Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, December 1, 1978, 0530Z

6238. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler—Caracas, Panama, San Jose for Ambassador only. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 190: Strategy in Next Steps of Mediation. Ref: (A) Managua 6237² (B) Managua 6239.³

1. By separate messages we have forwarded text of Somoza/PLN reply to our note of November 27⁴ and transcript of Somoza’s press conference. The reply was delivered by Quintana and Tablada to Jimenez at 6:00 p.m. Jimenez said there was no discussion of the response. Obiols and I joined Jimenez immediately after delivery of the reply and together listened to Somoza’s press conference which began at 6:30 p.m.

2. After the press conference my colleagues and I analyzed the FAO and Somoza responses and reached tentative agreement on how we should proceed. In essence we now have acceptance by both sides of a plebiscite based on the central issue of whether Somoza should remain in power for now. The FAO qualified its acceptance with a series of conditions, the most difficult of which is that Somoza, his brother and his son should leave the country during the period of the plebiscite. In conversation with Jaime Chamorro and Xavier Zavala this afternoon we determined that FAO agreement on this condition is what enabled all elements of the FAO to go along with the plebiscite and the condition probably rpt probably cannot be compromised without rejection of the solution by an important segment of FAO groups. All other conditions are negotiable.

3. The Somoza/PLN response accepts the plebiscite on the issue as formulated by the NG but wraps it up with a proposal for a constituent assembly designed either to provoke FAO rejection or to string the negotiating process out so long that he can complete his term until 1981. This gambit, as plausible as it may seem, does not provide a peaceful solution to the political crisis which Nicaragua needs in the short term to reverse the radicalization/polarization process and halt the bloodshed and human suffering which continues here as the FSLN presses its campaign and the National Guard reacts with increased repression.

4. In the face of the position taken by the two sides, my colleagues and I tentatively agreed tonight (subject to further discussion tomorrow) to recommend to our governments a strategy involving these elements:

A) Based on the responses, prepare a proposal for resolution of the crisis which the NG regards as reasonable within a democratic and constitutional framework.

B) This proposal would recommend going ahead with the plebiscite on whether Somoza should resign or not and postponing the constituent assembly advanced by Somoza as part of the plebiscite and by the FAO during the transition period on the grounds that:

(1) The country is in no shape to go to elections for a constituent assembly and will not be until it has had a period of peace in which confidence in government and the democratic process can be rebuilt,

(2) A total revision of the Constitution is not necessary or desirable during an interim period leading to democratic elections in 1981,

(3) Minimum partial amendment will take care of whatever changes are necessary to establish a government of national reconciliation for a transition period of two years.

C) Propose that in the event Somoza wins the plebiscite, the present government will be restructured on the basis of what the PLN and the FAO agree using the PLN proposals for resolving the crisis (Managua 5648);⁵ and if Somoza loses, a government of national reconciliation (GNR) will be established drawing on the FAO document. (Managua 5210).⁶

D) Outline what the NG regards as a reasonable formula for structuring the GNR which provides for a fundamental change with a minimum of constitutional alterations to take the country to general elections on schedule in February 1981. This would involve:

—Resignation of Somoza using Article 187 of Constitution;

—Election by the Congress of a temporary replacement from among its ranks as now provided in the Constitution (the choice to be agreed to by the PLN and FAO);

—Formation of a new Cabinet and replacement of top leaders in the National Guard, autonomous agencies, Supreme Court, electoral tribunal, accounting tribunal, and municipal governments on a PCN/FAO agreed basis to achieve national reconciliation;

—Partial amendment of the Constitution, following the established procedure, to allow election of a provisional President from outside the Congress to govern the country from May 1, 1979 to April 30, 1981 (this is essential in order to balance off retention of the present Somocista Congress with an executive branch that is rearranged along national reconciliation lines.)

5. Tomorrow my colleagues and I will be drafting a communication to the parties and the people of Nicaragua embodying the approach outlined above before Obiols returns to Guatemala on Saturday and Jimenez to Santo Domingo Sunday. They want to consult their governments on next steps. I would like to return to Washington on Sunday for the same purpose. All three of us would plan to be back in Managua by Wednesday, December 6 to make any last minute adjustments in our draft and present it to the two sides the following day. In making the presentation we would emphasize that we expect them to accept or reject the proposal with no further counter-proposals or basic conditions, it being understood that if the plan is accepted, the specifics will be negotiated directly and rapidly by the two sides under the sponsorship of the NG. My colleagues and I agree that we cannot permit this negotiation to drag out any longer. Cohesiveness of the FAO will not allow it. Without the FAO we see no viable negotiating alternative. Our final proposal calls for important concessions from both sides and offers them a reasonable solution.

6. I hope that by tomorrow night we will have a fairly good draft of our plan to forward to the Department.

7. I think it important that we consult Carlos Andres Perez on the plan before the NG returns to Managua. My colleagues agree. In this way he can call the FAO, G–12 and FSLN shortly after presentation to convey his approval and urge their support. It might be useful to have Bill Luers come to Washington on Monday or Tuesday so that we can give him a full briefing. Alternative would be for me to return to Managua via Caracas to brief CAP. Under this option I would like to have Southcom pick me up in Caracas, fly me to the zone to brief Gen. McAuliffe, and then on to Managua by Thursday⁷ morning at the latest.

8. Request instructions on my return for consultation.⁸

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1786. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José.
2. In telegram 6237 from Managua, December 1, the Embassy included the Spanish-language text of the PLN response to the Negotiating Group’s plebiscite proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. In telegram 6239 from Managua, December 1, the Embassy included an unofficial transcript of Somoza’s remarks, made before Somoza read the text of the PLN statement concerning the Negotiating Group’s plebiscite proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua VIII)
4. See footnote 2, Document 152.
5. See footnote 2, Document 132.
6. See footnote 4, Document 118.
7. December 7.
8. In telegram 304597 to Managua, December 1, the Department authorized Bowdler to return to Washington for consultation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496–1037)