162. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
6424. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 216: NG Meeting with Somoza.
[Page 424]Summary: NG had over two and a half hour session with Somoza on the night of December 6 during which we clarified two questions regarding our December 2 proposal2 and pressed him to lift the state of siege, grant a general amnesty, and abrogate the radio-TV code. For over an hour Somoza paraded all the reasons why it was hard for him to comply but in the end, and after I had made my acute frustration and annoyance clearly manifest, he backed off and promised to act on all three, not because of the FAO demands but because of the NG’s specific request. End summary.
1. This is an account of how the NG obtained the “Three Pearls.”
2. Obiols did not return from Guatemala until 7:15 pm (Dec. 6) despite efforts to get him to come on the morning flight. Jimenez arrived back at noon. By pre-arrangement FonMin Quintana obtained an appointment with the President at 9:00 pm so that we could deal with the clarifications he wanted and, more importantly, we could push for the three actions essential to get direct talks underway. Somoza received us in “the bunker.” He was accompanied by Quintana and PLN Secretary Tablada.
3. Somoza asked for only two clarifications. He, with Quintana’s support, again brought up the subject of inscription of voters during the Sundays preceding the plebiscite vote. As the discussion proceeded it became clear that their concern centered on preventing secondary school students from voting who are not eighteen years old or have their high school diplomas. Somoza said that unless this issue is resolved, there will be great confusion and controversy at the “Mesas Electorales”. I told Somoza the NG was aware of this. We had discussed it and considered it a matter that the parties should address in the direct talks in order to reach agreement.
4. Somoza next turned to the sentence in point 3 (B) of our December 2 proposal which states that all executive decisions shall be taken by the Cabinet Ministers in council. He wanted to know the scope of the provision as it curbed presidential prerogatives. Obiols responded that the decisions referred to had to do with significant legislative measures and not day to day administrative actions. I commented that I had received several inquiries about this sentence and its scope obviously needed to be defined with greater precision. I used this observation as a springboard to clarify, as we had agreed in a pre-meeting huddle, that our December 2 proposal should not rpt not be regarded by the parties as a definitive plan but rather as a NG contribution to the negotiating process to help the two sides focus on some of the key [Page 425] issues. We anticipated that the FAO and PLN would have ideas of their own, all to be negotiated in the direct talks we had projected.
5. Somoza then brought up the FAO response to our December 2 communications. He described it as a rejection and again made disparaging remarks about the immaturity of the FAO leadership. I told the President this was a serious misreading of the opposition at this critical juncture of the negotiations. The principal point of their response is the sixth paragraph. The three measures requested are important to them but they are also important to us as mediators. We had raised the need to improve the climate for the negotiations at our first meeting with him. We had also included the three points as basic conditions in our plebiscite proposal. The negotiations had now reached the point where favorable action on all three was essential if we are to move forward.
6. This touched off a long discussion of the advisability of taking the three steps in which Somoza and Quintana focused on the inherent problems. On the state of siege they mentioned the danger of cross border attacks from Costa Rica. Somoza said that GN intelligence showed the Sandinistas had closed their camps in the Orosi Volcano-Upala area and were moving eastward along the border. They feared an attack on San Carlos. He also worried about Sandinista spectaculars and attacks on the coffee and cotton harvest.
7. On the amnesty question Somoza had no problem with amnesty per se but threw up a lot of smoke about pardons and suspension of judicial proceedings. He carried on at length about the independence of the Nicaraguan judiciary and how executive interference would weaken the judicial system. He claimed that he would have a revolt on his hands in the Guradia if he pardoned Sandinistas who had been convicted of killing guardsmen. He brought up the difficulty of defining what is a political vs. a common crime. Indeed to hear him talk one got the impression that Nicaragua was a model democracy. Quintana was helpful to us on this subject, pointing out that certain flexibility could be found in getting the amnesty law through Congress quickly and in the release of at least some prisoners. We urged Somoza to move rapidly on amnesty and if need be set up a group to meet with the FAO to review difficult cases.
8. In the discussion on radio and TV censorship Somoza agreed that he had a duty to protect the Nicaraguan home from invasion by irresponsible stations which broadcast subversive material. He asserted all countries have to protect their airwaves. Obiols pointed out that the problem was probably less in the law itself than in the way it was administered. He urged administrative measures and suspension of the “Codigo Negro” while a new law is prepared.
9. When after an hour of examining all the reasons why it would be difficult to act on the three measures, Somoza asked what conces [Page 426] sions the FAO would give in return (he specifically mentioned a guarantee against FSLN attacks) and Quintana suggested the President might concede one of three steps, I felt the theater had gone on long enough. Aware that Somoza and Quintana had been watching me carefully throughout I scowled back at Quintana, shook my head, put my pen back in my pocket, uncrossed my legs, reached for my briefcase, and looked at Jimenez to catch his attention—all to convey an impression of acute frustration and annoyance. Somoza watched the performance, got the message and after a brief pause declared that he would not take the action because the FAO requested them but to meet the NG’s desires. After suitable expressions of appreciation by the three of us Somoza said he would still have to consult with his advisors before giving a final response and strode out of his office into the cabinet room with Quintana and Tablada in his wake.
10. An hour and twenty-five minutes later, after a series of conferences with key Cabinet members, PLN leaders and Guardia officers, Somoza returned to his office. He asked Quintana to read a statement setting forth what he was prepared to do. The statement contained the “three pearls” but explicitly tied the actions to the request of the NG. Somoza said he assumed we had no objections. We said we did not since the request goes back to our first session with him. Quintana then commented that he supposed our governments would be willing to comment favorably to the press on Somoza’s generous action. I replied that I was hopeful the President’s action would lead to quick acceptance by the FAO of direct talks and I was prepared to recommend to my government that it express satisfaction over the efforts made by the two sides to achieve a peaceful solution. My colleagues echoed this response and the meeting came to an end.
11. Department please pass to Caracas, Panama and San Jose for Ambassador only.
12. Comment: Neither before nor after this meeting has Somoza or any of his emissaries tried to follow up on the answers to the three questions posed by Pallais (Managua 6297).3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2323. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 158.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 159.↩