Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

155. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 30, 1978

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua Update

Today the FAO announced that it would accept the NG’s plebiscite proposal, with several conditions,² the most important of which were: Somoza would have to be absent from the country during the period prior to the plebiscite as well as the Commander of the National Guard; the National Guard, itself, must be confined to barracks 15 days prior to the vote; and all Nicaraguans living abroad must be given the chance to vote.

Rudolfo Robelo and his leftist group could not agree to the plebiscite and apparently have withdrawn from the FAO.

Venezuelan President Perez had contacted the FAO leadership yesterday and urged them to approve the plebiscite proposal—to be “audacious” in order to seize the initiative and approve the plan before Somoza reached a decision.

We remain in the dark on Somoza’s response. The PLN recommended that he take up NG’s offer to discuss and clarify the proposal. In meetings with his Cabinet and PLN leadership he seemed more confident than at earlier times. He referred to a phone call of support from Paraguay’s President Stroessner, the $20 million loan approved by the Central American Monetary Council, and a call from a high-ranking official from Washington (Congressman Murphy?).

Bowdler delivered the strongly worded demarche and Somoza seemed to take it in stride,³ though he did complain that it seemed unusually harsh to be presented to a friend of the U.S. Somoza spoke of a “dignified” departure and stated that he preferred the plebiscite option over that of outright resignation. As to the terms of the plebiscite, he still held out for his first proposal of one organized to assess the strength of the various political parties.

Bowdler was left with the strong impression that Somoza was not convinced of the firmness of the U.S. position concerning the plebiscite plan as proposed by the N.G. Nor was he sure of the strength of our resolve to alter drastically our relations with his government should he refuse to go along with the plebiscite. Bowdler concluded that we need to take steps, such as formally cutting off AID or removing the MILGRP, to correct Somoza’s erroneous impression.

I had an interesting converstion this evening with Adolfo Calero, who manages Coca-Cola’s interests in Nicaragua and is a leader in the FAO. Among the observations he made were: (1) Congressmen Wilson and Murphy detracted from the U.S. mediation effort in Nicaragua; their public statements created confusion in the minds of many common Nicaraguans as to where the U.S. stood;⁴ (2) he believed the “show of force” employed by the NG in its insistence that both sides reconsider the plebiscite was exactly what was needed to get them to consider the plan seriously; and (3) the U.S. needs to be careful not to be caught in another “Bay of Pigs” situation. The U.S. assumed a responsibility when it determined to act as a mediator in Nicaragua; expectations were raised. Should the effort falter, the U.S. cannot leave before a solution is found.

The comment on “Bay of Pigs” was interesting, and it reminded me of a comment by Cardenal last Saturday.⁵ When I prodded Cardenal that some people in the FAO might invite U.S. troops if they thought that would help, he responded sharply, by saying that the only thing that could drive him into the arms of the Sandinistas, seeking a violent solution, would be U.S. military intervention.

I pressed him on the reasonableness of the conditions the FAO had attached to its acceptance of the plebiscite, e.g., the demands that Somoza absent himself from Nicaragua prior to the plebiscite and that the National Guard be confined to barracks 15 days before the vote. He argued strongly that given the long history of Somoza’s oppressive rule, with the Guard as his instrument of power, it was difficult for Nicaragua to believe that a truly democratic vote could be taken with Somoza being present. Using the analogy of a Corporation Board of Directors, Calero said that on questions touching upon the person of a board member, that member would be expected to voluntarily leave the room while the matter was discussed and voted upon. On the National Guard issue, he said that an OAS peacekeeping force could replace it if necessary.

Just received word that Somoza accepted the plebiscite. We have not yet heard his conditions, but we can be reasonably certain that Bowdler and company will be bouncing back-and-forth for a while more.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/23–30/78. Secret.
2. See footnote 3, Document 154.
3. See Document 153.
4. See Document 142.
5. November 25.
6. See Document 156.