Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

205. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 27, 1980, 2:35–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Indo-US Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Thomas P. Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council
• Eric Gonsalves, Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs
• K.R. Narayanan, Indian Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Brzezinski welcomed Mr. Gonsalves and pointed out that a number of the issues which they had discussed during Gonsalves’ last visit to Washington² were still very much on the agenda. (S)

Gonsalves said that was indeed the case but it was that sort of thing that provided continuing employment for people in foreign policy. He then went on to convey a personal message from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the President, expressing great appreciation for the efforts that the President had made in bringing the Tarapur matter to a successful conclusion. Gonsalves noted that the issue was not fully settled but that the Government of India greatly appreciated the commitment to the bilateral relationship which the President’s effort represented. (S)

Gonsalves then recapitulated several themes that had come up in his morning discussion at the State Department.³ He noted first of all that it was evident that there are a number of misconceptions in the United States about Indian policy. This underlined the need to step up communication between the two governments and he is glad that Ambassador Narayanan has now arrived so that this can be done more effectively. Gonsalves believes that the Indian position is often misunderstood in the United States and no attempt is made to find out accurately what the Indian position is. It is automatically assumed that India’s view is against that of the United States. On the other hand, he admitted, the Indians are sometimes inclined to take simplistic views of the problems that the United States faces, as in the security area. He said that a second point that had become clear this morning was that, as Dr. Brzezinski had suggested in general terms earlier in the year, the sense of crisis in international affairs had moved from Europe towards Asia. It is now focussed on the Indian Ocean littoral where India has the misfortune to be located. Gonsalves said that India had not yet filled out its conceptual framework, but is attempting to gain an overview of the whole region. It sees this region as a much more fragile area than Europe and hopes to reactivate the role of the non-aligned movement to help structure peace and order in the region. India’s objective is to keep the great powers out of the Indian Ocean. The American presence is overwhelmingly powerful and the societies of the region are very fragile. This could lead to a crumbling of order in the area. He admitted that the non-aligned movement is in a very inchoate state now and somewhat obese with its bloated membership. India is not sure how it can be activated to provide a more stable and effective approach to the problem but is going to try and do this at the non-aligned conference which will begin in New Delhi in January. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski welcomed Gonsalves’ ideas and said they seemed to be a better way of stating some of the thoughts that he had recently given in a speech. (He gave a copy of the speech to Gonsalves and said he would appreciate any comments on it.)⁴ He pointed out that we are now engaged in the third phase of post-war history. The first phase had involved deterrence in Europe, the second is the safeguarding of the Far East and normalization with China, and the third would be the most difficult one, the preservation of stability in the Persian Gulf region. He agreed that the Persian Gulf region is quite different and that the United States, in dealing with it, must adopt a different approach that would be compatible with the post-Colonial experience. (S)

He also agreed that the United States and India must have serious consultative discussions such as the last talk that he and Gonsalves had had earlier in the year. He pointed out forcefully however that the United States Government did not make a practice of publicly criticizing Indian policies and expressed his regrets at the recent statement by Prime Minister Gandhi that the United States was still “tilting” against India.⁵ (S)

Gonsalves said that that was not really what Mrs. Gandhi had meant—that she was simply referring to statements that have been made by American writers. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski replied somewhat ironically that he was glad that there are no public polemics than between the United States and India. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that there is one problem that definitely needs elucidation. The Indians should understand that we are not seeking to bring the cold war to the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, however, we do have a vital interest in not allowing the Soviets to affect the flow of oil out of the region. Until about two years ago, Brzezinski said, the Persian Gulf was fairly well isolated from the Soviet threat by a buffer, comprising the States of the northern tier. India was also an important factor for stability. Now, however, Iran has an uncertain future and Afghanistan is objectively an effective wedge into that tier. It does not matter what the Soviets’ subjective reasons were for going into Afghanistan; objectively they now have such a position. Even if Brezhnev’s motives in Afghanistan are of the purest, we cannot be sure how a future Soviet Government might use that position. Now, the Iran/Iraq war threatens to become a war of attrition, providing an opening for foreign involvement.⁶ In that conflict we seek first to prevent its spread (and we have made significant contributions to that end already), second to reinforce the position of the moderate Arab states, and third, despite the hostage situation, to protect the integrity of Iran. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that the restoration of Afghanistan to a non-aligned status is in the interest of the states of the region. This will be possible, however, only if the Soviets perceive the price that they have to pay—both inside Afghanistan and on the international scene—as higher than the costs of withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States accepts the reality of the Soviet political preponderance in Afghanistan. We insist however that this must exist in the context of a neutral Afghan government that is acceptable to the people. The Babrak regime however is not acceptable and everyone knows that it could not stay in power for a day without the presence of 100,000 Soviet troops. We think that there should be transitional arrangements possible to permit the Soviets to withdraw while still leaving in place a government that would not be slaughtered on the spot. (S)

The United States, Brzezinski said, has a different perspective from India’s. The Indians are making it easy for the Soviets to remain in Afghanistan. India has a special role and a special authority. It is not easy to understand how India is able to compromise its moral qualities in the position that it’s taking in Afghanistan. India is helping to perpetuate the farce that the Babrak Karmal Government is an acceptable regime in Afghanistan. (S)

Gonsalves replied that that is not the Indian position. The Indians are at least as interested in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan as is the United States. The Government of India has made this point both in Moscow and to the Afghans. However it has to take reality into account. There is no visible alternative to Babrak Karmal at this time. The opposition forces are in complete disarray. India and the United States agree on the package required to get the Soviets out and the Indians have stated their position forcefully to the Soviets. But the Soviets are not willing to withdraw without guarantees against continued external interference, and nobody has been able to identify an alternative leadership. (S)

Gonsalves agreed that there should be a broad based government in Kabul. India had tried to get the Soviets to agree to withdraw in the context of guarantees from Iran and Pakistan not to interfere. The Pakistanis, however, have been reluctant to talk with the Afghan Government on this subject because of, allegedly, the position of the Islamic Conference. India had hoped to find common ground between the position of the Islamic Conference and the Afghan proposals of May 14,⁷ and it is still trying to do so. It is hard to see where to go from here but the matter will be taken up with Brezhnev when he visits India in December. Gonsalves reemphasized that India is not seeking to make the Soviet position easier. (S)

Brzezinski responded that that is not the impression that we get—the Indians seem to be equating incommensurate things in criticizing both the US and Soviet positions with regard to Afghanistan. (S)

Gonsalves again said that the United States misapprehends the Indian position which has been set forth in the recent statement of the Indian Foreign Minister.⁸ (Gonsalves said he would see that Brzezinski got a copy of that statement.) Reflecting a comment he had made earlier in the morning, he said that India was taking the low road to getting the Soviets out while the United States was taking the high road. (S)

Brzezinski responded that that was certainly understandable and we do not expect India to echo our position. India does however have important moral suasion to bring to bear. (S)

Gonsalves observed that the great problem was the need to find a face-saving way out for the Soviets. (S)

Brzezinski agreed that a formula has to be found but that formula must include a government. The Soviets insist on that being Babrak Karmal, but that simply will not work. It is of course true that the Afghan resistance is disorganized. Brzezinski wondered if there would be a possibility of Pakistan organizing a single Afghan resistance group. (S)

Gonsalves responded that the Pakistanis would not be able to do that. (S)

Brzezinski asked whether the Indians had perceived any flexibility in the Soviet position. (S)

Gonsalves replied that they have not seen much. India has repeatedly told them that there has to be a political solution and that the military option will not work. He said that India did not have the power to push the Soviets too hard. It is necessary to convince the Soviets that it is not in their interest for them to remain in Afghanistan. For instance, India has pointed out to the Soviets that their actions in Afghanistan are simply drawing the United States more and more into South Asia. (S)

Brzezinski agreed that that was exactly right and that the United States does not want to see a collapse of US-Soviet relations. Following the election we will move forward on SALT and hope gradually to see a return to a more reciprocal and restrained form of detente. In the earlier years detente had been defined so vaguely that it was bound to end up in confrontation. Perhaps the outcome of the present situation could lead to an improvement. Sometimes a lovers’ quarrel is a useful way of clarifying emotion. (S)

Brzezinski reiterated that the United States does not want to humiliate the Soviet Union and put them through another Vietnam. That would take too long, it probably would not be successful, and the price would not be worth it. We want a genuine compromise—withdrawal with some transitional arrangements to avoid bloodshed when the Soviet troops are taken out, and a more palatable government in Afghanistan. India could play a very useful role in that process. Brzezinski considered, for instance, the possibility of having non-aligned troops in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping force. This could include Algerians, Syrians, Indonesians and Indians if they want to be part of it. Perhaps some 50,000 troops could be put in to maintain some order. (Gonsalves interjected that 50,000 troops could not do anything more than hold a few cities; if they ventured into the countryside they, too, would be shot.) (S)

Brzezinski said that something along this line was needed to avoid the cul-de-sac of a continuingly interacting confrontation which, among other things, would make it hard for us to ratify SALT. (S)

Gonsalves thought that getting SALT back on the tracks would help make the Soviets more flexible. (S)

Brzezinski said he thought that was also the case and the United States will take the lead in moving towards improved relations with the Soviet Union. We will be doing this in good faith and they should reciprocate. Brzezinski hoped that the Indians would tell this to Brezhnev when he came to New Delhi in December. (Gonsalves said that they would do so.) Brzezinski went on to say that we can compete with the Soviets in an arms race although it would not be good for either of us. In the last analysis, however, we would win the competition because we have a stronger and more creative society while the Soviet Union has many internal weaknesses despite its outward appearance of strength. (S)

Gonsalves observed that an intensified competition with the Soviets would also not be in India’s interest. (S)

Brzezinski said that we have to return to the earlier status. It is important to settle the Afghan problem because of the impact it has on US public opinion and also because of the impact it has on a critical region of the world. He went on to say that the United States has no interest in forming military pacts or establishing a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean region. We have something much more flexible and indirect in mind. A solution to the Afghan problem will make it easier for the United States not to get too deeply involved. The buffer which isolated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf would be restored and remove a great deal of the pressure. (S)

Gonsalves observed that American fears seem somewhat unfounded to the Indians. The movement in Iran is a genuine political revolution which the Soviets cannot dominate. (S)

Brzezinski said that that was true as long as Iran did not become polarized; Gonsalves responded that that is not likely to happen in the immediate future (one or two years) and thus the important buffer is still intact. (S)

Gonsalves concluded by saying that India is seeking a universalized detente in the arc of the Indian Ocean—a situation which would allow the regional states to work out their own differences. This is the thought that they are developing and hope to be able to put forward at the non-aligned meeting in January.

Thereupon the meeting closed.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 7–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. See Document 172.
3. See Documents 206 and 207.
4. Not further identified.
5. As reported in telegram 22001 from New Delhi, October 21, Gandhi made the following statement at an October 21 press conference: “We have tried for friendship with America very consistently all along and that is still our role, because we think that regardless of a country’s system or what they want to do there, we should be friends, especially with such an important nation as the United States. Unfortunately, it is their administration which we learn according to their writers who are always having a tilt against us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800502–1139)
6. The Iran-Iraq war began on September 22 when Iraq invaded Iran, and ended in a stalemate in August 1988.
7. See footnote 4, Document 452. On May 14, the Afghan Government released a statement proposing a regional political solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 270.
8. Not further identified.