Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, November 3, 1980, 2223Z

293936. USIAEA, Colombo for Schaffer. Subject: US-Indian Bilateral Talks: Tarapur.

1. (Secret entire text).

2. Summary: The Deputy Secretary raised Tarapur briefly in his session with Gonsalves;² urging the Indians not to press for the second shipment. In a follow-on session devoted solely to nuclear matters, the two sides exchanged views on the second shipment, future US supply of fuel for Tarapur, the continuation of US-Indian nuclear cooperation, and the question of a joint determination to permit reprocessing of US-origin spent fuel. Gonsalves made clear he did not have a brief from his government on any of these issues, but flagged potential problem areas. The problem of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, about which the Indians were quite pessimistic, was also discussed. End summary.

3. The Deputy Secretary emphasized the political efforts by the administration to get Tarapur through the Congress. It had been a tight squeak and the letter to Senator Church was politically necessary.³ There were no new conditions affecting India, although the second shipment will not be sent until needed. Mr. Christopher urged that we let the dust settle and hoped the Indians would not press now for the second shipment since this would have an unnecessarily adverse effect on the situation. We should turn the issue over to the experts to discuss the question of when the second shipment is needed. Gonsalves agreed to discuss the matter with Assistant Secretary Pickering.

4. A follow-on session devoted to nuclear issues was held October 28. Participants were Assistant Secretaries Saunders and Pickering, ACDA Assistant Director Van Doren, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Coon and Nosenzo, NEA/INS Director Schaffer and OES/NEP Deputy Director Salmon. The Indians were represented by Secretary (East) Gonsalves, Additional Secretary Hiremuth, Director Mukherjee, DCM Haksar, and EmbOff Cowsik.

5. Assistant Secretary Pickering said that the administration’s recent intensive, politically sensitive, effort to secure congressional approval of the two fuel shipments for Tarapur demonstrated the US desire to preserve our nuclear relationship—a desire echoed by Prime Minister Gandhi in her letter to the President.⁴ However, the timing of the second shipment had to be governed by the letter from the Secretary to Senator Church.

6. Secretary Gonsalves replied that India and the US both had free presses and Parliaments which complicated the handling of issues such as this. India could not accept an indefinite delay in the second shipment. It was already overdue under a schedule the US itself had proposed and legally such delays could constitute US default of the agreement. India regarded the assurances provided to the Senate as a domestic US matter and as such would try to avoid commenting on them. The immediate problem for the GOI was developing an approach for dealing with the Tarapur issue before the Indian Parliament which would reconvene November 17. While there are obvious difficulties, Indian authorities would try to develop language which would avoid inflaming the situation and would accommodate the basic requirements of both sides. Their initial approach would probably say no more than that consultations with the US were underway, that they hoped for early release of the second shipment, and early, favorable action on the new application.

7. More generally, Gonsalves opined that the nuclear relationship was a continuing cause of irritation between the US and India. Although he had no mandate to discuss such a proposition, might it not be better in the long run to set our nuclear relationship aside?

8. Pickering said that in the view of the US the delay of the second shipment did not raise any questions of legal default. The schedule to which Gonsalves had referred was now outdated. However, the arrangement for the second shipment continued to proceed on the basis of the basic premise of that schedule, namely that the Hyderabad fuel fabrication facility should be kept in operation on a reasonable, uninterrupted basis. Unless India created a new situation by exploding a nuclear device, the second shipment would be treated on this basis. No new conditions were being imposed on India.

9. On the general point, Pickering said that the US had just been through a searing experience over Tarapur and abandonment of our nuclear relationship would be very difficult to accept at this time. In the longer term, perhaps such a concept would have to be discussed. However, termination should not be done hastily. If India was determined to initiate discussions on the termination of our relationship, the US, of course, could not refuse but nonetheless greatly preferred not dealing with this so soon after the Tarapur decision. Pickering made clear that the ball on this issue is in the Indian court and Gonsalves agreed.

10. Gonsalves said that the US was limiting India to a one year supply of fresh fuel while other nations, such as the FRG and Japan, had sufficient fresh fuel for seven or eight years in stock. As to future fuel supplies for Tarapur, the Muskie-Church exchange of letters implied that India must accept full-scope safeguards (FSS).

11. Pickering replied that the paragraph Gonsalves was referring to in the Secretary’s letter had been carefully drafted to reflect US law on this matter.⁵ Thus, it did not foreclose the possibility of a Presidential waiver as was provided under the law. In any event, leaving aside the obvious political problems of a waiver, the shipment under the next license would not be needed for at least a year.

12. Gonsalves reiterated for the record that India could not accept FSS. With respect to handling the exchange of letters, the potential problem lay with the possible reaction of the Indian Parliament. It was not clear how long the GOI could hold to their initial line in the face of heated parliamentary debate. He would review the situation on his return to New Delhi and talk with our Embassy about their line as they develop it.

13. Turning to the Indian aide memoire of last April,⁶ Pickering noted that it raised two issues—fuel supplies for Tarapur and a joint determination on reprocessing US-origin spent fuel. The US had responded orally in the past and now was prepared to respond in writing on both points now that the fuel supply situation had been clarified.

14. Reprocessing raised a timing problem for India, Gonsalves stated, since storage capacity for spent fuel would be exhausted at some point.

15. Pickering replied that reprocessing raises not only a variety of technical issues but also policy issues for the US. The US does not reprocess spent power reactor fuel in this country and is unlikely to change its policy of discouraging other nations from doing so. Moreover, reprocessing raises significant safeguards questions. Therefore, the US view on the joint determination was unlikely to change from the negative view which President Carter had previously conveyed to Prime Minister Desai.

16. Although not wishing to address the issue in depth and feeling that technical discussion would be premature and likely to create strains, Gonsalves said that India could not accept an indefinite delay in reprocessing. The US was bound to render a decision by the agreement. Speaking personally, he wondered if perhaps India should present the US with a fait accompli on reprocessing.

17. Such a step would be very badly received in the US Pickering stated. Our bilateral nuclear relationship would be ended in an acrimonious fashion. While one could only speculate about the fate of additional fuel licenses for India, it was important not to move precipitously now but rather to permit time for full consultations. Early Indian action such as this would simply place enormous strains on the rest of our relationship. As to the joint determination, the US legal position was that both sides were required to act affirmatively on it before reprocessing was permissible. Prime Minister Desai had publicly stated the same view.

18. Gonsalves said that the Indian legal position was the opposite of that of the US.

19. Both sides had raised important issues which the US would be happy to discuss further if India so desired. However, Pickering continued, it was important to avoid peremptory actions.

20. Gonsalves expressed understanding for US problems but said that India has political difficulties of its own. During the recent congressional debate, the GOI had sought to avoid exacerbating US political problems. Pickering said the US appreciated this restraint.

21. In reply to Pickering’s expression of appreciation for Indian restraint in foregoing further tests and work on a weapons program, Gonsalves said that some of the allegations about India which had surfaced in the recent debate over fuel for Tarapur were unfortunate. India has undertaken a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons despite the Chinese and Pakistani situations. India hoped to maintain this commitment but was troubled by the lack of appreciation for it in the US Congress and press.

22. Pickering said that the 1974 Indian explosion was the source of many of the problems which had arisen in the recent US debate. While it would have been very helpful if we could have asserted that the GOI had foresworn any further nuclear explosions, we could only say that we have no evidence that a further explosion was contemplated.

23. Turning to the problem of Pakistan’s nuclear explosive aspirations, Pickering said that the US had made a serious effort to halt the flow of supplies to this program. However, despite our efforts, we still could not be sure that the Pakistani effort will be stopped. We estimate that a Pakistani explosion is at least two years away and probably somewhat longer. The US has pressed Pakistan to foreswear the development of nuclear explosives, thus far unsuccessfully although they have denied that they intend to develop nuclear weapons. Would a joint Indo-Pakistani no-nuclear weapons pledge be a useful device?

24. Gonsalves said that Indian discussions with Pakistan on the nuclear issue had been inconclusive. India’s view was that this was a strongly held Pakistani objective and that Pakistan was unlikely to be turned from it. Indian estimates of Pakistan’s capabilities were similar to our own—they should be able to begin production of material for weapons early next year, both through enrichment and reprocessing. India had increasing evidence that the Pakistanis had diverted material from KANUPP for their reprocessing program and also had conclusive evidence that the Pakistani program predated India’s 1974 explosion. Gonsalves spoke of a fanatical Pakistan commitment to acquire a nuclear explosives capability which was being cynically abetted by members of the London Suppliers Group (LSG). Indian complaints to various LSG members brought only dispiriting replies and India saw no prospect of halting Pakistan’s efforts.

25. While the US saw no reason for much optimism, Pickering indicated, the US had applied great pressure on other suppliers and had made some progress. Our efforts had not been universally well received as other suppliers sometimes claimed that we were attempting to interfere in routine commercial activities. Nonetheless, the US would persevere. US law would require serious steps if Pakistan, or indeed any other non-nuclear state, was responsible for a nuclear explosion. The law gives us no choice in these matters.

26. In response to a query from Pickering, Gonsalves offered to provide evidence that the Pakistani program predated 1974. Pickering said that Pakistan’s serious effort to acquire nuclear explosives raised grave issues not only for the sub-continent but also elsewhere. In this vein, the US appreciated India’s restraint with respect to nuclear exports to sensitive countries.

27. While India is committed to equality in nuclear exports, Gonsalves acknowledged that India recognized that there were problem areas which required the exercise of discretion.

28. When queried about Indian evidence for the charge that the Pakistanis were diverting material from KANUPP, Gonsalves pointed to the difficulties in agreeing on an IAEA safeguards inspection at KANUPP and Pakistan’s recently completed indigenous fuel fabrication facility which could produce fuel for KANUPP as causes for concern. He did not claim, however, to possess any solid evidence of diversion. Pickering indicated that the US, too, was concerned about diversion from KANUPP and noted that the IAEA was conducting an inspection.

29. Comment: The Indians’ most immediate requirement is to develop the approach to be followed in the upcoming parliamentary debate on this issue. The Embassy should stay in contact with Indian authorities on this matter in an effort to assure that the GOI’s approach does not create political difficulties for us. End comment.

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870108–0301. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad, Vienna, Bombay, Colombo, and the White House. Drafted by John Salmon (OES/NET/NEP); cleared in S/S and by Nosenzo, Van Doren, Deitz, and Coon; approved by Pickering.
2. For the rest of Christopher’s discussions with Gonsalves, see Document 206.
3. See footnote 3, Document 197.
4. See Document 187.
5. Apparent reference to the following paragraph in Muskie’s September 10 letter to Church (see footnote 3, Document 197): “I agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for the treatment of future export license applications. The full-scope safeguards export licensing criterion as set forth in Section 128 A (1) of the Atomic Energy Act will apply to any future license applications for the export of nuclear fuel to Tarapur.”
6. See footnote 8, Document 180.