302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
222185. For Ambassador Hummel from Saunders. Subject: Meeting With Ambassador Yaqub Khan.
1. At his invitation, I had lunch with Yaqub Khan Tuesday.2 He has on previous occasions invited me for a general discussion either before or after his consultations in Islamabad. This time, however, I found him during a good part of our conversation somewhat rambling in his presentation and not at all his usual smooth and coherent self. His Minister, Hayat Mehdi, was with him.
2. The beginning of our conversation was devoted to a long review of his effort before and during his recent consultation to establish precisely our position on Pakistani assurances on the nuclear issue. He recounted how it had seemed initially to his government that we were [Page 709] seeking assurances from Pakistan that went beyond what the law requires. He said that after two conversations with Dave Newsom3 he had concluded that the U.S. position is as follows: The U.S. seeks from Pakistan no assurances beyond the fact that the French reprocessing deal is off. If, however, a Pakistani pronouncement of its peaceful intentions in the nuclear field could be made, this could be a helpful complement to our efforts to win support in Congress for a normalization of our relationship. Yaqub concluded this portion of his narrative by indicating that this is the way he had described the U.S. position during his stay in Islamabad, which had coincided with that of his colleague from Paris.
3. After stating his assumption that our next step would be to consult with the Congress on resuming normal aid relationships with Pakistan, he began to think out loud on the points that he himself would make in his contacts with key Members of the Congress. They included the following: The present U.S. legislation could have the effect of driving nations underground in the nuclear field rather than precluding nuclear development. Pakistan would consider the U.S. response now a test of whether the U.S. can be counted on to support Pakistan during this difficult period in South Asia. Yaqub then spun out the analogy of someone going through a divorce who tested the faithless partner in all kinds of ways so that, when the separation was completed, he could feel relief that all avenues had been tried and the partner had demonstrated beyond doubt that the relationship could not work. He added that if the U.S. resumed a normal relationship it would give us more leverage if Pakistan were found later going the nuclear route. It was during this part of the discussion that he seemed nervous and least articulate.
4. I asked what impression he would intend to leave with the Members of Congress regarding Pakistan’s future intentions in the nuclear field. He indicated that he would try to leave the impression that Pakistan foreswears the route of developing nuclear weapons, even though as a matter of principle there are some explicit commitments it cannot make. Conversely, he recalled that Pakistan is prepared to accept full-scope safeguards the moment India does. Mehdi added at that point that Pakistan knew it could not win an arms race, whether conventional or nuclear, with India and therefore had relied on diplomacy for its protection, such as proposing nuclear free zones.
[Page 710]5. Asking that his confidence be fully protected, Yaqub then said there was one other point he would like to make to Members of Congress but would refrain from making. This point reflected his deep concern with what he described as the revolutionary course of events now turned loose in Iran. In the end, his point was that, even though Pakistan might be “running on only two cylinders and might be facing disintegration itself, the time might come when Pakistan is the only area of stability in the region.” He went on at some length about the seriousness of developments in Iran, and it was only when we reached this part of the conversation that his normal coherence and articulateness returned. He recalled from his own Pakistani military experience the change that had taken place within the Pakistani Army when Army leaders realized that Ayub Khan had lost popular support and had no other source of support but the military. He suggested that this same kind of development could come about in Iran before long. He speculated that the current course of events would end with the Shah stepping aside in favor of some sort of regency until his son can come to power.
6. I cannot fully account for Yaqub’s unaccustomed nervousness and rambling during the entire part of our conversation when we were talking about the Pakistani nuclear problem. He did indeed ramble. The entire hour and a half was spent with him talking with almost no more than an occasional comment or question from me. My colleagues here have speculated that he sounded almost like a man who wanted to build the case that Pakistan had indeed been forced underground in its nuclear developments so that, when the facts came to light later, if there were such facts, he would not be guilty of having deceived us and would be in a position to say that he had indeed warned us that our actions were driving Pakistan down precisely the route we wanted it to avoid.
7. I do not want to make too much of this meeting because anyone is entitled to a bad day now and then. I report it to you only in case it jibes with observations you may have made during your meetings with Yaqub in Islamabad.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1796. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Tehran. Sent for information to the White House. Drafted by Saunders; cleared in S/S and by Newsom; approved by Saunders.↩
- August 29.↩
- Reference is to Newsom’s July 26 meeting with Yaqub Khan (see Document 295) and their August 1 conversation. According to telegram 194167 to Islamabad, August 1, in the August 1 conversation, Newsom assured Yaqub Khan that the United States did not require written assurances that Pakistan would not develop reprocessing technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2121↩