Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

230. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹ ²

Washington, October 14, 1970

SUBJECT:

• My Recent Conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin

My four recent meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, twice on September 25 and October 6 and October 9, were clearly very significant in the short term and potentially very important for our overall relations with the Soviet Union. I thought it would be useful if I reviewed the highlights of these sessions. The full records are attached in chronological order at Tabs A through D along with our note to them on the Cuban base issue and their note to us on the Middle East.

I plan to send you shortly a separate memorandum setting forth some of the implications I see flowing from these conversations.

In brief these meetings produced the following results:

• —We appear to have resolved, without a public confrontation, the potentially explosive issue of a Soviet base in Cuba;
• —There was a clear demonstration of Soviet interest in pursuing a Middle East settlement as well as a denial of any Soviet bad faith with regard to the standstill ceasefire;
• —We agreed in principle to a Summit meeting in Moscow in June or September 1971; and
• —There was a recognition on both sides that we are at a crossroads with respect to US-Soviet relations.

Soviet Base in Cuba

Our concern over this issue was the principal theme in my presentations during these sessions and its apparently satisfactory resolution was, of course, the most concrete outcome. In our first session on September 25 this subject did not come up but was behind my firm tone with regard to our overall relations while I singled out Soviet actions in the Middle East.

Later in the day the details about the Soviet Cuban base were released by the Defense Department and I then elaborated upon the issue at my press backgrounder on your trip, along the lines of interdepartmental contingency guidance. Thus, while the ostensible purpose of our meeting on the afternoon of September 25 was to discuss a Summit meeting, Dobrynin was obviously preoccupied with the Cuban base question, and I moved to make our position clear on the subject. I explained that we had deliberately inferred in our public statements that we did not know whether there was an actual submarine base in Cuba in order to give the Soviets a chance to withdraw without a public confrontation. We had no illusions and knew that there was already a submarine base there and I told Dobrynin that we would view it with the utmost gravity if the construction continued and the base remained. We did not want a public clash and were giving them, an opportunity to pull out, but we would not shrink from necessary measures if we were forced to do them. I added that we considered the following up of Vorontsov’s August 4 demarche with construction in Cienfuegos as an act of bad faith, but if the ships, especially the tender, left we would treat the whole matter a training exercise.

Dobrynin asked if we believed that the 1962 understanding had been violated. I responded that this was a legalistic question, that I did believe it was a violation, but that in any event in 1962 we had taken the most drastic action even though there was no understanding. Dobrynin said he would report this to his Government and give us an answer soon. In response to his question I said that we did not plan a big press campaign, but we were determined that there would be no Soviet base in Cuba. Whatever the phraseology of the understanding, its intent was clearly not to replace land-based missiles with sea-based ones in Cuba.

Dobrynin informed me on October 9 that Moscow had come back with a quick reply which he stated he was unable to give me until we returned from your trip. The Soviet note on Cuba said that they had received “with attention” your communication indicating uncertainty in your mind concerning the 1962 understanding. They welcomed your reaffirmation that we would stick with our side of the understanding, and stated that the Soviet Government in turn proceeded from this understanding. They said that they had not and were not doing in Cuba anything that would contradict that understanding.

They would continue to adhere to it if we would. They added that they considered groundless our assertion that we had the right to send atomic submarines into the Black Sea, claiming this is prohibited by the 1936 Convention. Dobrynin said that his government could not promise that the Soviet subs would never call at Cuban ports, but he said that they would not call there in an operational capacity.

I told him I considered this a forthright statement and said that we would have some clarifying questions on this issue because of the ambiguity of the term “base” and possible major disagreements concerning it. I said that we considered the presence of ships at Cienfuegos, especially the tender and barges, clearly inconsistent with the 1962 understanding.

At the October 9 meeting, called at my initiative, handed Dobrynin our note on the installations in Cuba (Tab E) to tie down our understanding. Dobrynin said that the only point which seemed bothersome was on communications facilities, that he would await further instructions from Moscow, and that Tass would soon publish a statement which would repeat in effect their October 6 note, denying any Soviet intent to establish a base in Cuba. I said that we would judge their actions by the criteria of our oral note. Later in the conversation Dobrynin started to say that the Cuba situation was not clear, to which I replied that we should not kid ourselves and that both he and I knew what was there.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Cuba.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Attachments A through D are attached but not published.
2. Kissinger’s account of multiple discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, including discussion of the submarine base at Cienfuegos, during meetings on September 25, October 6, and October 9.