Office of the Historian

203. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable1

[cable number not declassified]
Washington, October 9, 1980

COUNTRY

  • India

SUBJECT

  • Indian Intentions Regarding the Second Shipment of Enriched Uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and Regarding Reprocessing of Tarapur Spent Fuel [less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

  • [1 line not declassified]

1. Officials in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) are pleased that the meeting between the Indian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State was friendly and warm.2 Indian officials are especially pleased that the Secretary stated he would tell the U.S. President of Indian desires that the entire amount of enriched uranium for the Tarapur atomic power station be shipped as soon as possible rather than one shipment in 1980 and the second in 1981. Before the meeting, Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao received word from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he should play the subject of the second shipment in low key for the time being. She does not think that right before the U.S. elections is the right time to push the matter of the second shipment. Also New Delhi believes it necessary to look at the matter of the second shipment in the larger perspective of overall Indo-U.S. relations. However, the Government of India (GOI) does intend to press vigorously for the second shipment after the U.S. elections.

2. ([less than 1 line not declassified]: See [less than 1 line not declassified] that the GOI may start reprocessing spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Indian Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) sometime between 11–24 September 1980 approved the plan to begin reprocessing Tarapur spent fuel in approximately two months. The CCPA decision was made before Indian officials went to Vienna to talk with officials in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [less than 1 line not declassified] the GOI realizes the embarrassment potential for the U.S. administration in this matter is very high because of the administration’s efforts to obtain Senate [Page 511] approval for the shipments of enriched uranium. Further, the GOI expects that the U.S. will refuse to allow the second shipment if spent fuel reprocessing precedes it.)

3. ([less than 1 line not declassified]: The faction within the GOI advocating a hard line in nuclear matters is headed by Homi Sethna, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and his adviser M.A. Vellodi. It was Vellodi who prepared the briefing papers on nuclear affairs for Foreign Minister Rao’s meeting with the Secretary of State.)

4. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [2 lines not declassified].

6. Washington Dissem:

to State exclusive for the Director, INR.

to DOE exclusive for the Senior Intelligence Officer.

to ACDA exclusive for the Chief of the Intelligence Staff.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 10/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
  2. For Muskie’s report of the meeting, see Document 202.↩