Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume X

Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/2

Supreme Economic Council: Second Meeting of the First Session Held at the Ministry of Commerce [on 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.]

February 25, 1919, 3 p.m.

The Supreme Economic Council held its second meeting on the 25th of February, 1919 at 3 p.m. under the Chairmanship of Lord Robert Cecil.

The Associated Governments were represented as follows:—

Great Britain	Lord Robert Cecil
	Sir John Beale
United States of America	Mr. McCormick
	Mr. Hoover
	Mr. Norman H. Davis
	Mr. B. M. Baruch
France	M. Clémentel
	M. Klotz
	M. Loucheur
Italy	M. Crespi
	M. Chiesa

8. Minutes of the Preceding Meeting.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and approved.

9. Powers of the Council.

The council were informed that on 21st of February 1919 the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have decided:¹

“That measures of a transitory character shall be referred to the Economic Council established on President Wilson’s proposal, while those of a permanent character shall be considered by a special Commission to be established later, and of the terms of reference to their new functions:

To examine such economic measures as should be taken during the reconstruction period after the war so as to ensure:—

a) The due supply of materials and other commodities necessary for the restoration of devastated areas.

b) The economic restoration of the countries which have suffered most from the war.

c) The supply of neutral and ex-enemy countries without detriment to the supply of the needs of Allied and Associated countries.[”]

The following proposals suggested by the American Delegates were adopted:—

1. The establishment of Financial, Blockade, Raw Materials and Shipping Sections, either by the absorption of the existing Inter-Allied Organizations or by requesting each of the Associated Governments to designate one or more representatives to each section to be formed.

2. The name of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief to be changed to the “Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.”

3. The functions of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief and the Inter-Allied Food Council to be assumed by the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council. The Committee of Representatives of the Inter-Allied Food Council in London will continue as a sub-committee of the Food Section.

4. The Associated Governments to be asked to designate immediately their delegates for the sections of Raw Material and Finance.

5. The Allied Maritime Transport Council to continue for the present and to act as the Transport Section of the Supreme Council.

At the request of the French Delegates, it was agreed that the Financial Section should consider all questions submitted to the Council which may have a financial bearing, but this section is not expected to deal with questions of a financial character outside the scope of this council.

10. Food Supplies for France and Italy.

The Italian and French Delegates submitted statements dated 23rd (1)² and 24th February (2) pointing out the seriousness of the Italian and French food position, partially in view of the present shortage of tonnage.

It was agreed to refer the memoranda to the Shipping Section for consideration and report at the earliest possible date, and, so far as was necessary, to the Food and Financial Sections.

11. Relaxation of Blockade on Neutral Countries of Northern Europe.

With reference to Minute 5³ the American Delegates reported that it had been decided for the present to withdraw the proposal that the blockade on foodstuffs on the northern neutrals should be removed entirely.

12. Blockade of Austria.

With reference to minute 3 the American Delegates proposed that the blockade section should prepare a report on the question of the relaxation of the blockade on raw materials to the countries included in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

13. Supplies for Liberated Countries.

A memorandum from the Food Section dated 24th February (3) regarding the financial cost involved in the execution of the minimum programme for the relief of liberated territories was submitted and referred to the Financial Section for consideration. Agreed.

14. Supplies for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

A. Finance. A Memorandum from the Food Section dated 24th February (4) reporting on the financial position as regards food supplies for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria was submitted. The American Delegates, referring to the difficulty of realizing the credits offered by the Austrian Financial delegates, proposed that the principle should be accepted that payment for food furnished for relief should be recognized as a first lien or charge upon Austria’s assets of any kind.

It was agreed that the Council should give this direction to their Finance Section, subject to the reservation that this action in the case of Austria should not be regarded, in view of the urgency of Austria’s needs, the small amount involved and the Austrian military situation, as a precedent for other cases.

B. Transport. The American Delegates referred to the extraordinary difficulties of transport being experienced as a result of differences between the various sections of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and between them and Italy, and pointed out that unless satisfactory railway communications were re-established at an early date it would be quite impossible to ensure an adequate movement of foodstuffs from Trieste to these districts.

After general discussion of the position it was agreed:—

(a) to refer the matter to the Technical Communication Committee appointed on 17th February to deal with the re-establishment of communications in South Eastern Europe for consideration in collaboration with the Food Section;

(b) that the sub-Committee should at the same time consider the possibility of sending foodstuffs to Czecho-Slovakia through Northern Germany by the Elbe or the Rhine and that representatives of Marshal Foch and of Blockade Section should be requested to assist at the discussions.

In the meanwhile Signor Crespi agreed to impress upon his Government the urgent necessity for facilitating to the utmost, in so far as is compatible with strict military requirements, the passage of foodstuffs to all parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, by all routes which may be open to or under the control of the Council or its delegates.

15. Revictualling of Germany.

A memorandum from the Food Section dated 23rd February (5 & 6) was submitted and referred to the Financial Section for consideration.

It was agreed, however, that the proposal made by the Swedish Government that they should be permitted to furnish 50,000 tons of flour for distribution by the Swedish Red Cross in Germany, should be accepted.

16. Revictualling of Left Bank of the Rhine.

A memorandum from the Food Section dated 24th February (7) embodying proposals for the supplying of foodstuffs to the left bank of the Rhine was submitted.

It was agreed

(a) that this provisioning should be separated from that of the right bank of the Rhine and should be carried out under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Military Committee to be set up under the High Command and reporting to the Food Section of the Council.

(b) that the financial proposals embodied in the above Memorandum should be referred to the Financial Section for consideration.

17. Transport.

(a) Enemy tonnage. A letter from the Allied Maritime Transport Council dated 4th February (8) addressed to the Supreme War Council and referred to the Supreme Economic Council regarding the employment of enemy tonnage was read.

The resolutions embodied in this letter were accepted in the light, however, of certain explanatory notes mentioned by Mr. Salter as included in the Minutes of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (9).

(b) Tonnage for relief. A note from the Food Section dated 23rd February (10) was submitted. The British Delegates referred to the general scarcity of tonnage necessary for the execution of the allied Food Relief Programme and submitted that the position should be carefully examined by the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

Agreed.

18. Communications in Eastern Europe.

With reference to minute 2, a report for the Technical Communication Committee dated 22nd February 1919 (11) embodying proposals for ensuring the re-establishment of communication in Eastern Europe was submitted.

It was agreed:

(a) that the financial responsibilities involved in the proposals should be referred to the Financial Section with a recommendation that, in view of the urgency of the situation, the proposals should, if possible, be accepted.

(b) that the suggested appointment of a Technical Executive Committee should be approved, the Committee to consist of the members of the present Sub-Committee, to whom should be added a representative of Marshal Foch in the event of the activities of the Committee extending to countries other than those of South Eastern Europe.

19. Organization.

It was agreed:

(a) that the Secretaries of the four Delegations should meet before each meeting to agree upon the Agenda and to prepare the documents for distribution which should reach members of the Council at least 24 hours before the meeting.

(b) that no questions except those of utmost urgency should be considered at the meetings unless they have been first placed upon the Agenda.

M. Clémentel placed at the disposal of the Council the organization of his office in order to facilitate the work.

Date of Next Meeting.

It was agreed:

(a) that an emergency meeting should be held on Saturday 1st March at 3 p.m. to consider primarily the instructions to be given to the Delegates meeting the Germans at Spa on 4th March.

(b) that the next full meeting of the Council should be held on Monday 3rd March.

Appendix 1

23 rd February, 1919.

Memorandum From the Italian Delegation on the Italian Situation

The discussion which took place last Monday regarding the proposed increase in the rations allowed to neutral countries has disclosed the fact that the situation of Allied Countries and of Italy in particular, is such as to demand priority in consideration and action on the part of the Supreme Economic Council.

The following notes may give some idea of what the present situation is so far as Italy is concerned.

Italian Cereal Programme. Attention is called to the following statement of Italian Cereal imports as compared with those of other Allies, as shown by the official statements of the Wheat Executive.

Percentage of Importation as Against Requirements From the Beginning of the Cereal Year

	Italy	France	U. K.	Mean%
September	89. 3	172. 9	119. 1	123. 4
October	117. 0	143. 6	120. 0	124. 8
November	111. 4	117. 1	118. 0	116. 0
December	99. 3	109. 6	126. 7	115. 1
January	87. 4	109. 5	123. 1	109. 5
February	80. 2	96. 5	112. 3	98. 9
March	75. 8	83. 9	106. 0	91. 3
Deficit on mean%	–15. 5	–7. 4	+14. 7	91. 3
Deficit on total	–24. 2	–16. 1	+6. 0	100. 0

The deficit of arrivals against requirements, if equally distributed, ought to be 8.7 for each country. Italy’s actual deficit, however, is seen to be 15.5%, as against a deficit of 7.4 for France, and a surplus of 14.7 for England. This practically means that Italy’s programme is 30.2% in arrear as compared with the British, and 8.1 as compared with the French.^* The latest estimate of March arrivals in Italy (ships nominated) puts them down at 146,000 tons. Therefore against a total requirement for the cereal year (including recovered and new territories) of 4,230,000 tons, the deficit by the end of March would amount to 941,000 tons.

Future Outlook: By this time last year, Italy was in an admittedly desperate position in respect of cereals. The position this year is the following. Italy will have received by the end of March 300,000 tons more this year than last. But the excess is entirely absorbed by the additional requirements of the recovered and new territories.^†

While Italy had a poorer wheat crop last year, she had on the other hand a better maize crop, this year’s crop being not only scanty but almost totally unfit for human consumption. While, moreover, last year, from March onward, Italy received really conspicuous arrivals of cereals (March 228,000 tons, April 334,800 tons, May 383,000 tons, June 309,000 tons, July 244,000 tons, August 290,000 tons), she has yet to face this year, the worst period of her arrivals. The position to the 21st of February was that the chartering office of the Wheat Executive had not been able to secure any charters for Italian account, or indeed for anybody.

Other Foodstuffs: The comparative situation of Italy is shown by the following table:

Provisions

percentages showing the imports into italy, great britain, france, from september 1918 to end of march 1919 in relation with their requirements as ascertained by the inter-allied food council

	Italy	U. K.	France
Frozen Meat	60. 5	99. 2	80. 3
Preserved meat	60	93	111. 3
Pigmeat	74. 7	84.8	55. 5
Dairy Products	45	85. 7
Fish	39. 3
Fish and other goods, Class A*		109.5	66
Sugar	37.9	91.2	74
Coffee	53.5
Coffee and other goods, Class B†		125	45
Oils and Oilseeds	26. 7	101. 8	63. 2
Total Percentages	52. 1	96. 4	68. 7

*Class A.–refers also to dried fruits, tea, eggs, cocoa, etc.

†Class B.—refers also to jam, honey, wines, syrups, etc.

The above total percentages (52 against 68 and 96) show most eloquently what the general situation is.

As regards individual items, some additional information may be of use.

The Italian position in respect of frozen meat was depicted in the following terms by the Committee of Representatives on January the 31st.:—

“I am directed by the Committee of Representatives to state that the Committee has had under consideration the programme of arrivals of frozen meat in the Allied Countries. While arrivals in this country are in excess of the agreed requirements, arrivals in Italy are greatly in arrear. For the month of February only one cargo amounting to 2700 tons has so far been arranged, against the requirements which were agreed at 21,000 tons before the needs of the recovered territories were taken into account.

“The Committee had hoped that the position might have been ameliorated by the direction to Italy of some cargoes of United States meat for which finance was available, but it is now understood from the Ministry of Shipping that no tonnage can be provided for this purpose at the present time.

“The Italian Delegate informed the Committee that finance was not available for the purchase of cargoes from other sources, and under these circumstances the Committee decided to lay the facts, with an expression of concern at the grave position with which Italy will be faced unless at least another 8,000 tons are provided for February arrival.”

Four Italian boats with cargoes of frozen meat might have been available for Italy, but of this number three, unless they are financed on arrival at Gibraltar (one is already there) will, although on Italian bottoms, go to France or England, while the other boat is idle in the Plate since the 5th of this month, vainly waiting for her cargo to be financed. Meanwhile the other Allies have already secured more than their full requirements, also for April and May.

As regards hog products, a great quantity of which is already at New York on lighters (the railing to the seaboard having already been stopped) these cannot be shipped for lack of tonnage unless at the expense of the arrivals of wheat. The only alternative left Italy is thus to choose between allowing these accumulated stocks of hog products to rot where they lie, with no chance at any rate of their reaching Italy in time for consumption during the cold season, or further to aggravate the already dangerous cereal position.

Orders already dispatched for the shipment of sugar have had to be cancelled, thereby creating endless trouble with the shippers who had been asked for January/February delivery.

Coal Situation: The Allies know what a tremendous sacrifice Italy has been called on to make in contenting herself with 600,000 tons of coal. The Allied Maritime Transport Council had already strongly recommended that, if at all possible, this quantity should be increased, even in war time.

Yet, whereas until the date of the Armistice^3a the strenuous efforts of the British Ministry of Shipping were successful in securing the carrying out of the 600,000 tons programme, almost in full, they have not been equally successful since the Armistice, in spite of the fact that Italy’s needs have been increased by the requirements of the liberated and new territories. This is shown by the following official figures of total shipments:

15 November–14 December	503,776 tons
15 December–14 January	346,282 tons
15 January–14 February	663,735 tons
15 February to 14 March (estimate)	487,000 tons

While shortage of supply was at first responsible for such short shipments, lack of tonnage is alone responsible during the later period. What the position will become from the 15th March onward, in the event of a strike in the British mines—necessitating as it would the employment of an increased amount of tonnage for importation from more distant markets—can be more easily imagined than described. The Italian Representatives most emphatically warn the Allies that Italy could not withstand such a shock. It is simply impossible for the country to keep going in peace time under worse conditions than those created by the war. It is, on the contrary, imperative that its coal imports should be increased to 800,000 tons, which is itself about 200,000 less than Italy received before the war, when, moreover, she had not to provide for the needs of Trent and Trieste. It is quite time that Italy should return to a human standard.

Raw Material: Very few words need be spent on the subject of raw material, because Italy is importing practically none. Italy is the only country in Europe which is totally unable to import nitrates, thereby endangering her future crops. The effects of this will be felt next season.

The preceding facts and figures are amply sufficient to prove that Italy cannot withstand any continuance of present conditions. Italy is incomparably the worst off in respect of cereals, meat, coal and raw material.

The Allies will certainly realise that the Italian government is bound just now to be as liberal towards the Italian people as the other Allied Governments are towards their own populations. While evident political considerations point to the imperative necessity of liberality and generosity, Italy to-day cannot offer to the returning soldiers rations as strict as in war time, the meat ration being inconsistent not only with the requirements of a liberal policy, but with those of public health and common humanity. Coal, which is now scarcer than under war conditions, threatens to be totally unobtainable in a month’s time.

The combined effect of all the above must inevitably lead ultimately to economic death, and from war to revolution. The Italian representatives wish to be both clear and emphatic on this point.

Appendix 2⁴

Memorandum From the French Delegation on the French Supply Situation

The French Government wishes to draw the attention of the Supreme Economic Council to the present French Food position.

The Food Import programmes have been ascertained and agreed upon by the Inter-Allied Food Council in London.

It seems that there is at present a sufficient world supply of essential foodstuffs to carry out these programmes.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the actual quantities at present on passage to French ports or for which ships have already been nominated are extremely low, in fact lower than ever since the outbreak of the war.

The reason is that, since the Armistice, the close co-operation between the work of the various shipping administrations of the several Associated Powers which had been established through the agency of the Allied Maritime Transport Council has been allowed to relax, through the release, now under progress, of a great number of ships.

This means that nations such as France, whose mercantile tonnage is inadequate to meet their needs, are no more able to receive from the Allied or Associated Nations the additional tonnage they need to fill their import programmes.

An agreement has been reached whereby Great Britain undertakes to supply such additional tonnage to France; but the actual working of that agreement has so far been delayed through technical difficulties.^*

The French Government furthermore wish to call the attention of the Supreme Economic Council to the present high cost of foodstuffs in France. This matter is one of great concern to the French Government, who have devised a plan to meet the situation mainly through purchases of commodities from foreign sources.

They regret to find that, outside of the shipping difficulties as already described, financial difficulties often stand in their way in carrying out the above-mentioned plan.

Therefore the French Government would ask the Supreme Economic Council to recommend to the Associated Governments:—

1. That the Associated Governments as a whole (especially Great Britain and the United States) should take the necessary steps to ensure that the release of the several mercantile fleets should be proceeded with in a co-ordinate way, the ascertained essential needs being given due priority.

2. That, in view of the great importance, from a social point of view, of the present endeavours of the French Government to fight the high cost of living, it is essential that the plans devised by the French Government to that end should not be checked through financial difficulties.

February 24, 1919.

Appendix 3

Note From the Food Section on the Finance of Food Supply to Liberated Peoples

The approximate cost per month of the minimum programme from the present outlook would appear to be:—

	Dollars.
Belgium	25,000,000
Poland	15,000,000
Czecho-Slovaka	13,000,000
Roumania	8,000,000
Serbia	5,000,000
Montenegro	600,000
Jugo-Slavia	2,000,000
Turkey	5,000,000
Russian Prisoners	750,000
Sundry	5,000,000
Total	79,350,000

The American Relief Administration has been created by Presidential order for the purpose of giving effect to the American portion of the relief undertaken under co-ordination by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. Through the direction of the American Relief Administration, the foodstuffs put at the disposal of those various liberated countries upon credits or charity from the United States between February 1st and March 1st will be approximately as follows:—

	Dollars.
Belgium	26,000,000
Poland	8,000,000
Turkey	5,000,000
Roumania	5,000,000
Czecho-Slovaka	9,000,000
Serbia, Jugo-Slavia, and Montenegro	6,000,000
Total	58,000,000

Preparations have been made by the American Relief Administration for the delivery of approximately $55,000,000 worth of food during the month of March.

The financial solution of the balance of these programmes is urgently needed.

February 24, 1919.

Appendix 4

Note From the Food Section on the Finance of Food Supply to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria

The problem of financing the balance of these programmes is earnestly recommended to the Supreme Economic Council. It is urgently necessary to complete some form of finance for these areas. The situation in Austria is of the most critical order. The monthly food requirements apparently amount to about $12,000,000. Up to the end of February the Allied Governments, through the Italian Government, will have made an emergency sale to the Austrian Government of approximately $5,000,000 worth of food and the American Relief Administration approximately $250,000 worth of food, all for payment in kronen. This form of payment, however, is impossible of continuance.

Hungary will apparently need supplies later in the year, and some system of finance needs to be devised.

Bulgaria requires about $2,500,000 worth of foodstuffs per month, and apparently has the resources with which to pay in cash if agreement can be reached amongst the Associated Governments, her case being practically akin to that of Germany. The American Relief Administration is endeavoring to complete the sale of $2,000,000 worth of foodstuffs against Bulgarian balances in the United States, but there is some doubt as to whether these balances really exist.

February 24, 1919.

Appendix 5 (a)

[Memorandum From the Director General of Relief (Hoover), February 23, 1919, Regarding] Finance of German Food Supplies

I attach hereto—

(a) Memorandum by Sir John Beale (Appendix 5 (b)).

(b) Report by British Food Investigation Mission to Germany (Appendix 5 (c)).

(c) Report by American Food Investigation Mission to Germany (Appendix 6).

I wish to point out with all emphasis the urgency of this situation. Foodstuffs to the amount of approximately $80,000,000 monthly must be delivered into Germany, beginning with the 1st March, and shipments must continue until one month after the blockade against Germany is withdrawn. It appears that the solution of the German financial problem could be reached either by (a) releasing the blockade, (b) allowing Germany to part with her liquid assets to the value of $80,000,000 a month, or (c) for the Associated Governments to consent to finance Germany to this amount for food.

The provision of some 30,000 tons of fats by the United Kingdom for gold and neutral currency is in progress, but, as will be seen by the above-mentioned reports, this is but a very small portion of the absolute necessities.

I understand the Swedish Government offers to supply the German Government 50,000 tons of flour under their own arrangements, the Swedish Government making conditions to re-import to Sweden a similar quantity, which contract we should be able to effect. We strongly recommend that this should be done.

H. Hoover

Appendix 5 (b)

Memorandum From Sir John Beale Regarding Relief Supplies for Germany

1. Sufficient facts have now been collected to enable a statement to be prepared showing the position of the Allies in relation to the relief of Germany.

The situation appears to be one of the utmost gravity, calling for immediate consideration by the Supreme Economic Council and a decision on general policy before the next meeting with the German Delegates.

2. The Associated Governments have accepted a definite measure of responsibility for the prevention of famine in Germany by the utterances of their statement, and their participation in the formation of the Allied Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, and its work, as well as by becoming parties to the agreement of Treves of the 17th January 1919.^4a

3. Though the present rations in Germany are very much below the Allied standard, there appears to be no doubt that the food supplies in a large part of Germany will be exhausted before many weeks are past; the date will vary in different localities, but in some, shortness will become apparent as early as the end of March or the beginning of April.

This statement is founded, in the first instance, on information supplied by German Delegates at Conferences at Treves and Spa in connection with the renewal of the Armistice. It is a significant fact that no report of any kind from any other source has been laid before the Council of Supply and Relief which would tend in any way to throw doubt on the accuracy of the statement of the general position put forward by the German Delegates or to lessen the gravity of the outlook. On the other hand, confirmation has been freely forthcoming. I would refer to:—

(a) Military reports from the occupied districts.

(b) The attached report compiled from personal observations of fourteen British officers who have recently returned from Germany.⁵

(c) Extract from a detailed report of two of these officers who visited Hanover.⁵

(d) A forcible statement by Dr. Frederick Ferriers, Chief of the Executive of the International Red Cross, who is convinced that the approach of famine is nearer than is understood by the Entente agents who have gone into Germany, and that the approach of starvation must result in Bolshevism.

(e) Reports from Dr. Alonzo Taylor, who has recently returned from a Mission of Enquiry in Berlin for Mr. Hoover.⁶

4. It is difficult to establish the exact quantities of food required, but it should be noted:—

(a) That the agreement of the 17th January provided for a first instalment of 200,000 tons of cereals (for part of which condensed milk may be substituted) and 70,000 tons of fats, and the Council of Supply and Relief regarded this quantity at the time as a suitable basis for a monthly ration.

(b) The Germans themselves asked for approximately double this quantity including certain other commodities.

(c) Dr. Taylor suggests the following quantities as minimum requirements:—

• 320,000 tons flour or corresponding wheat monthly for six months.
• 100,000 tons mixed pork products monthly for six months.
• 10,000 tons condensed milk monthly for four months.
• 10,000 tons vegetable oils monthly for four months.

After consideration of all the various reports received from the interior of Germany, it seems certain that Dr. Taylor’s estimate is not on the high side. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that shipping, port and railway difficulties must prevent the importation and distribution of so large a quantity. In my judgment, the Supreme Economic Council ought to regard some such quantity as 200,000 tons of breadstuffs and 100,000 tons of fats and other commodities as a minimum to be worked to, and increased, if possible.

5. If, at their meeting on the 25th February, the Supreme Economic Council are able to solve the shipping and financial difficulties and give the Council of Supply and Relief instructions to proceed with the supply at once on this suggested minimum basis, it is certain that the food in such quantities cannot commence to arrive in Germany in regular monthly supplies before the middle or end of May at the earliest, though certain consignments can be arranged in the meanwhile.

6. Negotiations following the agreement of the 17th January have disclosed serious difficulties in relation both to finance and tonnage.

Finance.—Negotiations at Trèves and Spa in January and February have resulted in the Germans providing £26,000,000 in a manner acceptable to the Financial Delegates. This sum will pay for part of the first instalment of food, amounting to 30,000 tons of pork products, about 5,000 tons of condensed milk and a small quantity of other commodities. The financial report of the discussions at Treves makes it clear that, though immediate payment may be forthcoming for the balance of the first instalment of foodstuffs, it is practically certain that it will be some considerable time before payment can be provided for later instalments. The minimum monthly supplies up to the end of August are estimated to cost some £150,000,000.

Tonnage.—The first part of the first instalment of foodstuffs for Germany will be provided from surplus stocks in the United Kingdom, and, since the Germans are not yet in a position to transact ordinary commercial business, and the bulk of the German tonnage is to be handed to the Allies, it is proposed to arrange the transport from the United Kingdom to Rotterdam by the Ministry of Food chartering such ships as are available—whether British or neutral—or by using American ships manned by the American Navy recently used for transporting coal from the United Kingdom to France for the American Army. At the present time, the United Kingdom holds large stocks of food, but in spite of this, it requires a certain amount of arrivals to enable distribution to be maintained from ports at which large stocks are not held. Both France and Italy are anticipating difficulty in arranging sufficient tonnage for the transport of supplies for liberated countries, who are, by declaration of the Allies, and on all moral grounds, entitled to priority over Germany, while there appears at present to be little or no prospect that German ships will be available in sufficient quantity to swell the volume of imports to a satisfactory figure before the month of May, at the earliest. In all of the Associated countries the process of release of shipping control is being pushed forward rapidly. Unless this process is checked, and, indeed, control reimposed to some extent, it would seem impossible to provide sufficient tonnage.

7. Put shortly, the position is—

(a) The Associated Governments are not only pledged to provide relief for Germany, but must accept the fact that the need in Germany is so urgent that, if relief is not provided, anarchy must supervene.

(b) That the Allies are morally bound not to relieve Germany unless ample supplies are forthcoming for Allied and liberated countries.

(c) That the French and Italian Food Programmes threaten to become so much in arrear as to cause anxiety, while there will be difficulty in providing adequate supplies for liberated countries.

8. The conclusions I arrive at on the general question are as follows:—

(1) The food situation in Germany is already serious, and will, unless drastically helped from outside by immediate action, be desperate in a few months, so that Germany will probably be overtaken by economic and political disaster, with consequences which may spread to Allied countries.

(2) It is impossible, under present conditions, which require Germany to pay in actual cash for all food she receives, for the Associated Governments to supply food in sufficient quantities to meet Germany’s needs, and it is, therefore, difficult to see how the Associated Governments can escape some measure of responsibility unless the blockade is lifted promptly so far as food is concerned, and Germany is left free to make her own importation arrangements.

(3) It seems essential that Peace (or Preliminary Terms of Peace) should be settled immediately, since the Blockade must be retained as a lever to secure acceptance of the Terms.

Meanwhile, it is the duty of the Associated Governments (and, indeed, a necessity in their own interests) to arrange a steady flow of supplies to Germany to such extent as the prior claims will permit. For this purpose, large credits must be provided, and so far as they cannot be furnished by the Germans, should be made a first charge on future payments by that country, and a substantial volume of shipping must be made available by the Associated countries until German shipping is forthcoming.

J. Field Beale

Paris , February 21, 1919.

Appendix 5 (c)

Combined Report on Food Conditions in Germany During the Period January 12 to February 12, 1919

1. Introductory. The following report has been compiled from the personal observations of fourteen British officers who visited parts of Germany during the above period to carry out special investigations.

The chief places visited were Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Hanover, Leipzig, Dresden, Magdeburg, and Cassel.

Of the officers who carried out these investigations, Captain E. W. Tennent is working director of C. Tennent, Sons and Co., Ltd., Metal and Chemical Merchants; Lieutenant H. A. Rose is a barrister practising at the English Bar; Captain C. W. Bell is an employe of an important Indian Trading firm; Captain W. Stewart Roddie is employed by the Treasury.

2. Employment and Labour Conditions. Unrest and disturbances are diminishing owing to the more stable political conditions and the firm line adopted by Noske, the Minister of National Defence, whose position has been very much strengthened against the Spartacus movement by the large combined Social-Democratic majority in the newly-elected National Assembly.

At the same time, unemployment, accompanied by an inevitable rise in the cost of living, is on the increase. In Berlin this increase is estimated at 5,000 a day, the number of unemployed being over 200,000. In Hamburg the number is 72,000, in Munich 32,000, and in Leipzig 22,000.

This great and constant increase in unemployment is due to the rapid demobilisation of the army of war industries, coupled with the inability of peace industry to get started, owing to the dearth of raw materials and coal. Concomitant causes are:—

(a.) Reluctance on the part of capital to embark on fresh enterprises.

(b.) High prices and wages prevailing.

(c.) Lack of will to work on the part of the workers; partly due to idleness and the high unemployment grants, partly to the physical and mental inertia engendered by malnutrition.

This increase in unemployment forms the most dangerous element in the present situation, especially where the large industrial centres are concerned. Unemployment and hunger are the chief predisposing causes of Bolshevism, and if these are removed there is no chance of Bolshevism gaining foothold in Germany.

3. Coal and Transport. All over Germany, except actually in the coalfields areas, industry is stagnant and shutting down altogether owing to the lack of coal. The Silesian and Saar Valley coal supplies have been entirely cut off; coal is still being raised in Westphalia, but over a million tons are waiting at the pit-mouth for lack of transport facilities.

Railway transport has been crippled throughout the country owing to the enormous quantity of rolling-stock lost since last November. To the number handed over under the terms of the Armistice must be added a great quantity abandoned and lost on all fronts, especially in the East, since last November. This applies more especially to locomotives. At the same time, the facilities for repairing locomotives have decreased considerably owing to the lack of essential raw materials. Throughout Germany the average percentage of locomotives undergoing repair has increased from 17½ to 40 since August, 1914.

In the Hanover district the number of locomotives in peace time was 1800, of which 1,450 were in continual use; at the time of the Armistice 1,300 were on charge, and on the 6th February, 1919, only 850 remained, of which 35 to 40 per cent, were worn out and incapable of repair. Many of the best heavy locomotives have had to be handed over to the Allies, consequently the passenger traffic has had to be reduced to 29 per cent, of the normal.

The transport difficulties in the north-east of Germany have been still further enhanced by the cessation of the coasting trade between the Baltic and North Sea ports since the Armistice.

4. Food. The shortage of staple articles of food throughout the country is such that the mass of the population are living upon rations which, whilst maintaining life, are insufficient to nourish the body adequately. Mothers and young children are particularly affected. Malnutrition has increased the mortality and diminished the birthrate; it has given rise to new diseases (e. g., war œdema and “mangold wurzel disease”), besides aggravating the previously known ones.

It is difficult to confirm the accuracy of the official statement as to the dates on which the present food-stocks will be exhausted. These dates vary for different districts in proportion to the local transport and agricultural conditions; Saxony, for instance, is in a particularly unfortunate position, being an industrial district cut off from her normal agricultural resources.

In general, the following terminal dates given by the Central Food Office in Berlin are probably generally correct:—

Breadstuffs	Beginning of April, 1919.
Potatoes	End of May, 1919.
Fats	End of March, 1919.

The meat ration can be continued indefinitely at the cost of the slaughtering of all milch-cows and breeding-stock.

In Saxony, however, the official date for the cessation of potato stocks in [is] the middle of February, in Bavaria the end of February, and in Hamburg the end of March.

The above estimate of the continuance of the meat ration seems to be optimistic, considering that in Hamburg and Hanover cows in calf, milch-cows, and draught oxen are being already slaughtered, as well as 8-day calves.

Given normal weather conditions during 1919, the coming harvest is expected to yield only half the average pre-war crop.

5. General conclusions. The general impressions of all the visiting officers is that the need for revictualling Germany is really urgent. The country is living on its capital as regards food supplies, and either famine or Bolshevism, probably both, will ensue before the next harvest, if help outside is not forthcoming. The need of fats is especially urgent.

The present social and political condition of Germany is sufficiently stable to guarantee the orderly distribution of food under the existing rationing machinery.

On the other hand, while Germany is still an enemy country which has not yet signed Peace Terms, it would be inadvisable to remove the menace of starvation by a too sudden and abundant supply of food-stocks. This menace is a powerful lever for negotiations at an important moment. It is still impossible to gauge the period within which Germany’s military power could revive, although there is no immediate danger on this score. The allotment of foodstuffs should be carefully controlled, but, provided they are handed over to the authorised representatives, there seems no reason for anxiety as to their ultimate equable distribution.

Military Section,
British Delegation, February 16, 1919.

Report by Captains E. B. Trafford, Scots Guards, and D. Christie Miller, Coldstream Guards, on their visit to Hanover, from the 2nd February, 1919, to the 10th February, 1919, where they had been sent by the Armistice Commission, Spa, for the purpose of enquiry into and reporting on the economic situation as regards food:—

Before making our report, we should like to say that we were prisoners of war in Germany for 40 months—the ten worst months were spent in the Hanover Army Corps Command, notorious for its ill-treatment of prisoners. We have been during our captivity spat at by a German officer and made to perform menial tasks in the presence of German non-commissioned officers and men. We can, therefore, hardly be accused of having any friendly feeling towards them.

6. Economic Life. Although this is a military report, we feel it our duty to add a few words on the economic situation as regards food.

We studied the question of food and its issue most closely. We visited the largest factories and interviewed deputations of workmen. We paid surprise visits to workmen’s tenements, to one school, and many large shops, and examined their stocks. We had interesting interviews with the Police President, the manager of the Dresdner Bank, and other public men, about food, political, and financial questions.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Hanover district and town are extremely short of food. There is at present quiet, but an undercurrent of Bolshevism may very easily come to the surface. They estimate that they cannot hold out after the 1st May, as they are three months short on their last harvest. No milk, except for children under six and a few sick people. Milk cows are slaughtered for food and tuberculous cattle eaten.

The manager of the Dresdner Bank estimates that throughout Germany about 1,000,000 men were at this moment doing no work and drawing about five to eight marks a day. He was partially satisfied with the new Government, but not quite, as they were not strong enough. With his 43 years’ business experience, he had not the slightest hesitation in saying that, if the extremist movement were to spread, not only Germany but the whole of Europe would be engulfed.

7. Summary. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that—

(a) The situation is at present quiet in Hanover.

(b) The food shortage in Hanover is very serious indeed.

(c) Serious internal disorders are certain to break out if food (especially fats) is not soon forthcoming.

(d) That there is a great shortage of engines and rolling-stock, particularly the former.

Appendix 6

February 22, 1919.

[Report by the American Food Investigation Mission to Germany]

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Director-General,
Supreme Council of Supply and Relief.

Sir: We have the honour to present herewith, on the basis of personal observation, examination of official statistics and conference with German Government officials and technical experts, the following summarised statement of nutritional conditions in Germany, with recommendations covering the period to the 1st September, 1919. The complete data will be filled later, in extenso, in a formal general report.

1. The agricultural statistics indicated in September, 1918, that the supplies available to Germany from her domestic production would represent about eleven months’ food supply at a ration approximating the mean of the past two years, excluding the critical summer months of 1917 and 1918. In September it was the belief of the German authorities that the requirements for the twelfth month with the continuation of hostilities could be covered with comestibles drawn from the occupied areas.

2. With the collapse of the military forces and the signing of the Armistice, not only were all seizures from occupied territory prevented, but at the same time considerable amounts of foodstuffs already in hand were lost direfctly, and other amounts escaped the hands of the authorities and entered into private trade. In addition it was necessary at once to raise the ration beyond that previously enforced. The Germans suggest that the total of the foodstuffs therein involved might represent a three months’ supply on a minimal basis.

3. The control of illicit trading has been greatly reduced under the new Government and the morale of distribution seriously undermined. Because of this, a further loss in the supply of controlled food has resulted.

4. The sum of these considerations leads to the conclusion, which is supported by estimates which have been derived from authorities in charge of food affairs in cities exceeding 30,000 inhabitants, that the machinery of distribution will, after the 1st May, be unable to supply large sections of the German industrial population with foodstuffs, and large classes of non-producers will be reduced to competitive illicit traffic in foodstuffs. This estimate of date may be too early or too late, depending upon industrial, economic, and political considerations, the exact development of which, in time and extent, one does not presume to estimate in a casual opinion.

5. The German Food Administration and the scientific experts to whom the Administration has entrusted the technical evaluation of their food resources have suggested the following programme as covering their requirements up to the new harvest in a manner that will be satisfactory, under the circumstances, and provide a better ration than is at present available:—

Monthly Programme for Six Months

Wheat flour, 320,000 tons, or wheat in part, as determined by the seller (80 parts of flour corresponding to 100 parts of wheat). The Germans would accept a small amount of rye, if of high extraction; they do not wish barley flour; they would accept rice or rolled oats in small part, but only if at equal prices.

One hundred thousand tons mixed pork products, including lard substitutes.

Ten thousand tons vegetable oil per month for four months, for margarine.

Ten thousand tons condensed milk per month for four months, if available; otherwise the lacking amounts to be delivered in terms of vegetable oil.

It is our judgment that these imports, plus domestic stocks, would not represent a per capita ration of over 2,400 calories per day. The intake of the industrial classes would be materially lower than this figure.

The Germans also desire 200,000 tons of maize per month for five months, or a corresponding amount of oil cake. This is to be regarded as a programme of secondary order, since German financiers and leaders of industry recognise that this item stands upon a different footing from the others. The maize and oil cake would not be fed to any considerable extent to dairy cattle, but would go to meat production (which pays the producer better than dairy production), and would yield no meat in material amounts until late in the summer.

The Germans own somewhere between forty and fifty thousand tons of fish products in Scandinavia. It is recommended that they be permitted to import this at once. We further recommend that fishing in the North and Baltic Seas be thrown open to the German fishing fleet, under such conditions of regulation and control as the Supreme War Council and Supreme Economic Council may dictate.

We wish to record the judgment that the admission of these foodstuffs into Germany will operate in the direction of maintenance of public order and social tranquillity. At the same time, we wish to point out that (a) hunger is only one of three elements operating in the direction of Bolshevism, the other two being (b) lack of employment, and (c) dissatisfaction with the results of the revolution and the character of the present Government—since large elements of the working classes are convinced that under the elected Government, as at present constituted, the principles of social democracy, with respect to socialisation of what they denominate public industries (such as coal mining), are not to be carried out. In addition, they believe that the policies of the National Assembly do not sufficiently tend to promote measures destined to transfer the load of payment of war cost and war indemnity from the working classes to the capitalistic classes, who are commonly regarded by the working classes as equally guilty with the military classes in the causation of the war.

• Vernon Kellogg
• Alonzo Engelbert Taylor

Appendix 7

Note From the Food Section Regarding Finance of Food Supplies for the Left Bank of the Rhine

This problem has been urgently called to the attention of the Permanent Committee⁷ by Marshal Foch, and numerous discussions have taken place. As yet, no real solution has been reached. Marshal Foch considers it extremely important from a military point of view that this provisioning should be separated from the provisioning of the right bank of the Rhine, and there seems to be general agreement that it should be carried out under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Military Committee, to be set up under the High Command and reporting to the Permanent Committee.

There are two or three alternative methods of finance:—

(a) That a certain portion of the foodstuffs furnished to Germany under some general plan of German finance for the whole of Germany should be assigned to the east bank of the Rhine.

(b) That as the provisioning of the civil population under occupation is of prime military importance to the occupying armies, it should be undertaken by the armies themselves from their own funds.

(c) That freedom to trade in foodstuffs between the east bank of the Rhine and adjoining countries, neutral and Allied, should be freely permitted. The latter solution would probably be only partial, but it might be contributory of considerable value, as neutral and Allied merchants would no doubt work out a great deal of credit and payment machinery of their own.

February 24, 1919.

Appendix 8

British Delegation,
Paris, February 4, 1919.

[Letter From the President of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (Salter) to the Secretary of the Supreme War Council]

Sir: I have the honour to inform you that the Allied Maritime Transport Council, which met in formal Session on Saturday, the 1st of February, and Tuesday, the 4th, unanimously passed the following resolutions, and decided to submit them to the Supreme War Council for approval by the Associated Governments:—

• “1. In arranging for the allocation for management and employment of enemy tonnage, the Allied Maritime Transport Council have done so on the understanding that the ultimate disposition of the vessels by the Terms of Peace shall be in no way prejudiced, and that in order to mark the fact that the vessels are being administered in the meantime in trust for the Associated Governments as a whole, they will fly at the poop (or, in the case of vessels manned by naval officers and crews, at the fore) the flag of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, as well as the national flag of the country undertaking management. The Council recommend that each of the Associated Governments should make a definite declaration in the above sense, including a statement that in discussing the question of the ultimate disposition of the vessels they will found no argument on the allocation for the management or service of the vessels in the meantime.
• “2. The Allied Maritime Transport Council desire to point out to the Supreme War Council that no Allied Council is at present vested with sufficient authority to deal with all enemy shipping questions or with the provision of tonnage, whether Allied or enemy, for relief purposes. The agreement concluded with the German Government on the 17th January, 1919, included a provision to the effect that the Associated Governments would arrange for the administration of the German vessels handed over, either through the Allied Maritime Transport Council or through some other body which they might create or designate for the purpose. No such appointment has yet been made. The Council are prepared to accept the responsibility if the Supreme War Council desire them to undertake it, but they would desire in that case that a definite and explicit decision of the Supreme War Council should invest them with the necessary authority. Apart from the German ships, no central Allied body is entrusted with the settlement of the numerous questions arising in regard to the acquisition, allocation, and use of Austrian vessels. The allocation has, in fact, been made in many cases through naval commissions in the Adriatic, in Spain and elsewhere, but in cases where agreement through those local commissions has not been arrived at there has been no central body to settle the points in dispute. The Allied Maritime Transport Council have, in fact, been arranging the employment of such vessels as have been brought into service, but again they have had no specific authority from the several Governments. The Council suggest that the Supreme War Council might find it convenient to appoint the Allied Maritime Transport Council as a central authority for dealing with enemy shipping questions generally including authority to direct the allocation or re-allocation for management or use.”

The Allied Maritime Transport Council venture to urge the extreme importance of an early decision being given. In the case of the first resolution, approval will doubtless be regarded as of a formal character, in view of the fact that the representatives of the Allied Governments agreed unanimously to its terms and that it deals with a matter within the scope of the Council.

The second resolution refers to the scope of the authority of the Council; the Supreme War Council will doubtless consider whether it is desirable to assign the proposed authority to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, or to some other body. The Council, however, desire in this instance also to emphasise the extreme importance of an immediate allocation of the authority proposed either to themselves or to some other body.

I am [etc.]

J. A. Salter

Appendix 9

Extracts From Minutes of Proceedings of the Allied Maritime Transport Council

As regards Resolutions 1 and 2, it is understood that the words “enemy tonnage” should mean “enemy tonnage acquired or to be acquired after the signing of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918.”

It is further understood that the responsibility which the Allied Maritime Transport Council has taken upon itself in Resolution 2 is the allocation and re-allocation of enemy tonnage, for management by one or the other of the Associated Governments and for their use; as well as the responsibility of the financial arrangements regarding the handing over and the use of the ships.

It is also understood in connection with Resolution 2 that, in accepting final responsibility, the members of the Maritime Transport Sections of the various countries do not hold themselves responsible as to whether it is absolutely essential to make use of the power of requisitioning in order to procure national tonnage to be used in case of relief.

It is understood that the authority granted to the Allied Maritime Transport Council does not apply to the granting or temporary re-granting of ships, and does not in any way affect the final disposition of the ships after Peace.

Resolutions 1 and 2 were submitted to the Supreme War Council for approval on the 21st February, 1919.

Appendix 10

Note From the Food Section [Dated February 23, 1919,] Regarding the Provision of Shipping for Transportation of Food

The Permanent Committee strongly recommends that the shipping members of the Supreme Economic Council shall take at once into consideration the systematic provision of shipping for the purposes of food transportation. It must be obvious that the German cargo tonnage will not be available for some time, either for German transportation or to relieve the pressure to liberated countries, and that in the meantime Allied shipping must be provided. At the present moment the American Shipping Board is providing the entire shipping for fully one-half of the needs of the liberated countries, and they advise that they cannot longer continue to take such a portion of the burden, in view of their other obligations.

Appendix 11

Report of Sub-Committee on Re-establishment of Communications in Eastern Europe

1. The Sub-Committee confirm General Mance’s Memorandum of the 25th January as correctly representing the situation, and emphasise the necessity for prompt action to prevent the situation from getting worse.

2. They recommend the appointment of a Technical Executive Committee of the Allied and Associated Powers capable of rendering assistance, with the following terms of reference:—

(a) To organise and co-ordinate the necessary urgent assistance for the maintenance, improvement, and operation of the existing port, railway, and telegraphic facilities, with a view to the earliest possible return to normal conditions:—

(1) In pre-war Austria-Hungary and Eastern Germany.

(2) In European countries further to the east, including prewar Russia.

(3) In any other country indicated by the Supreme Economic Council.

(b) To apportion the necessary action between the Allies with a view to the most effective solution.

(c) To organise immediate despatch of the necessary Technical Missions.

(d) To arrange for the earliest supply of essential materials within the financial limits laid down.

(e) To arrange adequate control of expenditure allotted through the Technical Executive Committee.

(f) To report to the Supreme Economic Council.

3. In order to meet the barest necessities of the above countries during the period of transition, the Sub-Committee recommend that a sum of twenty millions sterling should be allotted to the proposed Technical Executive Committee; this being only a small percentage of the requirements put forward by the countries themselves. This amount can only be regarded as a tentative estimate of the direct assistance which may be necessary until such time as essential requirements can be met through the ordinary trade channels.

The expenditure would, in any case, be spread over several months, but the nature and extent of the immediate assistance would depend on the total sum likely to be available.

4. It is essential, both in the interests of efficiency and ultimate economy, that the financial procedure should be such that supply is not delayed by the need for prior financial adjustment between the Allied and Associated Powers before expenditure is incurred. It is therefore suggested that, if possible, funds should be advanced in each case by the Power arranging for the country of origin of any article, any Inter-Allied adjustments being made subsequently as a matter of accounting.

The Sub-Committee assumes that a financial, as well as a technical representative, would be appointed to the proposed Executive Committee by each Power represented thereon.

5. The Sub-Committee indicate the following lines on which the proposed Executive Committee might act:—

(a) In the case of each country assisted by the Committee, allot responsibility to one of the Powers represented on the Executive Committee for sending immediately a Technical Mission, and for effecting the necessary supply of essential material.

(b) Define the duties of the Technical Missions, whose principal functions will be to examine the conditions of the ports, railways, telegraph, and telephone systems of each country; to report what essential materials are required, and in what other ways effective assistance should be rendered; to act as technical advisers to the local administration wherever necessary, and, where necessary, to exercise temporary control of operations to assure the maximum use of the resources available and to regulate through traffic. Copies of the reports of the Technical Missions to be submitted to the Executive Committee, and instructions to the Missions issued through the Power providing the Mission.

(c) In order to give these Missions an Inter-Allied complexion, lay down that the other Powers on the Committee may and, at the request of the Committee, shall appoint liaison officers, who will not, however, be responsible members of the Mission.

(d) Lay down general principles regarding the nature of the supplies which may be undertaken by the Committee.

(e) Give to the responsible Power concerned provisional authority for the expenditure of a specific amount for each country assisted to cover the preliminary supply of most urgent materials.

(f) Arrange for up-to-date statistics and reports on expenditure, and for adequate control of expenditure without delaying the same.

(g) Encourage, in every way possible, the supply of the necessary requirements through any available trade channel.

G. Gassotuin

General, representing Minister of Public Works and Transport

Lazzerini

Captain, representing Signor Crespi

Wm. G. Atwood

,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Engineers, U. S. A.

H. O. Mance

Brig.-General, British Representative, Chairman of Sub-Committee

February 22, 1919.

1. See BC–36, minute 4 and enclosure to annexure A, vol. iv, pp. 62 and 68.
2. Reference is to appendix 1, p. 8. This style of reference to appendixes appears throughout most of the minutes of the Supreme Economic Council. The appendixes have been printed immediately following the minutes of each meeting and have been numbered consecutively from 1 to 330 to correspond with the numbering of the references in the minutes.
3. Ante, p. 3.
4. The above figures do not include imports for animal food and distilleries which are received in other countries. [Footnote in the original.]
5. Italy has also lent, out of her own resources, some wheat to Vienna. [Footnote in the original.]
6. For text of armistice of November 11, 1918, see vol. ii, p. 1.
4. The texts of appendixes 2 to 11 are filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/33.
5. Negotiations on this subject are at present in progress in London. [Footnote in the original.]

6. Der Waffenstillstand 1918–1919, das Dokumenten-Material der Waffenstill-stands-Verhandlungen van Compiègne, Spa, Trier und Brüssel, herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutscben Waffenstillstands-Kommission mit Genehmigung des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin, 1928), band 2, p. 37.

   For draft texts of this agreement, see BC–1, minute 3 and BC–1A, minute 4, vol. iii, pp. 512 and 521.

5. See appendix 5 (c), infra.
5. See appendix 5 (c), infra.
6. See appendix 6, p. 23.
7. Permanent Committee of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief.