Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

123. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to Director of Central Intelligence Bush¹ ²

Washington, March 15, 1976

SUBJECT:

• Assessment of the Damage Resulting from Soviet Interception of Domestic Telecommunications

Soviet interception of our telephone microwave links seems to be a larger problem than first appreciated. In particular, we have verified that activities are being carried out in Washington and in a fairly broad area in the New York City area region, and we believe but have not yet confirmed that operations are being conducted in San Francisco. Given the compactness of the intercept equipment, these activities may well be expanded into other cities and areas in the US. As our comprehension of Soviet interception has increased, it has become clear that their targets are fairly broadly distributed in both the government and private sectors. In addition to targeting of sensitive government communications and security-related communications between government contractors, there are many examples of Soviet interest in the activities of our financial, transportation, industrial and other sectors.

Actions are underway to deny the Soviets access to critical government conversations in the Washington area. Planning and R&D are being carried out to secure all microwave links in Washington and possibly in a few other vulnerable cities, and provision of narrow-band end-to-end secure service is being considered. The threat, however, may be running ahead of our remedial activities.

Certain major decisions will have to be made as to how far the US should go in securing the national telecommunication system. Securing communications against interception on a national scale incurs very significant costs, in financial and other terms, which must be weighed against the known risks.

Before considering this decision it will be necessary for the President to have the best possible estimate as to the damage we may be suffering —in the government, government contractors, and commercial sectors—from the Soviet intercept activities or reasonable projections of these activities. The damage from these activities would have to be sufficient to warrant the costs of a broad solution.

Such a damage assessment is obviously difficult, as well as being sensitive. It may prove inconclusive. The attempt must be made, however, so that the President can base his decisions on all relevant considerations and best possible estimates.

I request that you undertake this assessment in coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency over the next two months, so that the results can be incorporated in the study and decision paper that is being prepared for the President.

William G. Hyland

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject Files, Box 1, Communications (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Director of the National Security Agency. At the bottom of the last page, Hyland wrote, “George, I’m not sure CIA is real action agency, but Intelligence Community as a whole should be involved.”
2. Hyland explained the rationale behind his request that Bush conduct an assessment of the damage resulting from Soviet telecommunications intercepts.