185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Geneva1
21039. Del by—opening of bus. 1/281 White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Instructions for CTB Negotiations.
1. Following CTB instructions for Amb. Warnke received today from Dr. Brzezinski.
2. Begin quote. “When the trilateral CTB negotiations resume on January 20, the President wants you to move ahead with the negotiation of the key elements of a multilateral CTB treaty and protocol, and to explain and seek Soviet acceptance of our positions on the contents of a supplementary U.S.-Soviet agreement on verification. In doing so, you should be guided by the following considerations.
3. You should propose the concept of challenge on-site inspections, which would include the following elements: (a) there would not be a limit on the number of OSI requests, nor conditions as to the type or technical adequacy of evidence that must be presented before a questionable event would be eligible for an OSI request; (b) a party not accepting an OSI request would be obligated to provide a detailed justification; (c) a requesting party not satisfied with the explanation would be entitled to bring the matter to the U.N. security council; and (d) there would be an agreed understanding that arbitrary refusals to grant OSI requests could undermine confidence in the treaty and could create a situation in which a party whose requests had been arbitrarily denied would consider that its supreme national interests were jeopardized (thus providing a basis for withdrawal from the treaty).
4. You should present our new position in a manner that encourages maximum Soviet movement toward us on issues of importance. You should stress that our new position on inspection is part of an integrally related and essential verification package—which includes our position on internal seismic stations and OSI procedures. Furthermore, you should state that the offer of this verification package represents movement on our side on an important and sensitive issue, and is contingent on Soviet movement to satisfactory solutions on the duration and PNE protocol issues along the lines we have proposed.
5. You should draw on the working group guidance paper in continuing to promote our approach to obtaining timely, useful, and au [Page 441] thenticated data from internal seismic stations. If it appears helpful in advancing our objectives, you may indicate to the Soviets that, while we are not prepared to propose a specific number of stations, we are examining networks ranging up to around twenty installations. You may indicate that the precise number will depend on such factors as noise levels, locations, and the extent to which arrays of seismometers may be included.
6. You should draw from the working group guidance papers in presenting our views on the rights and functions of on-site inspection teams that would be explicitly provided for in the separate, U.S.-Soviet verification agreement and on procedures for international seismic data exchange.
7. If the issue of permitted nuclear experiments is raised, you should repeat our position that the terminology used to describe the basic CTB prohibitions may require mutually acceptable understandings regarding distinctions between prohibited explosions and permitted nuclear experiments. The Delegation should indicate, however, that we are not prepared to pursue this issue further at this time.
8. You should continue discussion of issues concerning the treaty duration and PNE protocol on the basis of my December 4th instructions.” End quote.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), 3–12/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.↩