctions for enforcement of covenants and guarantees. Evidently whole subject of Geneva protocol of 1924 is in this way sought to be opened again, with a view as well, perhaps, to wider application of Locarno formula.51 Conclusion is difficult to avoid that this proposal is wide departure from (at least, striking enlargement of) purposes of Preparatory Commission as these were originally laid down. If proposal be adopted, it would virtually establish a parallel organization to Preparatory Commission. Assembly’s resolution clearly expresses opinion that work of Preparatory Commission is practically in suspense and that further progress cannot be made until problem of security is worked out. It appears that League, instead of taking up problem of security as strictly a League matter as has been its practice heretofore, is adopting rather peculiar expedient of attempting to work problem out through and under Preparatory Commission. Whether or not this procedure is merely device to bring this Government into that discussion, it is certain that the United States cannot, in any event, enter into mutual covenants that guarantee security or undertake to use either its military or naval forces in the application of sanctions or sign arbitration treaties such as European nations seem to regard as essential to their particular needs. We are inclined to believe, under these circumstances, that this Government ought not to be drawn into negotiations of this nature, and that should the Preparatory Commission resolve itself, in effect, [Page 209] into a conference on the subject of security and sanctions, we should have to consider possibility of withdrawing altogether.

Our present judgment (on which we should like to have your opinion) is that of course Wilson should be authorized to attend forthcoming meeting of Preparatory Commission but that he should be instructed to take no part in organization of proposed Security Commission or to accept a place on that Commission on behalf of the United States.

At same time it should be made plain that this Government intends to continue its representation on Preparatory Commission, participating in deliberations of that body and rendering assistance that it can in connection with the matters embraced in the original agenda. If Security Committee is eventually to report to Preparatory Commission, question of what course this Government would feel obliged to follow in that contingency would naturally command our consideration at that time.

Kellogg